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ABSTRACT 
The last two decades have witnessed increased con-
cern about economic development. The endeavours in the 
struggle against underdevelopment have led to some successes 
and achievements. However, problems of underdevelopment and 
poverty remain unsolved. 
The countries in the third world would find better 
pro~pects for their development in instituting large, coherent, 
regional economic systems. This is so because integration 
would create for them larger markets for a greater productive 
capacity. 
The West African leaders seem to understand that their 
condition of underdevelopment compels them to adopt a program 
of economic integration that would promote development. 
However, up to the present time, the West African nations 
have had very little success even with the planning stages 
for economic integration, and the future is uncertain. The 
advantages that a regionally integrated market offers West 
Africa are considerable. 
This study is an inquiry into the problems of inte-
gration in West Africa and the contributions a fourteen-
country economic community would make to the development of 
the region, and needless to say, the individual countries. 
West African nations are reluctant to take part fully 
i 
in this regional undertaking. They seem to be paying only 
lip-service to the formation of a regional economic community. 
The difficulties they consider serious problems are for the 
most part minor obstacles that would be wiped away as they 
start implementing a programme of coherent integrated develop-
ment that would secure benefits for each sovereign state. 
Economic integration once begun, it can be argued, is likely 
to soften some of the political rivalries that stand in the 
way of economic development. 
There are a number of benefits to be gained by re-
gional integration: larger markets and better opportunities 
for regional specialization, a protected environment for 
growth of infant industries. This study presents a list of 
industries that are capable of development within the con-
text of a West African Economic Community and tries to sug-
gest the proper regional location for some of these 
industries. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A) WORLD-WIDE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The race for economic development can be conceived 
of as a struggle for a higher standard of living. In this 
sense, it is possible to state that the search for economic 
development dates back to the origin of man. There is ample 
evidence that shows man to have striven to improve his con-
ditions of life. Economic development as a subject of sys-
tematic study can be traced to Adam Smith. Since Adam 
Smith, the interest in economic development has varied. How-
ever , the intense interest in economic development on a 
world scale is a phenomenon of the last quarter of a century. 
Subsequent to the Second World War, a large scale program 
of reconstruction was undertaken in Europe. 
Before long, interest in economic development spread 
to the rest of the world. This interest was reinforced by 
improved world- wide transportation and communication, by 
ideological conflict and political competition between the 
great powers, and by the ris i ng expectations engendered by 
political elites in the emerging countries. Not only the 
national leaders who called attention to the possibility of 
economic development but also international leaders, before 
long, started to feel the p ressures exerted. National, in-
ternational, and intergovernmental organizations intended 
to promote development emerged on the world scene. The 
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increase in development banks in the different countries 
can be taken as a good example at the national level. 
within the framework of the family of nations, various 
assistance programs were devised to help the third world, 
financially as well as technically. For instance, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) , 
better known as the World Bank, has extended loans for 
development projects throughout the world. 
AID, the American Agency for International Develop-
ment; FAC, the French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation; and 
EDF, the European Development Fund, to cite but a few of 
the more prominent institutions, have made considerable 
contributions. The resource flow from the more advanced 
market economies and multilateral agencies, between 1960 
and 1968, is given in table 1-l below. 
Table 1-1 
Capital Flow to Developing Countries: Net Official Flow of 
External Resources from Developed Market Economies and 
Multilateral Agencies 
Year Millions of US $ 
Total Latin Africa Asia Unalloca-
Arner- ted and 
ica inter-
regional 
1960 4219 289 1482 2304 144 
1961 4920 768 1654 2297 201 
1962 5374 856 1778 2488 252 
1963 5920 1095 1663 2859 303 
1964 5935 988 1761 2976 210 
1965 6228 995 1701 3330 202 
1966 6374 1180 1591 3349 254 
1967 6897 1177 1601 3864 256 
1968 6716 1251 1562 3471 432 
Source: UN-Statistical Yearbook 1969. 
New York, 1970. p. XXX. 
As % of Total 
Latin 
Ameri-
ca 
7.1 
16.3 
16.7 
19.5 
17.3 
16.5 
19.3 
17.7 
19.9 
Africa 
36.4 
35.0 
34.7 
29.6 
30.8 
28.2 
26.0 
24.1 
24.9 
Asia 
56.5 
48.7 
48.6 
50.9 
52.0 
55.3 
54.7 
58.2 
55.2 
Twenty First Issue. 
3 
The flow of resources from the Socialist bloc, though 
less in importance when measured in absolute figures, is not 
insignificant. The situation in the nineteen-sixties is 
summarized in table 1 - 2. 
Table 1 - 2 
capital Flow to Developing Countries: Commitments of 
Bilateral Economic Assistance of Centrally Planned 
Economies 
Year Millions of US $ As % of Total 
Total Latin Africa Asia Latin Africa Asia . 
Amer- Amer-
ica ica 
1960 868 414 454 47.7 52.3 
1961 1005 270 314 421 26.9 31.2 41.9 
1962 316 55 261 17.4 82.6 
1963 341 242 99 71.0 29.0 
1964 1246 874 372 70.1 29.9 
1965 646 15 247 384 2.3 38.2 59.5 
1966 1313 100 46 1167 7.6 3.5 88.9 
1967 621 107 420 94 17.2 67.6 15.1 
1968 758 20 223 515 2.6 29.4 68.0 
1969 560 30 38 492 5.3 6.8 87.9 
Source: UN- Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty First Issue. 
New York, 1970. p. XXX. 
The underdeveloped nations often have the atti t ude 
that aid should be given to them as compensation for the 
abuses of imperial domination. On the other hand, the more 
developed nations frequently evoke humanitarian reasons in 
support of their actions, whereas they may be motivated by 
reasons of self- interest such as the wish to maintain or 
expand export markets and insure sources of raw materials 
or influence world affairs. They all would state the pro-
motion of free societies and rising standards of living as 
4 
their objectives. 1 
The Soviet Union did not sit idle while the West 
was spreading its ideology of capitalistic development 
among the emerging countries. By the mid-nineteen fifties, 
the Soviet Union decisively entered the race, and the 
assistance programs were strengthened as important instru-
ments in the battle of the cold war. The preaching of 
capitalism and socialism as effective means of development 
was intensified on both sides. 
In the race to pull the emerging countries to either 
the capitalist or the socialist camp, modern technology has 
made it very easy to reach most distant areas of the globe. 
The radio and the press have been extensively used as effec-
tive means of propaganda. 
Very few leaders in the less developed nations 
understood the many advantages the cold war offered them to 
play the large industrial powers against each other in their 
requests for assistance. Few took advantage of the oppor-
tunities, while the majority of them categorically aligned 
themselves behind one particular bloc characteristically for 
security reasons, and thus became slaves to a particular 
ideology. 
1. Rubin, Seymour J.: The Conscience of the Rich Nations: 
The Development Assistance Committee and the Common Aid 
Effort. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations 
by Harper and Row, Publishers. New York and London. 
Copyright (c) 1966 by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 
p. 5. 
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In the quest for development, planning became im-
portant even in the non- socialist countries. The general 
attitude is to consider planning as being indispensable 
for development. Planning was seen as a deus ex machina 
which would bring development and spread it all over the 
national territory. In the emerging countries where inde-
pendence was being won, the interest in economic develop-
ment manifested itself in the adoption of national develop-
ment plans. 
Planning, in addition to the guarantee it seems to 
offer for a high rate of balanced economic development and 
growth, became a symbol of sovereignty and modernism in the 
third world. 
Also, in some instances, it became a condition for 
a relatively easy foreign aid. 
Raising the question whether planning should be 
made a condition for development or development assistance 
is not necessary. 
The question worth raising here is how much the stan-
dards of living all over the world have improved since the 
beginning of world - wide interest in economic development. 
At first approximation, it can be observed that after a 
quarter of a century of efforts both on the national and the 
international levels, there have been some achievements and 
successes. The general conditions of living in the less 
developed countries have improved. However, the problem of 
economic development as a whole still remains unsolved. 
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There are, of course, limitations to measuring and 
comparing the incomes of the less developed countries. But 
if the term "underdeveloped" is used to describe countries 
where "per capita real income is low when compared with the 
per capita real incomes of the United States of America, 
canada, Australia, and Western Europe" 1 , then it follows 
from Table 1 - 3 that a fair range of countries are very poor. 
And worse than that, a fair range of countries are getting 
poorer by international standards. In fact, between 1958 
and 1967 the per capita income in the United States of 
America went up by $1,195, going from $2,115 to $3,310, 
whereas in Latin America, the same indicator increased by 
only $81 for Peru; $132 for Brazil; and $79 for Columbia. 
In Asia, the increase was only $9 for India ($64 to $73); 
$50 for Pakistan, going from $62 to $112; $14 for Burma 
($53 to $67); and $4 for Indonesia, going from $82 to $86. 
On the African continent, the United Arab Republic regis-
tered a $45 mcrease; Ghana, a $69 increase. A peculiarity 
with Ghana on the continent is that in 1958, the per capita 
income was $140. It increased to $233 in 1965 and to $265 
in 1966 to fall down to $209 in 1967. On the same continent, 
the Ivory Coast saw her per capita income increase by $89, 
going from $123 to $212 over the period under consideration. 
1. Higgins, Benjamin: Economic Development - Principles, 
Problems, and Policies. Copyright (c) 1959 by W.W. 
Norton and Company, Inc. p. 6. 
TABLE 1-3 
Estimates of Total and Per Capita National Income 
and Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost 
(Selected Countries and Years) 
Continent Type of Total Per Capita 
and Estimate 
Countries (a) 1963 1958 1965 1968 1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Millions of dollars Dollars 
Europe: 
United Nl A 52,331 80,473 80,216 1,013 1,303 1,478 1,544 1,586 1,451 
Kingdom GDP 56,345 86,541 86,971 1,091 1,400 1,590 1,668 1,715 1,573 
Germany Nl A 45,025 86,357 101,227 829 1,254 1,463 1,528 1,519 1,682 
GDP 50,000 98,410 116,025 921 1,420 1,667 1,750 1,752 1,928 
France Nl A 38,207 74,524 '96,216 853 1,322 1,528 1,642 1,752 1,927 
GDP 42,402 84,457 109,786 947 1,487 1,732 1,866 1,999 2,199 
Italy Nl A 23,443 47,464 60,164 478 763 920 992 1,075 1,149 
GDP 25,917 52,149 66,299 528 841 1,011 1,088 1,178 1,257 
Asia: 
Pakistan Nl A 5,482 9,725 13,241 62 82 95 108 112 121 
GDP 5,889 10,423 14,203 66 88 101 116 121 130 
India Nl A 26,459 43,230 64 78 89 75 73 
GDP ... 28,223 46,128 • 0 • 69 83 95 80 77 0 • 0 
• •• 2 
TABLE 1-3 
(cant.) 
Continent Type of Total Per Capita 
and Estimate 
Countries (a) 1963 1958 1965 1968 1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Millions of dollars Dollars 
Asia: 
Burma Nl A 1,134 1,502 1,763 53 59 61 59 59 67 
Indonesia Nl A 7,333 8,151 9,659 82 74 78 80 80 86 
Thailand Nl A 1,936 3,268 4,617 80 98 106 123 127 137 
America: 
United Nl A 369,962 568,424 719,196 2,115 2,562 2,921 3,175 3,310 3,578 00 
States GDP ... 412,873 629,06~ 796,636 2,361 2,855 3,233 3,521 3,679 3,960 
Canada Nl A 25,732 35,878 46,677 1,503 1,602 1,830 1,990 210 85 2,247 
GDP 30,281 42,362 54,449 1,266 1,892 2,161 2,341 2,451 2,621 
Peru Nl A 1,542 2,540 3,145 163 202 218 228 244 246 
GDP 1,665 2,759 3,427 176 222 23il 250 266 268 
Brazil Nl A 9,150 15,578 ... 139 225 193 232 271 
Colombia Nl A 2,733 4,439 189 227 246 256 268 
Africa: 
Egypt Nl B 2,730 4,739 111 140 161 161 156 
GDP A 2,723 4,883 110 143 166 167 161 
(cant.) 
TABLE 1-3 
(cont.) 
Continent Type of 
and Estimate 
Countries (a) 1963 1958 1965 1968 1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Millions of Dollars Dollars 
Africa: 
Kenya Nl B 525 835 1,092 69 87 89 101 103 107 
GDP A 583 926 1,206 76 96 99 112 115 118 
Ghana Nl B 898 1,801 1,661 140 188 233 265 209 198 
GDP A 979 1,983 1,838 152 207 256 289 230 219 
1..0 
Ivory Coast N1 A 379 735 123 163 192 205 212 
GDP ... 406 816 131 179 213 223 231 . .. 
Senegal Nl B 475 617 676 160 168 177 182 174 183 
GDP A 517 668 727 174 183 192 197 188 197 
Source: UN: Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty First Issue - New York 1970. 
(a) Nl refers to National Income and GDP to Gross Domestic Product. 
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In senegal, the increase was only $14 ($160 to $174), while 
in Kenya, it was $34 ($69 to $103). 
If these statistical figures can be relied upon, 
then it follows that the increase in the per capita income 
in. the United States of America (where this indicator was 
the highest at the beginning of the period) was larger than 
in any other country considered. What this greater increase 
in the American per capita income indicates is that the 
United States is still developing, and better than that, the 
United States is developing faster than the so-called devel-
oping countries. 
This observation is equally true for other more ad-
vanced industrial countries. They are developing more rapid-
ly than the developing nations. In the United Kingdom, the 
increase was $573. Here, the per capita income increased 
from $1,013 to $1,586. In Germany, it increased from $829 
to $1,519, that is a total increase of $690. In France, it 
went from $853 to $1,752r that is a total increase of $899. 
In Canada, it went from $1,503 to $2,085, thus registering 
a total increase of $582. 
In view of the fact that in some instances GNP per 
capita is not an adequate index of economic well-being , it 
is in order to take a short look at some other indexes. 
Even there, a miracle cannot be expected from the under-
developed world. The following set of tables, related to 
health, education, and manpower reveals this very well. 
TABLE 1-4 
Health ~ Hospital Establishments and Health Personnel 
Latest Available Year - (Selected Countries) 
Hospital Establishments Health Personnel 
Popu-
Popu- lation 
lation Per 
per Physi- Physi- Den- Pharma- Mid-
Country Year Total Beds Bed Year cians cian tists cists Nurses wives 
Africa 
Dahomey 1962 179a 2,331 930 1966 77 31,300 ... . . . • •• ~ 
Gambia 1966 5 488 690 1966 18 18,670 1 • • • b 240 67 ~ 
Ghana 1966 154 10,296 770 1966 597b 13,310 39b 341 3,010b 747b 
Guinea 1966 58 6,843 530 1967 88 42,070 9 9 964 145 
Ivory 
62c Coast 1966 . . . 7,672 510 1966 218 17,980 8 1,624 123 
Liberia 1967 32 2,181 510 1965 96 11,150 14 13 299 67 
Mali 1966 114 3,474 1,330 1966 91 50,710 6 8 1,231 84 
Mauritanial965 18 282 3,720 1965 35 30,000 ... 2 . . . ... 
Niger 1966 55 2,553 140 1967 66 56,140 5 7 465 22 
Nigeria 1966 1,163 27,318 2,190 1967 1,982b 31,000 68b 713 11,097 11,714b 
Senegal 1967 83a 4,997a 720 1968 217 16,980 23 51 1,017 202 
Sierra 
Leone 1963 30 1,895 1,210 1965 144 16,440 9 10 262 71 
Togo 1966 16a 2,272a 740 1967 87 19,820 5 17 307 78 
Upper 
Volta 1967 4la 2,144 2,360 1967 68 74,320 3 10 1,290 40 
(cont.) 
TABLE 1-4 
(cont.) 
Hospital Establishments Health Personnel 
Country Year Total Beds 
Popu-
lation 
Per 
Bed Year 
Physi-
cians 
opu-
lation 
Per 
Physi-
cian 
Den-
tists 
Pharma-
cists Nurses 
Mid-
wives 
America 
Canada 
United 
States 
Brazil 
Peru 
Asia 
1966 1,449 211,601 
1967 
1967 
1967 
7,172 1,671,125 
3,238 294,083 
282 29,510 
90 1967/68 23,353 
120 
290 
420 
1967 
1966 
1967 
305,453 
39,732 
6,223 
890 
650 
2,090 
1,990 
6,199 10,585 
98,670 122,420 
24,337 8,737 
1,948 1,987 
913,694 
23,597d 
3,708 
... 
950 I-' 
N 
India 1965 13,166 291,184 
33,309 
1,670 
3,560 
1966 
1967 
103,184b 
19,069b 
4,830 
9,890 
5,673 
328 
74,567 
388 
57,621 62,537 
4,16lb 905b Pakistan 1967 2,262 
Euro12e 
France 1965 1,097 
Germany, 
Fed. Rep. 1967 3,609 
Sweden 1966 722 
392,676 
649,590 
112,049 
120 
90 
70 
1967 
1967 
1967 
58,3ooe 
97,400 
9,240 
850 19,100e 26,900 
650 
850 
31,148 
6,130 
20,743 
2,700 
130,000 
128,712 
24,950 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty First Issue. New York 1970. pp. 673-676. 
(a) Government establishments only (administered by a governmental authority at any level, 
whether central, intermediate or local). 
8,300 
7,746 
1,910 
(b) Number of registered persons. Not all of them are resident (and working in the country 
(deaths, retirements, emigrations etc. are not always erased every year). Besides, in 
some countries registration is not compulsory and, therefore, a certain number of persons 
working in the ~ountry may not be counted. 
(c) Including nonJ...university level "pharmacists". 
(d) Personnel in the hospitals only. 
(e) Stomatologists and odontologists who are physicians (doctors in medicine) are included 
with physicians and not with dentists in France. 
World and 
Regions 
Africa 
North America 
South America 
Asia 
Europe 
Oceania 
d U.S.S.R. 
Estimated Total School Enrolment by Level of Education 
Year 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
1950 
1960 
1967 
a Total 
221,503 
323,587 
443,619 
9,328 
21,238 
32,758 
38,822 
59,244 
76,376 
11,619 
20,900 
31,651 
66,967 
110,691 
164,194 
56,966 
70,453 
81,775 
2,058 
3,306 
4,240 
35,743 
37,755 
52,625 
Number of Pupils Enrolled (thousands) 
First Second Third 
Level 
177,145 
248,486 
320,814 
8,511 
18,931 
28,028 
28,988 
43,201 
46,889 
10,158 
17,609 
24,759 
53,303 
87,236 
126,880 
42,899 
49,106 
51,729 
1,584 
2,403 
2,783 
31,702 
30 1 000 
39,746 
Level 
38,041 
63,927 
101,268 
745 
7.,115 
4,373 
7,377 
12,168 
21,826 
1,261 
2,874 
6,086 
12,658 
21,325 
32,724 
12,786 
19,285 
26,450 
419 
801 
1,241 
2,794 
5,359 
8,568 
Level 
6,317 
11,174 
21,538 
71 
192 
358 
2,458 
3,875 
7,661 
199 
417 
806 
1,007 
2,131 
4,590 
1,280 
2,061 
3,596 
55 
102 
216 
1,247 
2,396 
4,311 
Percentage 
Distribution 
First 
Level 
80.0 
76.8 
72.3 
91.2 
89.1 
85.6 
74.7 
72.9 
61.4 
87.4 
84.3 
78.2 
79.6 
78.8 
77.3 
75.3 
69.7 
63.3 
76.9 
72.7 
65.6 
88.7 
79.5 
75.5 
Second 
Level 
17.2 
19.8 
22.8 
8.0 
10.0 
13.3 
19.0 
20.5 
28.6 
10.9 
13.8 
19.2 
18.9 
19.3 
19.9 
22.5 
27.4 
32.3 
20.4 
24.2 
29.3 
7.8 
14.2 
16.3 
Third 
Level 
2.8 
3.4 
4.9 
0.8 
0.9 
1.1 
6.3 
6.5 
10.0 
1.7 
2.0 
2.6 
1.5 
1.9 
2.8 
2.2 
2. 9 
4.4 
2.7 
3.1 
5.1 
3. 5 
6.3 
8. 2 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty First Issue. N.Y. 1970. p. xxix. 
(a) Excluding pre-school and special education; adult education defined as such 
is not included; but in a number of countries, data on education at the 2nd 
level cover also evening and correspondence courses. 
(b) General, vocational and teacher training. Including evening and correspondence 
courses in a number of countries. 
(c) Excluding China (mainland), North Korea and North Vietnam. 
(d) General education at the 1st and 2nd levels, comprising eleven grades, was divided 
for 1950 and 1960 into grades 1-7 for the 1st level and grades 8-11 for the 
second level. In 1966 and 1967, grades 1-8 are considered as 1st level, and 
grades 9-11 as second level. 
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TABLE l-6 
Unemployme nt (Selected countries) 
Number and Percentage of Unernployeu - (thousands) 
country 
Argentina a 
% 
Canada 
% 
Belgium 
% 
France 
Code* 
A 
A 
E 
Germany, Fed.E 
Rep. % 
Ghana E 
Guinea D 
1953 
162 
3. 0 
l71.6d 
159.5 
1,258.6 
7. 5 
6.ld 
1963 
374 
5.5 
59.1 
2.7 
140.3 
174.2 
0.8 
15.4 
1966 
172.7 
5. 6 
267 
3.6 
61.5 
2.7 
147.7 
154.3 
0.7 
11.5 
0.2 
1967 
198.7 
6.4 
315 
4.1 
85.4 
3.7 
196.0 
444.6 
2.1 
18.7 
1968 
153.3 
5.0 
382 
4.8 
102.7 
4.5 
253.8 
313.6 
1.5 
17.6 
India D 4 7 7 . 6 2 1 6 0 5. 3 2 1 G 0 9 . 8 2,706.3 2,902.8 
Ivory Coast D 
Japan 
o. 
·o 
Kenya 
Hali 
Niger 
!\. 
D 
D 
Nigeria .. 
Sierra Leone of 
United King-
dom Eh 
United States A 
530 
1.3 
1.8 
356.3 
1.7 
1,834 
2.9 
0.4 
4~0 
0. 9 
8. 3 
0.2 
0.1 
16.8 
4. 4 
558.0 
2. 4 
4107 0 
5.7 
440 
0.9 
l 0. ~' 
0.1 
0.1 
28.6 
4 • 9 
361.0 
1.5 
2,~75 
3.8 
0. 4 
630 
1.3 
8.1 
0.2 
0.1 
20.0 
5.2 
558.8 
2.3 
L.,975 
J.8 
0. 4 
590 
1.2 
0.4 
0.1 
12.9 
5.5 
586.0 
2 . 5 
2181 7 
3. 6 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook 1969 - Twenty First Issue. 
N.Y. 1970, pp. 85-87. 
* A: 
0: 
E: 
(a) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
( f) 
( CJ ) 
(h) 
( i) 
( j ) 
( k) 
( 1) 
Labour force sam~le survey 
Registered applicants for work 
Reqistered unemployed 
Greater Buenos Aires only . 
~vholly unemployed rece iving insurance benefits. 
1954. 
Average of l e ss t~an 12 ~onths . 
Applicants for \·:ork re ·-; istered at thl~ ~!c.ritime 
P rior to 1960 , excluding l'\1.:-:s)~a un<~ !Ja\·Jall . 
Wholly un em9loyed . 
Ouagadongon and Bobo ~ioulasso. 
:1ales only. 
Prior to 1960, c xcludin--] 1\lc>.ska Clnc:i r:c:n·wij 
Scope of Series revised , beginnin g 1967 . 
Poo 1 . 
TABLE 1-7 
Manpower; Employment, excluding Agriculture.Inde~ Numbers: 1963 = 100 
(Selectad Countries) · 
Country Code a 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Austria B 93 96 98 99 101 102 103 102 101 
Belgium B 94 95 97 99 102 103 104 103 103 
Cameroon c 104 100 103 80 102 109 113 101 
Canada A 90 92 94 97 104 109 115 119 122 
CzechoslovakiaC 89 92 96 99 102 105 107 110 112 
France c 95 96 96 98 101 101 101 100 99 
Germany, 
Fed. Rep. c 94 96 98 99 101 102 102 99 100 
Ghana c 81 84 92 · 97 103 104 95 97 
Italy A 93 95 97 99 102 99 99 102 103 
Japan A 88 91 94 97 103 107 111 115 118 
Kenya c 110 112 108 107 100 101 96 
Nigeria c 105 113 95 120 123 126 
Peru 92 96 104 108 
Sierra Leone c 83 85 89 94 104 113 114 110 109 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty-First Issue. New York 1970. 
pp. 81-82. 
(a) Code: A = Labour force sample surve:ys 
B = Statistics of compulsory social insurance 
C = Statistics of establishments. 
f-1 
U1 
TABLE 1-8 
Education (Selected countries} 
Teaching Staff and Students, Ratio of Student to Teacher 
Public 
recurring 
Teaching Students expenditures Ratio of 
Country Type of Staff Enrolled on education Students 
Currency Unit Education Year Total Total (thousands} to Teacher 
Algeria 1st level 1966 30,666c 1,409,381. 396,398 46 (Dinar}a,b 2nd level 1966 7,658 147,455 170,813 19 
(Teacher-
training} 1966 (255} (4,062} (16} 1-' 3rd level 1966 9,272 56,890 
"' 
Dahomey 1st level 1967 3,445 139,734 837,936 41 
(Franc CFA}e 2nd level 1967 557 14,210 259,742 26 
(Vocational} 1967 ( 69} c (727} (55,589} ( 11} 
(Teacher-
training} 1967 (18} (129} (51,461} ( 7} 
3rd level 1967 115 9,516 
France a b f Pre-primary 1966 34,906c 1,884,325 795,502 54 
(Franc} ' ' 1st level 1966 177,800c 5,435,061 4,250,528 31 
2nd level 1966 200,898 3,370,475 6,498,629 17 
(Teacher-
training} 1966 (2,063) (31,293) (175,022) ( 15) 
3rd level 1966 531,750 2,972,418 
(cont.) 
Country 
Currency Unit 
Ghana 
(cedi)g,d 
India . 
(Rupee)g,J 
Ivory Coast 
(Franc CFA) 
TABLE 1-8 
(cont.) 
Teaching 
Type of Staff 
Students 
Enrolled 
Total Education Year Total 
Pre-primary 
1st level 
2nd level 
(Vocational) 
(Teacher-
training) 
3rd level 
Pre-primary 
1st level 
2nd level 
(Vocational) 
(Teacher-
training) 
Pre-primary 
1st level 
2nd level 
(Vocational) 
(Teacher-
training) 
3rd level 
General 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
443 
49,098k 
( 77 5) 
(1,200) 
672 
13,168 
1,288,383 
(17,587) 
(16,782) 
4,768 
1965 ..• 11,773,000 
1965 1,570,000 49,639,000 
1964 7,102,914 
1964 24,146 (440,183) 
1964 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
. . . 
8,818 
(203,312) 
2,085 
407,609 
42,169 
(3,571) 
(1,138) 
2,640 
(37,460) 
Public 
recurring 
expenditures 
on education 
{thousands) 
24,140 
28,865 
( 785) 
(14,928) 
23,214 
11,000 
1,263,000 
2,299,000 
(82,000) 
( . . . ) 
Ratio of 
Students 
to Teacher 
30 
26 
( 2 3) 
(14) 
7 
32 
(18) 
46 
(cont.) 
Country 
Currency Unit 
Kenya 
(pound) g 
Laos 
(kip)e 
Mali 
Type of 
Education 
1st level 
2nd level 
(Vocational) 
('reacher- . 
training) 1 
3rd level 
Pre-prirnaryc 
1st level 
2nd level 
(Vocational) 
(Teacher-
training) 
3rd level 
lst level 
~nd level 
(Vocational) 
(Teacher-
training) 
3rd level 
Year 
1968 
1968 
1968 
1·968 
1968 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
1967 
TABLE 1-8 
(cant.) 
Teaching 
Staff 
Total 
Students 
Enrolled 
Total 
37,923 1,209,680 
5,273 109,867 
(161) (1,872) 
(468) (6,634) 
395 4,967 
8 322 
5,119 196,751 
580 10,124 
181 (1,636) 
(1,636) 
(149) (2,198) 
. . . 348 
5,324 186,022 
589 6,206 
(304) (2,301) 
(114) (2,064) 
90 345 
Public 
recurring 
expenditures 
on education 
(thousands) 
8,000 
4,343 
(509) 
( 834) 
1,923 
994,872 
387,193 
(90,862) 
(19,404) 
122,254 
Ratio of 
Students 
to Teacher 
32 
21 
(12) 
(15) 
13 
41 
39 
18 
( 9) 
(15) 
35 
11 
( 8) 
(18) 
4 
(cont.) 
....... 
00 
TABLE 1-8 
(cont.) Public 
recurring 
Teaching Students expenditures Ratio of 
Country Type of Staff Enrolled on education Students 
Currency Unit Education Year Total Total (thousands) to Teacher 
N' . k 1st level 1967 57,866 1,778,976 12,319 31 1ger1a1 (pound) 2nd level 1967 9,011 172,776 7,971 19 
(Vocational) 1967 (986). (16,214) (1,116) (16) 
(Teacher-
training) 1967 (1,079) (19,310) (3,252) (18) 
3rd level 1967 1,281 8,076 4,362 6 
Peru Pre-primary 1967 1,450 62,592 43 1-' 
(sol) 1 1.0 1st level 1967 65,394 2,236,397 903,396 34 
2nd level 1967 33,387 511,173 316,150 15 
(Vocational) 1967 (8,254) (86,752) (118,297) 11 
3rd level 1967 11,649 101,099 196,260 9 
U.S.S.R. Pre-primary 1968 536,000 7,537,000 b 14 2,010,000 
(Rouble) 1st level 1968 2,345,000 49,125,000m 6,249,ooob,m 30 
3rd level 1968 ... 4,469,7oon 1,685,000b 
United States 1st level 1967 1,207,000 32,181,000 327,500,000 27 
(Dollar)q 2nd level 1967 909,000 18,006,000 ... 20 
3rd level 1967 . . . 6,911,748 8,800,000 
Source: UN-Statistical Yearbook 1969. New York 1970 (except the last column) pp. 716-40) 
(cant.) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h)' 
(i) 
( j ) 
(k) 
( 1) 
( m) 
( n) 
(p) 
(q) 
( r) 
TABLE 1-8 
(cont.) 
Expenditure of the Ministry of Education only. 
Expenditure data refer to 1967 
Data refer to public education only 
Including capital expenditure 
Expenditure of Central or Federal government only. 
Including overseas territories: Martinique, Guadeloupe, Reunion, and French Guinea 
Expenditure data refer to 1965. 
Teaching staff of junior secondary schools is included in the first level 
Teacher-training at the third level of education 
Including private expenditure on private education 
Data refer only to ~ ~out of 12 states 
Expenditure data refer to 1962 
Data on general education at the 2nd level are included with the lst level of education 
Including evening and correspondence courses 
Full time only 
Including debt service 
Including data for pre-primary education. 
N 
0 
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In Canada, the United States of America, and the 
western European countries shown in the tables above, the 
ratio of population to physician was well below 1,000 in 
1967 (unless otherwise indicated) . In South America, Asia, 
and Africa, this ratio was well above the 1,000 level 
throughout the decade. 
In the other fields, the third world is still lag-
ging far behind the more industrialized countries. The 
ratio of students to teacher is still very high for them. 
If any conclusion is to be drawn, it is a generali-
zation of the observation with regard to the increases in 
the per capita incomes. The more advanced countries are 
still developing and are developing faster than the poor 
countries. This conclusion, of course, does not overlook 
the fact already stated that some successes have been achieved. 
The standard of living in the less developed pre-industrial 
countries has been raised; but it still remains very low. 
The gap between the rich and the poor countries is still 
very wide. 
The answer then to the fundamental question, raised 
above with respect to the materialization of the world-wide 
interest in economic developmentm therefore that, on the 
whole, a great deal has been accomplished. Nevertheless, 
the problem of underdevelopment remains unsolved. 
Economic development itself, the phenomenon the 
world is said to have developed a special interest in over 
the last quarter of a century is a multi - dimensional process. 
22 
The following section is an attempt to bring to light its 
different aspects. Economic integration will be analyzed 
as an aspect of the development process. An attempt will 
be made to state an approach to developing the West African 
economies through integration. This approach is in effect 
an exposition of the contributions economic integration 
would make to the development of the region as a whole, 
and needless to say, of the individual countries. 
B) ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS AN ASPECT OF DEVELOPMENT 
Economic development, as was previously stated, is 
a multi - dimensional process. It means that the development 
of any country oriEgion of the world involves a variety of 
processes. Development is a function of numerous factors. 
It is not a mere economic phenomenon. It involves 
other aspects of culture. In other words, the economic 
aspect of development is closely linked to all other as -
pects of human activities. This is why the concept of de-
velopment is multi - dimensional. The concept of economic 
development is by nature moral, social, cultural, political, 
as well as economic. 
In this sense, the concept of development is similar 
to that of social evolution, and that of progress. It is 
an indivisible process that encompasses all aspects of life 
that can be improved. It is indivisible in so far as it 
implies the idea of progress. As Ayres says: progress is 
an "aggregative term. There can be small aggregates as well 
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as large ones, of course. We can speak intelligibly of a 
single individual's progress in learning to swim, or of a 
whole community's progress in physical fitness. By the 
same token, we can speak of human progress in general, 
meaning the broadest possible aggregate of all human ac -
tivities." 1 
The relevant point here is that " ... human progress 
consists in finding out how to do things, finding out how 
to do more things, and finding out how to do all things 
better ... ". 2 
If Ayres' view is a valid one, then the society that 
is said to be economically developing will be evolving in 
the course of time, discarding antiquated, inadequate prac-
tices , and adjusting to the exigencies of modernism to gen-
erate, probably from its defunct techniques, new modes so 
as to allow for the most efficient production of more goods 
and services that will assure its general well-being. In 
this sense, economic development goes hand in hand with the 
ever present move to achieve the most efficient modes of 
production that will make available the greatest variety of 
products to satisfy unlimited human wants. It is the improve-
ment, tangible and intangible, engendered through the multi-
efforts to satisfy limitless human wants which constitutes 
economic development. 
1. Ayres, C.E.: The Theory of Economic Progress; A Study 
of the Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cultural 
Change. Second Edition. Copyright (c) 1962 by Schocken 
Book Inc. Cf. Foreward - 1962, p. vi. 
2. Ibid. p. v. 
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Economic development as viewed above is an on-
going process that involves the whole activities of the 
community. 
For development to take place, all the forces in-
fluencing development have to be in motion, transacting in 
a progressive system. Among these forces, the cultural 
aspect of development, which somehow englobes the others, 
deserves a special attention. A kind of 'cultural revolu-
tion' must occur to clear the way for the institution of 
those conditions under which more goods and services can be 
produced. It does not mean that these cultures ought to be 
swept away and replaced by Western or other cultures. What 
is needed is the injection of flexibility and the establish-
ment of new institutions in these cultures to allow for the 
production of more goods and services, for the introduction 
of new commodities or techniques of production. 
In a culture where the appropriate financial insti-
tutions do not exist to channel the available funds for in-
vestment and, for example, funds are used for sumptuous 
funeral or wedding ceremonies, conditions do not exist for 
technological progress to permit the effective massive pro-
duction of those goods and services that can assure the well-
being of an ever-increasing population. 
What might be required for the flexibility to be in-
corporated within the social institutional framework is the 
emergence of social entrepreneurs to lead the necessary 
transformation of the communities. A social entrepreneur is 
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the agent who mobilizes local resources for productive uses. 
The social entrepreneur breaks tradition, h~nce he breaks 
impediments to progress. By so doing, the social entre-
preneur introduces changesm the community. 
With respect to the cultural aspect of development, 
it is important to note that development cannot be trans-
posed from culture to culture. Development arises within 
the culture itself. However, this does not mean that each 
culture should try to be self-contained. On the contrary, 
the more open a society is, the more flexible it is likely 
to be, hence the more progressive it becomes since it can 
benefit from the phenomenon of acculturation which is a 
fertile ground for progress. What this means is that de-
velopment is the product of the transaction between internal 
and external forces, propelling progress within a given 
social system. 
If development were transferable, the problem of 
underdevelopment would have been solved long ago. However, 
once again, the development process at any place generally 
requires external and internal factors. External factors 
such as foreign aid and technical assistance discussed ex-
tensively above should be designed solely to promote inter-
nal ones such as appropriate administrative schemes, a more 
qualified labour force etc ••• , appropriate to the social 
system concerned. What is important is that the internal 
forces be able to sustain development once it starts. 
Today, in the less advanced countries, the initiation 
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of development is left in the hands of governments. This is 
to say that as it is approached nowadays in the poor countries, 
development is an induced process. It is a process induced 
by the government which is seen as having the responsibility 
of generating it. However, it cannot be achieved by the 
government alone. It has to involve the society as a whole. 
All the government can do to promote development is what has 
been repeatedly said over the recent years, namely, that the 
government paves the way. The government can pave the way 
through the provision of the basic necessities, the infra-
structure as they are called. When the government provides 
the basic necessities, it requires ambitious men to make use 
of them. 
In the process of inducing development, close ties 
have grown between governments at the world level. That 
development today is a world economic problem has been 
dealt with extensively in the preceding section where it is 
also observed that national development plans are adopted 
almost everywhere to assure a balanced development. Jan 
Tinbergen 1 explains that the elaboration of these national 
development plans requires not only data of a national char-
acter, but also considerable information on the prospective 
development of other countries and of the world markets. 
1. Jan Tinbergen: International Economic Integration. 
Second , Revised, Edition. Elsevier Publishing Company, 
1965, p. 94. 
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"For this purpose and also for the purpose of creating the 
basis of an international economic policy, an international 
plan is needed ". The benefits of such a world development 
plan would be extensive. The plan would help toward a 
more efficient development of both the more developed in-
dustrial and the less developed pre-industrial countries. 
The above view of a world plan can be conceived of 
as a special form of integration. It points to the import -
ance of integration in the solution of the economic problems 
of the 'developing continents' . Before going further , it is 
in order to clarify the concept of integration as it will be 
used in this thesis. This is the purpose of the following 
section. 
C) THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Integration is an ambiguous 1 term, the definition 
of which must be approached with care. In everyday usage, 
it implies the idea of movement towards, the idea of merg-
ing heterogeneous entities into a homogeneous unit. In 
this sense , integration is conceived of as a process. This 
point will become clear from the discussion in the following 
paragraphs. 
Economic integration can hardly be dissociated from 
social integration. This is why Myrdal's concept of 
1. " Dans la hierarchie des mots obscurs et sans beaute dont 
les discussions economiques encombrent notre langue, le 
terme d'integration occupe un bon rang ' . Fran~ois Perroux: 
L ' Europe sans rivages (Paris : Presses Universitairsde 
France, 1954). 
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integration should be seriously considered. As approached 
by Myrdal, integration is a social and economic process 
which is, by its nature, not only an international phenome-
non as it~ generally taken to be, but alsa a national under -
taking or realisation. This social and economic process aims 
at demolishing social and economic barriers among hetero-
geneous entities so as to create a homogeneous environmental 
structure, or harmonious environmental conditions for their 
economic activities. To put it in Myrdal's own words, "The 
economy is not integrated unless all avenues are open to 
everybody and the remunerations paid for productive services 
are equal, regardless of racial, social and cultural differ-
ences " . 1 
In this study, the expression economic integration, 
once again, refers to the process of constructing an economic 
entity. This is to say that it is an attempt to bring differ -
ent economic units together into a single and a unique 
economic organisation. They would be intertwined in such a 
way that what previously existed and functioned as separate 
economies, would now operate as parts of a unique viable mar-
ket . Transactions between two individuals, no matter where 
they are located within the integrated market, would be more 
or less the same as transactions between individuals of the 
1. Myrdal, Gunnar : An International Economy, N.Y. 
1956, p. 11. 
Harper; 
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same national market. 1 
Bela Balassa would certainly not agree to view eco-
nomic integration chiefly in terms of a process. For the 
author of The Theory of Economic Integration, the expression 
refers to a process and a state of affairs. " •.. Regarded as 
a process", wrote Balassa, "it encompasses measures designed 
to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging 
to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, 
it can be represented by the absence of various forms of 
discrimination between national economies". 2 
Nicholas Plessz views the problem in a similar way. 
In Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration in West 
Africa 3 , the expression is said to be defined in two differ-
ent ways: 
Statically, the economic integration of an area 
can be taken to mean that the persistence of 
national borders within the area does ~ot have 
any effect on the structure of the economy or on 
location of economic activities. In other terms, 
not only is -the movement of goods and services 
not uninhibited by state boundaries, but also 
economic policies would not be influenced by the 
existence of different national units. 
This is clearly integration viewed as a state of affairs. 
And Plessz continues: 
1. Raymond Aron wrote: "Two different economic units may 
be said to be the more highly integrated when transactions 
between two individuals, one in each of the two units, 
most closely resemble transactions between two individuals 
in the same unit". cf. R. Aron in "Problems of European 
Integration". Lloyds Bank Review, April, 1953, p. 1 
2. Bela Balassa: The Theor-y of Economic Integration (c) 
1961 by Richard D. Irwin, Inc. p. l. 
3. Nicholas G. Plessz: Problems and Prospects of Economic 
Integration in West Africa. Montreal. McGill University 
Press. 1968 p. 2. 
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Dynamically, economic integration can be taken 
to cover all measures, arrangements and develop-
ment which aim at achieving economic integration 
as defined earlier. 
This is exactly what integration is as far as this study is 
concerned. It shall therefore concern itself with only the 
process aspect of the issue. 
Taken as a state of affairs, integration is the re -
sults of the measures , the arrangements Plessz talked about ; 
integration would imply an end to the dynamism of the process 
composed of the measures designed to abolish discrimination 
between the economic units concerned. This would represent 
the final stage of the process . In this sense, the term 
economic fusion should rather be used. An established free 
trade area, or even a customs union, as defined below, can 
hardly represent integration as a state of affairs . The 
persistence of national boundaries might still constitute 
an impediment to the location of economic activities. As 
long as the free movement of the factors of production is 
not provided for , discrimination will persist in a form or 
another. At those stages, it is the dynamic aspect of in-
tegration which applies. In other words, a free trade area 
or a customs union is not statically integrated. In conclusion, 
the term economic fusion should be used where integration is 
viewed as a state of affairs. The phrase economic integra-
tion refers better to the process leading to the fusion of 
national economies. It is worth adding that the nature of 
this study obliges the author to deal exclusively with 
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integration as a process. 
One other point which merits clarification before 
proceeding relates to Myrdal's concept of integ~ation. In 
the present study, integration is not analysed at national 
levels. The issue is raised at the international, i.e. 
regional or subregional level. However, it should be well 
understood that economic integration can be defined at the 
national level as well. The UN Economic Commission for 
Europe 1 once wrote that "No single country would be regarded 
as having a well-integrated economy as long as glaring dis-
parities persisted between the levels of development and 
standards of living in different areas within it". The only 
difficulty with this conception is the problem of the stage 
at which the regional disparities are no more glaring. It 
makes economic integration a value term which it should 
not be. 
The question of whether or not integration at the 
international level can be achieved if the various national 
economies remain disintegrated is not discussed here . It 
would be superfluous to do so. The concern is only at the 
international level. 
When integration is defined at a subregional or 
regional level, the dynamic element is reinforced. To 
1. Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
1953: Economic Survey of Europe since the war. p. 218. 
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integrate is to increase, on a given space, the planning 
'responsibility', the 'accountability' of a number of 
decision- making centres which are to form a unique economic 
system. 1 What is important is the idea of decision- making 
centres (centres de decision) going to form a common and 
unique economic system. Here is the issue : the problem 
involved in harmonizing the policies of decision-making 
centres. The term decision- making centre is much more ex-
pressive than economic entities or units for it reveals 
the dynamism of the transaction between the systems to be 
brought together. How to go about conciling the interests 
of these various decision-making centres is the problem. 
An adequate answer cannot be given to this question here. 
An attempt will be made to answer indirectly in the sub-
sequent sections when the issue of industrial coordination 
is discussed. However, it is probably appropriate to make 
it clear that integration being the merging of parts into 
a whole, a master plan must necessarily exist. 
When Paul G. Hoffman defined economic integration 
as " the formation of a single large market within which 
quantitative restrictions on the movements of goods, monetary 
1. Henry Bougignat: "Regionalisation, integration , copro -
duction " . Economie Appliquee, Tome XXII, 1969 n. 1 - 2. 
Here, Bourg1gnat 1nterprets Bye's concept of integration 
as follows: integrer, " c ' est accroitre, sur un espace 
donne , la comptabilite des plans d'un ensemble de centres 
de decisions a ppeles a former un seul systeme econo-
• II m1que ••• 
barriers to the flow of payments and, eventually all tariffs 
are permanently swept away " 1 , the size of the market was 
explicitly discussed. The issue of the size of the market is 
very important and its discussion might be undertaken in a 
later section. 
Thus conceived , integration can be distinguished 
from cooperation. A Clear cut distinction does not always 
appear among these two terms. Is integration a form of 
cooperation or the other way round? In its everyday usage, 
cooperation describes relations between sovereign nation 
states. A nation is not usually said to cooperate with it-
self. 
R. Triffin is said 2 to have taken the activities 
of the Organization for European Cooperation and the Pay-
ments Union as forms of economic integration. A discussion 
of this issue goes beyond the scope of this study. The idea 
is introduced here simply to show the different interpre-
tations of the concept of cooperation and integration. 
Different nation states taking part in economic 
integration are undergoing a process of becoming elements 
of a new whole. They become, in other words, subregions 
1. Paul G. Hoffman: The Speech before the Council of Econom-
ic Cooperation. Paris, October 31, 1949. cf. Jacob 
Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, N.Y. 1950, p. 132. 
2. R. Triffin: 
economique " . 
Integration " • 
"Convertibilit~ mon~taire et int~gration 
cf. Balassa : "Towards a Theory of Economic 
Kyklos vol. XIV, 1961, pp. 1 - 2. 
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while under cooperation, agreement might be reached on a 
particular or a specific form of economic activity. In 
other terms, under cooperation, different national economic 
units do not become parts of a whole. The different de -
cision making centres involved remain manifestly independent 
but carry out specific economic activities in line with 
policies agreed upon. To the extent that integration brings 
the partners closer to one another , it can be argued that 
cooperation is an early form of integration. 
It is a hard task to distinguish between economic 
integration and economic cooperation. However, within the 
framework of this study, the term integration will not be 
used to describe simple interactions as trade relations be-
tween independent economies on the world market. As long 
as there is no tendency, no action to destroy discrimination 
between the participating countries, the term integration 
shall not be used. Any undertaking to smooth the extent of 
discrimination in economic activities or particular economic 
activities shall be termed cooperation. This, it is to be 
added , is pretty close to Balassa's 1 distinction which states 
that 
1. 
•~ ... The difference is qualitative as well as quan-
titative. Whereas cooperation includes actions 
aimed at lessening discrimination, the process 
of economic integration comprises measures that 
entail the suppression of some forms of discrimin-
ation. For example, international agreements on 
Bela Balassa : The Theory of Economic Integration. Op. 
Cit. p. 2. 
35 
trade policies belong to the area of inter-
national cooperation, while the removal of 
trade barriers is an act of economic integration. 
Distinguishing between cooperation and inte-
gration, we put the main characteristics of the 
latter - the abolition of discrimination within 
an area - into clearer focus and give the con-
cept definite meaning without unnecessarily di-
luting it by the inclusion of diverse actions in 
the field of international cooperation." 
This distinction shall be maintained here. 
Different Stages in Economic Integration. 
Cooperation then is an early phase of integration. 
In light of this distinction, a preferential area would fall 
in the field of economic cooperation. Indeed, a preferen-
tial area exists where the participating members 
" ... agree to grant one enother more favourable 
tariff treatment than they give third countries. 
This does not mean that they abolish all tariffs 
on trade with one another but only that mutual 
tariffs are lower than the tariffs applied to 
imports from other countries. The difference 
between the two tariff levels is referred to as 
the margin of preference. 111 
A preferential area should be classified as a form of cooper-
ation for it aims at lessening discrimination and not at 
eliminating it. 
On the other hand, a free trade area, to the extent 
that participating countries eliminate entirely tariffs 
and other restrictions on their internal trade, falls in 
the first stages of economic integration. Only internal 
1. Sidney Dell: 
and Co. Ltd. 
Trade Blo·cs and Common Markets. Constable 
(c) 1963 Sidney Dell. pp. 76-77. 
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tariffs are removed. Each member of .a free trade area applies 
its own tariffs on imports from third countries. 
A customs union goes to further stages. In addition 
to abolishing tariffs and other restrictions among themselves, 
the partners in a customs union apply a common external 
tariff to the outside world. Needless to say, the revenue 
from the common customs duties and taxes would be allocated 
in accordance with a principle chosen and agreed upon. 
A common market goes still further and thus, in 
addition to all the dispositions of a customs union, provides 
for a free movement of the factors of production. 
A still more advanced stage of integration is an 
economic union. What distinguishes it from the preceding 
stage is that, beside the internal free movement u[ Ll1e 
factors of production, it undertakes to coordinate the 
economic, financial, and social policies of the different 
decision-making centres. Here, the term economic fusion ca·n 
be made use of; an economic union operates as a single and 
unique economic system in its relationship with the outside 
world. A single currency could be adopted and a common 
central bank could be established. 
These are the major stages involved in economic 
integration which deserve attention. If the definition given 
by the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is 
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maintained, then 1 
A free trade area shall be understood to mean a 
group of two or more customs territories in which 
the duties and other restrictive regulations on 
commerce are eliminated on substantially all the 
trade between the constituent territories in pro-
ducts originating in such territories. 
The problem of a free trade area thus defined is 
concerned with the differences in the levels of the different 
external tariffs applied to the outside world. What would 
prevent consumers or investors in the high tariff countries 
to import their final products or raw materials through the 
low tariff partner(s)? What wou1d prevent investors from es -
tablishing their firms in the more advanced partner cou ntry 
from where they can easily invade the rest of the area with 
their products? 
On the set of problems a free trade area can give rise 
to , the definition of GATT is explicit for instead of stating 
that obstacles to internal trade are removed , it makes it 
clear that the elimination occurs with products originating 
in the territories concerned. It is nonetheless true that 
the problems persist. To prevent them , ways and means have 
been found to set limits to these abnormal possible practices. 
These ways and means simply complicate the tariff administra -
tion. The origin and/or destination of the commodities have 
to be ascertained. The problem with origin is the stage of 
1. GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Do~uments, Vol. 1 , 
Part III, Article XXIV, Sec. 8 !b). 
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its transformation at which a product can be said to origi -
nate from country B rather than £rom country A, where the 
first transformation took place. That is the problem of 
value added. The whole principle around which centres the 
issue is that the area products are traded duty free within 
the union. The rule based on the calculation of value added 
to remedy the deficiencies of a free trade area is generally 
known as the percentage rule. 
Another rule, that of transformation, regards a 
member country as the origin of a product when the relevant 
process, among the production processes previously agreed up-
on, takes place within its boundaries. 
These and many other rules have been discussed in 
the literature on free trade area. None of them can be said 
perfect. But w~thout measures against the deflections, im-
ports, and possibly exports, would go through the lowest 
tariff partner. Only transportation costs would increase 
together with transit trade. 
A customs union , by essence, discriminates against 
the outside world. The definition given by GATT reads: 
A customs union shall be understood to mean the 
substitution of a single customs territory for 
two or more customs territories, so that (i) 
duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce are eliminated with respect to substan-
tially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union ... and, (ii) substitan-
tially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce are applied by each of the members of 
the union to trade of territories not included 
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in the union. 1 
This is clearly an incomp lete definition of a customs union : 
it does not include provisions concerning the repartition 
of the product of the customs duties. Even where they are 
levied for purely protective purposes , and/or might consti -
tute a tiny percentage of total public revenue (in the United 
states of America , this contribution is around only 1%), 
customs duties do constitute revenue anyway. The loss of 
this source of revenue should be accounted for in a clear 
concept of a customsunion. Furthermore, the distribution of 
the common revenue from customs duties can be a cause of 
serious disagreement among the partners. 2 
To go back to GATT, this international institution 
provides for a 'soft' discrimination against third countries 
by members of a customs union. The lev.el of the common ex-
ternal tariff applied to the outside world will not exceed 
the average of the tariffs prevailing in the member countries 
before the formation of the union. In general terms, trade 
controls should not be, on the average , more restrictive 
after the formation of the customs union than before. 
However, it might sound strange to read these defini-
tions of free trade area and customs union in the documents 
1. GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Vol. 1 
(Geneva , 1952), Part III, Article XXIV, SEc. 8 (a). 
2, This provision is made clear in Viner's concept. Cf. 
The Customs Union Issue. Carnegie Endowment for Inter -
national Peace, New York, 1950, p. 5. ff. 
40 
of GATT where the clause of the most favored nation is con-
sidered to be a useful and a widely appreciated provision. 
GATT exempts customs unions and others from this clause of 
most favored nation. The clause then applies within the 
union only. 
In a comparison of customs unions and free trade 
areas, it is clear that the former, from an economic point 
of view, are much better than the latter because they make 
necessary fewer trade and investment deflections and have 
generally lower tariff administrative costs. It was explained 
above that free trade areas, to the extent that the deflec-
tions have to be controlled, complicate the system of tariff 
administration. 
Undoubtedly, at both stages, the removal of restric-
tions on inter-state trade is very significant especially 
for countries where transit trade has an importance and does 
constitute a substantial source of public revenue. In a 
customs union, this source of revenue is cut off. In a free 
trade area, without the prohibition of the deficiencies pre-
viously discussed, the transit trade increases. This in-
crease, needless to say, occurs at the expense of the high 
tariff partner(s). 
On the whole, a free trade area is a domestic trade 
promoter; a customs union is a "fusion of the tariff inter-
est of two or more states", whereas an economic union is a 
fusion of two or more economic systems. 
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A customs union ma kes it possible for its members to 
trade freely among themselves and provides for protection 
for producers inside the union against competition from out-
'd 1 s1. e. It can be added that the protection is less, or 
rather loosely organized in a free trade area and that in 
an economic union, the producers belong to a completely har-
monized economic system. 
The various well known studies of economic integra-
tion deal mainly with customs unions. R. Lipsey defines the 
theory of customs u~ions as "that branch of ta~iff theory 
which deal with the effects of geographically discriminatory 
changes in trade barriers". 2 
At this stage of the discussion, it is worth noting 
the validity of Meade's observation regarding the evaluation 
of customs unions. It is practically impossible to pass 
judgement upon these economic groupings in general. " They 
may or may not be instruments for leading to a more economic 
use of resources. It all depends upon the particular circum-
stances of the case ... ". 3 
1. Johnson, H.G., Money, Trade, and Economic Growth, London 
1962, p. 47. 
2. Lipsey, R.G. "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General 
Survey". Economic Journal LXX 1960, p. 496. 
3. Meade, J.E. The Theory of Customs Unions, North Holland 
Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 107. 
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Some Issues in Economic Integration 
One of the major advantages of economic integration 
is the increase in the size of the market it secures. The 
example of the United States of America is usually given. 
It is often argued that the size of the market has provided 
for competition, for mass production, and hence standardiza-
tion of products. But is the consumer everywhere really 
better off in consuming standardized products! Certainly 
consumers somewhere might prefer non-standardized products! 
Aesthetics cannot enter the discussion; it goes beyong the 
scope of this study. 
Integration permits mass production, large scale 
operations. Another way of viewing the size of the market 
is that the larger the union, the more diversified the re-
sources are likely to be, and hence, the larger the number 
of large scale industries that are likely to be installed. 
The more varied the industries, the more prosperous the intra-
regional trade is likely to be. A.J. Brown expressed this 
idea in these terms: 
... The bigger the area, the more varied its 
resources, the larger the number of industries 
that have reasonable chances of growing within 
it to scales on which either they can stand 
foreign competition or, if they are to be pro-
tected permanently, the opportunity cost of pre-
serving them is fairly small. 1 
The success of a customs union then depends on its ability 
to install within its boundaries large scale industries 
1. Brown, A.J., "Economic Separatism versus a Common Market 
in Developing Countries. The Case of Customs Unions". 
Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research, 1959-62, 
n. 13. pp. 33-34. 
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capable of resisting foreign competition. 
The interest shown in large unions comes also from 
the belief that " the larger an economy, the more likely it 
is to be in a position to improve the terms on which it 
exchanges exports for imports through the exercise of mono-
poly power" . 1 
Jacob Viner 2 explains that 
the greater the economic area of a tariff unit, 
other things equal, the greater is likely to be 
the elasticity of its 'reciprocal demand' for 
outside products and the less is likely to be the 
elasticity of the 'reciprocal demand' of the 
outside world for its products, and consequently 
the greater the possibility of improvement in 
its terms of trade through unilateral manipula-
tion of its tariff. 
It follows from the fact that a tariff does not only divert 
consumption from foreign goods to domestic ones, but it also 
improves the terms of trade of the tariff-levying country by 
improving the rate at which its exports exchange for its 
imports that 'survive the tariff'. 
To the extent that a customs union widens the size 
of the new tariff territory, it increases the efficacy of 
the tariff by improving the terms of trade of the union 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
The larger the union, the larger the size of the 
market, and the higher the possibility open for a division 
l. Sidney Dell: Op. Cit. p. 52. 
2. Viner, J. Op. Cit . . p. 55. 
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of labour, for specialization, for efficiency in production 
resulting from this specialization. As Adam Smith said: 
"The division of labour is limited by the extent of the 
k t il 1 mar e · This is quite obvious if the size of the market 
is taken to mean the volume of production. 
It can be argued that the larger the union, the 
more chance there is of developing regional imbalances; the 
more chance there is for certain areas to be sacrificed for 
certain others. 
Regional disparities do not exist solely with large 
economies. Furthermore, the division of labour in a large 
union can hardly be denied. The arguments against large 
unions therefore are limited in their scope. 
According to Dell, economies of scale , or of mass 
production are those that arise where greater efficiency 
and lower unit costs can be achieved if total output is 
very large; economies of specialization are those that occur 
when countries concentrate upon those types of productive 
activities for which they are best suited by virtue of natural 
resources, capital endowment, or acquired skills. 
Large scale economies, engines of growth as Kaldor 
described 2 them, make it possible to develop industries up 
to their optimum size. 
1. cf. B. Balassa. Op. Cit. p. 101. 
2. Ewing, A.F., Industry in Africa, with a Foreword by 
Robert Gardiner. Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 15 
note 28. 
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Economic integration would not only lead to exter nal 
economies, economies of scale, or competition; it would also 
develop internal economies. 
Given certain industries, small countries cannot pro-
duce on a large scale: specialization being limited. Hence, 
the wider the market, the larger the economies of specializa-
tion that can be developed. 
On the whole, economies of large scale are not related 
o n ly to the size of the market. Many other factors need to 
be taken into consideration. Among these factors, the nature 
of the industries to be installed, the level of technology, 
and the resource endowment are the most i mportant. 
Before Viner developed the concept of trade creation 
and trade diversion, the reasoning was common that "free 
trade maximizes world welfare; a customs union reduces tariffs 
and is therefore a movement towards free trade; a customs 
union will, therefore, increase world welfare even if it does 
not lead to a world welfare maximum". 1 
A customs union can be evaluated in terms of its trade 
creating and trade diverting effects; that is, on balance, if 
the customs union has resulted in trade creation or in trade 
diversion. The term trade creation is generally used to de-
note the increase in trade among the participating members 
of a union as a result of the formation of the union whereas 
1. Lipsey, R.G. Op. Cit. p. 497. 
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trade diversion generally refers to a reduction in trade with 
third countries, due to the same phenomenon. It automatically 
comes to mind, as a partisan of Viner would put it, that 
trade creation is good whereas trade diversion is bad. It 
follows from the essence of human beings who always want to 
dispose of more wealth. 
One interesting aspect of these effects of trade 
creation and trade diversion is that, the higher the elas-
ticity of supply in the relatively low-cost partner, the 
larger the gains from trade creation. On the other hand, 
the higher the elasticity of supply in the low-cost foreign 
country, the larger the losses resulting from trade diversion. 
Under trade creation, the volume of trade at world 
level would increase. Under trade diversion, on the contrary, 
it can be argued that a reallocation of the existing volume 
of trade occurs. This 'inefficient' allocation of world 
resources sustains the inadequate (for the world) customs 
union. At world level, trade diversion can only be a negative 
factor affecting well-being. 
But the concept of trade creation and trade diversion 
deserves more attention than the simple formulation given 
above. Suppose that, because of an effective customs union 
in West Africa, the volume of trade among the members in-
creases, which is highly desirable. Suppose specifically 
that imports in Ghana (imports from her partners) increases. 
The increase might be at the expense of domestic production. 
This is to say that trade creation exists if members of a 
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customs union substitute, for their previously high cost pro-
ducts, the low cost products of other members within the union. 
The increase in Ghanaian imports might, instead, be at the 
expense of her trade with third countries. This is trade 
diversion. Trade diversion takes place where members of a 
customs union reduce their imports from low-cost suppliers 
outside the union and buy the same products from the union, 
but at higher prices. 
Trade creation and trade diversion thus understood, 
it is clear that with given countries producing the same 
range of commodities, the more different the comparative 
advantage enjoyed in each prospective member country, the 
more considerable the trade creation effects will be, for 
the partners will be able to rationalize their production. 1 
The more competitive the prospective members are, but po-
tentially complementary, the larger the trade creation effects 
are likely to be. 2 If on the contrary, the partners have 
1. Compare with R.G. Lipsey op. cit. pp. 498-499: "This 
analysis leads to the conclusion that customs unions are 
likely to cause losses when the countries involved are 
complementary in the range of commodities that are pro-
tected by tariffs ... This point of Viner's has often been 
misunderstood and read to say tha~ ... , the economies of 
the two countries should be competitive and not comple-
mentary. A precise way of making the point is to say 
that the customs union is more likely to bring gain, the 
greater is the degree of overlapping between the class 
of commodities produced under tariff protection in the 
two countries." 
2. cf. Meade, J.E. Op. Cit. pp. 107-111. 
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similar comparative advantages - they then trade heavily with 
third countries - the formation of the customs union will 
lead to trade diversion. 
On the volume of trade between partners, Lipsey 1 
admirably observes: 
" •.• This argument gives rise to two general con-
clusions, one of them appealing immediately to 
common sense, one of them slightly surprising. 
The first is that, given a country's volume of 
international trade, a customs union is more 
likely to raise welfare the higher is the pro-
portion of trade with the country's union part-
ner and the lower the proportion of trade with 
the outside world. The second is that, a customs 
union is more likely to raise welfare the lower 
is the total volume of foreign trade, for the 
lower is the foreign trade, the lower must be 
purchases from the outside world relative to pur-
chases of domestic commodities. This means that 
the sort of countries who ought to form customs 
unions are those doing a high proportion of their 
foreign trade with their union partner, and making 
a high proportion of their total expenditure on 
domestic trade. Countries which are likely to 
lose from a customs union, on the other hand, are 
those countries in which a low proportion of total 
trade is domestic especially if the customs union 
does not include a high proportion of their for-
eign trade. 
It can be added 2 that territories might lose in the 
formation of a customs union even if the union increases its 
total income, welfare, and whatever might be expected to in-
crease. These less fortunate countries are those that have 
strong comparative advantages in primary production and . sup-
ply their partners with only goods that they could equally 
1. Lipsey, R.G., op. cit. pp. 508-509. 
2. Brown, A.J., "Should African Countries Form Economic 
Unions?" Economic Development in Africa, Oxford, 1965, 
pp. 176-193. 
49 
export to the rest of the world. Their benefits would be 
expressed only in the form of public services. Their resi-
dents would have easier access to development centres in 
the rest of the union. Other territories which might equally 
lose include those that have comparative advantages for some 
industries but which might not succeed in attracting these 
industries. The failure in doing so might be due to the 
presence of a partner, relatively more advanced and who 
offers better prospects for the same industries. 
At the present time, the structure of the West Afri-
can economies is favourable to such anomalies. This is why 
the type of customs union instituted in the region is very 
important, and deserves serious studies. 
Viner explains that "Customs unions are not important, 
and are unlikely to yield more economic benefit than harm, 
unless they are between sizeable countries which practice 
substantial protection of substantially similar industries". 1 
In final analysis, a good customs union is the one 
which increases the income and the well-being of the popula-
tion through its trade creation effects. It constitutes in 
itself a step towards free trade. A bad customs union, on 
the other hand, reduces well - being; in fact, it simply rein-
forces protectionism. These are the effects generally attri-
buted to these phenomena. 
1. Viner, J. op. cit. p. 135. 
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But either trade creation or trade diversion cannot 
be evaluated a priori. Following Cooper and Massell, 1 the 
author of this study would strongly support the view that 
either trade creation or trade diversion can be good or bad. 
If, given a customs union, trade creation takes place - that 
is industries move from country B (high cost producer) to 
country A (low cost producer) - B will purchase cheaper goods 
but its industrial sector will have been "lost in the bargain". 
The question is to determine whether or not B is necessarily 
better off. When trade diversion takes place, each partner 
deve~ops its own industrial sector. 
So far the discussion has centred around the theory 
of customs union in general. No specific provisions have 
been made for the so-called developing countries. Because 
they present special conditions, and more convincingly be-
cause the area of study in this thesis is a less developed 
region, the subsequent section deals exclusively with the 
case of the new countries. 
The Case For the Less Advanced Pre-Industrial 
Countries 
The less advanced countries, because they lack that 
industrial sector that can sustain a high degree of trade 
among them, deserve special treatment. 
It is sometimes argued that the interest in economic 
integration in the underdeveloped world h a s its deep roots 
l. Cooper, C .A., and Massell, B. F. : "Toward ··A General Theory 
of Customs Unions for Developing Countries". Journal of 
Political Economy LXXIII, 1965, p. 475. 
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in political considerations, or in a simple desire to imi-
tate Western Europe. Some sceptics would go as far as to 
doubt gains from integration in this part of the world. 
Thus R.L. Allen 1 observes that "integration itself does 
not necessarily attract investment", it does not offer un-
limited scope for economies of scale, and "external economies 
are not a direct function of integration". There are many 
other factors to be considered. In sum, "In the development 
process", wrote Allen, "integration has no role other than 
its basic one of economizing resources". This would express 
the feeling of those who find it necessary to stress the 
idea that a common market is not a deus ex machina. 
For Allen, trade creation has little prospect in the 
developing world. As long as import competition comes from 
outside, an abolition of trade barriers among developing 
countries under protection against products from industrial 
countries will have an insignificant advantage. It follows 
from the theory that trade creation will be beneficial only 
if in the region undertaking integration, competition exists 
among member countries which previously protected their in-
dustries and that high cost producers give way to low cost 
producers. 
In the developing countries then, trade diversion is 
likely to take place with the formation of customs unions. 
1. Allen, R.L. "Integration in Less Developed Areas". 
Kyklos Vol. XIV, 1961, Fasc. 3, pp. 315-336. 
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Departing from this set of arguments that underdeveloped 
countries trade mainly with industrial countries, and that 
their own union will not be beneficial at the international 
level, it has been suggested that these so-called develop-
ing countries enter free trade arrangements with the developed 
world with which they trade. Peter Robson for instance 
wrote: 
" ... The general conclusion is that in terms of the 
criterion of gain of traditional theory, a customs 
union among typical less developed countries would 
be likely to offer small opportunities of gain. 
Indeed the conclusion suggested by the static theory 
taken in conjunction with these facts is that less 
developed countries ought to form customs unions, 
if at all, with some of the advanced industrial 
countries. It is with these countries that they 
do most of their trade and the advanced countries 
have a big comparative advantage in most kinds of 
manufacture! 
The less developed country will surely purchase cheaper 
manufactures but will have to sacri fice its own industrial 
sector. Will it be better off? Will it move to a higher 
indifference curve? A more meaingful approach would pro-
bably be that of the adherents to the doctrine which states 
that the less advanced countries form the union with the 
semi-industrialized countries within their area. 
Economic integration is more justified for the less 
developed countries than for the more advanced ones. As 
far as the size of the market is concerned, integration does 
enlarge the market in both a developed and an underdeveloped 
1. Peter Robson, Economic Integration in Africa. (c) George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968, pp. 32 - 33. See also by A.J. 
Brown, "Should African Countries Form Economic Unions?" 
Op. Cit. p. 179. 
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world. Where it is more justified for the less advanced 
countries is that, here, it promotes industrialization. 
In other words, it makes it possible for new commodities to 
be produced and offered the consumer. It is not hazardous 
to make this argument, namely that integration constitutes 
a force clearing the way for the new states to develop new 
productive capacity, the core of the integration movement 
in the third world. The traditional view would simply sup~ 
port the hypothesis that in the process of economic develop-
ment, integration has no role other than economizing existing 
resources. Even if integration among the less developed 
countries does not permit the most efficient use of the 
existing resources, it does however open the door for a 
more efficient utilization of these resources than their use 
in the indiv~dual small national economies. 
The industrial club has already been monopolized 
by the developed countries so that the new world has little 
prospect, it has limited opportunities to export its manu-
factures to the world market. The appropriate solution for 
the new states would be to form large regional markets, 
regional trading areas. It follows from the fact that a new 
country cannot develop a viable industry if the commodities 
are to be sold only on the domestic national market. 
This would express better the attitude of the under-
developed world. Furthermore, it is imperative to keep in 
mind that the world development plan as previously explained 
is advocated in the interest of the less developed countries. 
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On the whole then, integration, by developing a new 
capacity of production, paves the way to economi c develop-
ment. This does not make integration a deus ex machina. It 
does not mean tha~ as soon as they integrate their national 
economies, the different member states will develop. Inte-
gration is not a sufficient condition for development but it 
might be a desirable condition. It means that economic inte-
gration makes it possible to better create those conditions 
necessary and indispensable for economic development to take 
place. In the emerging countries, development can hardly 
take place in the!, absence of industries. Integration is pre-
cisely meant to promote their industrial sector. Thus the 
less advanced countries ought to form their ovm unions. If 
the unions are formed with the more advanced industrial 
countries, the less developed pre-industrial nations would 
simply continue to export raw produce, and reap no benefits. 
Economists who argue that poor nations, if gain is 
to be made at all, ought to form the unions with their pre-
sent trade partners in the more advanced world seem to sup-
port the view that the poor nations would benefit in the long 
run as they continue to develop. What this view seems to 
ignore is what is technically known as external economies, 
already mentioned. Moreover, it ignores entirely the infant 
industry argumen~ ~ause of these effects, if a customs 
union is instituted between advanced and less developed 
economies, the industries would concentrate in the more ad-
vanced countries where they can profit from externalities, 
55 
tnat is where facilities are already existing. The less 
advanced countries would continue to sell raw produce, thus 
sustaining expansion in the more advanced world. The absence 
of externalities is an impediment to development in the less 
advanced countries. It is unlikely that their union with the 
more developed countries can lead to their development. 
The secret behind external economies is that, when 
a firm is established within an industrial zone, it can incur 
lower costs than when installed in isolation. Transporting 
semi-finished products becomes cheaper. Above all, the 
scarcity of skilled labour might be reduced for a firm can 
benefit from the services of a technically trained labour 
in the region. 
Given a region, a growing industry will create ex-
ternal economies not only for the supplier but also for the 
user industry. The 'industrie motrice' and these other 
industries could constitute a development pole. 1 
Under these circumstances, a wise attitude is for 
the less developed countries to devise the particular me-
chanism that suits the most their own conditions. A customs 
union in the less developed world need not be the same as 
a customs union among the advanced countries. And a customs 
union need not be the same everywhere in the underdeveloped 
world either. It all depends on the peculiar conditions of 
each prospective union. 
1. This is an allusion to Fran~ois Perroux's notion of 
industrie motrice. 
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In general, the industrial countries can afford 
unions aimed at simply fostering exchange among the partners. 
The less developed countries have to develop the appropriate 
measures to avoid sacrificing certain partners for certain 
others. This is an essential point in this study. It is 
not enough to arrange customs unions. What kind of customs 
union is arranged given certain conditions is the question. 
The traditional commercial approach then is for the 
old world. The planning approach which goes beyond this tra-
ditional approach, secures benefits for each partner and 
suits better the conditions in the so-called developing 
countries. This does not mean that the less developed 
countries need not increase exchange between themselves if 
they undertake integration. What is being maintained is 
that the planning approach distributes the benefits derived 
from the union in accordance with principles agreed upon and 
promotes the balanced development so much desired in the 
underdeveloped world. 
It has already been stated that customs unions need 
not be the same everywhere even in the third world. This is 
so because the policies have to depend on the particular con-
ditions in each region. Needless to say, what has been dis-
cussed so far is a set of general statements about the con-
ditions in the world and the less developed areas at large. 
How can integration be achieved in West Africa, the area 
chosen for this study? Before answering this question, it 
would be pertinent to have an overview of the West African 
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economies. The following chapter attempts to present the 
socio-economic structure of the region and tries to char-
acterize the level of development achieved so far. 
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CHAPTER II 
WEST AFRICA: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGION 
A) GENERALITIES 
The phrase West Africa, as widely used over the 
world, is a mere geographical expression with, as it seems, 
imprecise or rather no definite territorial delimitations. 
There is no space here for going over how different people 
or organizations might interpret the term. The definition 
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
shall be used here. Then, for the purpose of this study, 
the expression refers to the area of the African continent 
covering the national territories of fourteen new states 
lying West of the Cameroon Republic and South of the Sahara 
Desert. They are: Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta. 
The latest statistics reveal that the population 1 
of West Africa, slightly over one hundred million people, is 
unequally spread over a total area of a little more than 
six million square kilometers (approximately 2.4 million 
square miles). The nations within the region are unequal 
1. Table 1 of the Appendix gives the population, its rate 
of increase, the birth and death rates, and the popula-
tion density, compared with other regions of the con-
tinent. Table 2 gives the total population and GDP and 
per country while Table 3 gives in addition the income 
per capita. 
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in their size. Nigeria alone counts more than 56 million 
people and thus accounts for more than 50 per cent of the 
total population while no other single state, taken separ-
ately, would have more than 8 million inhabitants. 1 Gambia, 
the smallest of all, has about 0.34 million. This is an in-
dication of the small size of the domestic market for each 
individual nation. 
Always dealing with the dimension of the nations un-
der consideration, one should note also, for purpose of 
anlaysis below, that of the fourteen countries, three, Mali, 
Niger, and Upper Volta, are completely landlocked, cover 
about sixty per cent of the regional area, and account for 
only 13.34 per cent of the total population. Table 2a in 
the Appendix gives an idea of the economically active popu-
lation in selected countries. Other valuable information 
about the population is summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3 in 
the Appendix. 
It is worth comparing the region thus delimited with 
other economic entities, or possible economic groupings in 
the world. A meaningful comparison would be with typical 
developing regions. The table against attempts to show the 
evolution in selected indicators for the years 1963 and 1968 
for proposed integrated areas in 1958. 2 
1. Cf. Table 3 in the Appendix. 
2. Cf. R.L. Allen: in Kyklos vol. XIV, 1961, pp. 315-336. 
Selected Indicators of Economic Activity in Some Less-Developed Areas* Compared with the EEC - 1958, 1963, 1968 
Central America Latin America North 
Indicators 1958 1963 1968 1958 1963 1968 1958 
Population a 
(million) 10.3 ll.870 14.019 143.0 165832 190945 25.3 
GDP-~1i llion$ 3.ll2 4.245 51824 37299c 
Gross Product 
(billion $) 2.4 29.9 4.4 
Exports 
(million $) 459 586 947 3655 5093 6689 987 
Imports 
(million $) 488 652 1047 4632 5205 7005 1778 
Percentage 
of world 
exports . 4 .38 .40 3.7 3 . 31 2.80 l.O 
Percentage 
of world 
imports . 4 .40 .42 4.5 3.21 2. 78 1.7 
Intra area 
trade 
(million $) 18.7 366 40 
Source~: Kyklos Vol. XIV, 1961, p. 321; UN; Statistlcal Yearbook 1968 
(*) Groupings as proposed in 1958 - cf. Allen in Kyklos Vol. XIV, l96J 
(a) The ?Opulation for 1963 and 1968 are estimates of midyear. 
(~) Includes Algeria, Libya, ~orocco, Tunisia, and the UAR. 
(c) Only Ghana and Senegal for West Africa in 1968; Latin America ex-
cludes Argentim, Brazil in 1968; North Africa includes only 
~~orocco and Tunisia in 19 68. 
(d) ::est Africa excludes Guine, t . 
Africa 
1963 1968 
29544 
5839 3707c 
1605 3860d 
1587 287ob 
l. 04 l. 61 
. 98 1.14 
West Africa E.E.C. 
1958 1963 1968 1958 1963 1968 
40.9 93797 106 168.0 175.5 183.4 
8721 2565c 136637 221444 333421 
3.2 154.5 
713 1462 l957d 22730 37550 64200 
732 1710 l816d 22940 40430 61960 
. 7 .95 .82 23.6 24.37 26.84 
. 7 l. 05 .72 22.8 24.91 24.60 
4 6762 
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While in the sphere of comparisons, ment ion should 
be made of the ECA study of the 1966 GDP origin for different 
areas in Africa. The findi ngs are summarized in Table 3a, 
in the Appendix. West Africa had the highest share in 
agriculture. This means that all economic activities con-
sidered, in West Africa, the contribution of agriculture to 
GDP was the highest; at the same time, this percentage for 
west Africa was higher than the same percentage for any 
other African region. 
But more specifically, what is the level of the GDP 
in West Africa alone? This economic indicator reveals very 
well the inequality among the units in the region. The 
GDP 1 computed in million US dollars, was 2,523 for the whole 
former French West Africa in 1956; 1,433 for Ghana in 1959-60; 
and 2,628 for Nigeria in 1957. The GDP 2 for Nigeria, Ghana, 
the Ivory Coast, and Senegal was over 6 billion dollars in 
1961. 
Elsewhere, although all the figures are not indicated, 
the GDP at factor cost taken country by country has been in-
creasing since 1958, except perhaps for Ghana. This is 
shown in Table 4 of the Appendix which gives the evolution 
in the estimates of total and per capita national income 
1. Onitri, H.M.A. "Towards a West African Economic Community". 
The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies. 
March 1963, vol. 5, n. 1. 
2. Nations Unies, Commission Economique pour l'Afrique: 
Etude sur la situation economique de l'Afrique. val. 1: 
Afrique de l'Ouest -Afrique du Sud. Nations Unies. 
N.Y. 1966, p. 151. Note the number of the vol. E/CN.l4/370. 
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and gross domestic product at factor cost from 1958 to 1968. 
The same thing could be said about the evolution in 
the level of the Gross National Product, shown at market 
prices in Table 5 in the Appendix. For the region as a 
whole, the GNP at market prices amounted to 6,341 million 
dollars in 1958. In 1963, it increased to 9,322 million 
dollars, thus registering an increase of almost 50 per cent 
over a period of five years. Even though the 1965 figure 
does not include data for Dahomey and Guinea, 1 the total 
GNP rose to over 10,000 million dollars. This progression 
is confirmed by the 1966 statistics which do not show figures 
for Dahomey, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania. The 1966 
figure for only nine countries amounted to 10,239 million 
dollars. 
Table 6 in the Appendix shows a rising trend in the 
evolution of the estimates of national income and gross do-
mestic product, given in national currencies. The slight 
drop in 1967 in Ghana was recovered in 1968 whose figure goes 
beyond the previously highest level of 1966. The same is 
true for Senegal. This is to say that the national income 
and the GDP over the period 1958-1968 can be represented 
graphically by an upward sloping curve with a kink at the 
level of 1967 for Ghana and Senegal. 
The per capita income, as shown in Table 3 in the 
Appendix, reveals the gap between citizens of the different 
1. Cf. Table 5 in the Appendix. 
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nations in the region. It ranged from 50 dollars in Upper 
volta (one of the lowest in the world) , to 230 dollars in 
Ghana, for that year. 
A simple interstate comparison of per capita income 
is not very significant. What would be more meaningful 
would be the fluctuations in, or the evolution of the per 
capita income in each given country, over a period of time. 
The interstate comparison is being made simply because the 
nations are proposing to integrate their economies. 
It has already been said that Table 4 in the Appendix 
gives estimates of total and per capita national income and 
gross domestic product at factor cost. The table reveals 
that those countries whose data are accessible have re-
gistered an increase in the per capita income over the p e r iod 
considered. However, in Ghana, where the highest level was 
enjoyed at the beginning of the period, a drop occurred to-
wards the end of the last decade. The Ivory Coast registered 
the highest level in 1967. 
On the other hand, Table 5 in the Appendix shows that 
those countries for which the statistics are available have 
registered an increase in the per capita national product at 
market price over the period 1958-1966. Again Ghana with the 
highest figure at the beginning, reached a pick of 314 
in 1966 and then fell behind the Ivory Coast in 1967 and 
1968. 
These facts reveal that, on the whole, the level of 
economic activity in the region has been rising. 
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The structure of the regional economy, needless to 
say, has been highly influenced by colonialism. The relevant 
point to make is simply that the colony was, at whatever 
cost, to grow and to export the more those raw materials the 
already wealthy European power was in need of. 1 This is how 
the so- called exchange economy developed. And here what is 
important is that, since the poor colony was to support ex-
pansion in the European power, the economy of the region un-
der consideration specialized in the export of primary pro-
ducts. This is ~ill the dominant characteristic of the re-
gional economy. 
As Neumark has well observed: 
The modern development of tropical Africa is 
closely linked up with the expansion of Europe's 
demand for tropical products. Following the in-
dustrial revolution, there was an increased demand 
1. Paquin, Jean-Jacques: Les relations economiques exte-
rieures des Pays d'Afrique Noire de l 1 Union Fran~aise 
1925-1955; Librairie Armand Colin 1957; p. 6: "On in-
siste souvent plus sur la domination economique, et 
cependant, les cultures d'exportation furent dans de 
nombreux cas, imposees a l'autochtone sinon au sol ... " 
Elsewhere in the same book (p. 145), the same author 
argues: "Coloniser, c'est organiser l'exploitation d'un 
pays etranger sur lequel a ete etablie une emprise po-
litique ou militaire. La colonisation peut evidernrnent, 
et c'est souvent le cas, poursuivre quelques fins 
desinteressees, ... , mais toujours elle doit servir 
l'interet de la Metropole, en lui permettant le plus 
souvent d'exploiter economiquement le pays colonise et 
en lui procurant quelquefois des avantages d'ordre 
strategique ou demographique." 
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for oils and fats for edible and industrial 
purposes ..• The resulting great demand for 
soap and candles had the interesting conse-
quences that, instead of slaves, West Africa, 
the horne of oil palm (Elaeis guinensis), was 
called upon to supply palm oil for soap and 
candle making. Another reason was that the 
machines of the industrial revolution needed 
new sources of lubricating oil and fat, since 
the existing animal and fish supplies were 
neither adequate nor suitable. But of no less 
importance was the fact that before the end 
of the nineteenth century two new uses were 
discovered for palm oil products: in the 
eighteen-seventies palm kernels began to be 
used in the manufacture of margarine; and in 
the eighteen-nineties, palm oil began to be 
extensively used in the tinplate industry as 
a means of preserving the heated iron sheet 
from oxidation. 1 
Thus as Europe expands, demand increases for West African 
produce which, it should be said, might be supplied from 
other sources as well. 
Over the colonial era, to facilitate the exports 
of the agricultural produce and of the raw minerals towards 
the European powers, few roads and railways were built to 
link the ports with the zones of interest. Thus in Ghana 
for instance, gold mining in what was then known as Gold 
Coast, was responsible for the construction of the first 
railway and its extension. In Nigeria, this role was per-
formed by tin and coal; in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it was 
iron. Examples can be given also for the promotion of export-
crop production. In Ghana again, the Accra-Kurnasi line was 
1. Daniel Neurnark: Foreign Trade and Economic Development 
in Africa - A Historical Perspective. (c) 1964, Board 
of Leland Stanford. p. 148. 
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designed to serve the cocoa areas. In Nigeria, the Kana-
Lagos line was to facilitate the export of cotton. Thus, 
the transportation network pointed only at the sea, aiming 
at easing the export of industrial crops and/or of ~aw min-
erals. They were not to serve primarilyfor exchange between 
areas of the same colony or within the region as a whole. 
In other fields, education and health for instance, 
it is only sufficient to note that little effort was made. 
In education, West Africans were trained for clerical posi-
tions. Training in higher education was mere accident. As 
far as health is concerned, few hospitals were built but 
mainly in the capitals where the colonial administrators were 
living. 
All these factors have highly influenced the struc-
ture of the Eegional economy. 
B) AGRICULTURE 
While dealing with the economic structure of West 
Africa, it is appropriate, first, to mention the traditional 
occupation of the population. Agriculture is the main, not 
to say the sole occupation of the population. Here, agricul-
ture is to be taken so as to include animal husbandry, fish-
ing, forestry, and agriculture per se. 
In general, in tropical Africa, people are self employed 
farmers who are engaged mainly in growing foodstuffs for their 
own consumption; portion of the output might be locally dis-
tributed. As Table 7 in the Appendix indicates, in the early 
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nineteen-sixties, the proportion of the non-commercialized 
agricultural production was very high. 
Two belts of agricultural production exist in West 
Africa. The first one, the forest belt as it is called, 
would lie along the coast and would concentrate on growing 
crops especially for export. This is the home of cocoa, 
rubber, coffee, banana, timber, etc ... It is the area of 
industrial plant production. The second belt, the northern 
savannah belt is better known for its livestock breeding. 
This belt 'specializes' in the production of cereals such 
as varieties of pearl millet, sorghum, fonio, and others. 1 
This area is known as the grain production belt, or simply 
grain belt. 
The belts stretch in the East-West direction. Some 
authors such as Plessz in Problems and Prospects of Economic 
Integration in West Africa might feel that a kind of comple-
mentarity exists between various parts of the region, for 
instance the belts of production, but that this complementar-
ity is not being fully exploited. Thus over recent years, 
demand for staple foodstuffs increased very rapidly but pro-
duction in the grain belt did not keep pace with this increase 
and the intra-regional trade, consequently, did not grow. 
The requirements were met by imports from overseas. 
1. by Elliott P. Skinner, "West African Economic Systems". 
Economic Transition in Africa. edited by Melville J. 
Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz. 1964 by Northwestern 
University Press, p. 79. 
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It should be added that the present state of the 
means of transportation also contributes to the failure of 
the intra-regional trade to increase. The present state of 
the infrastructure does not facilitate the distribution of 
products within the region, especially when perishable pro-
duce as foodstuffs need to be transported. Thus, even if 
the production, or the supply of the staple foodstuffs had 
increased, their distribution within the region would not 
have been easy. In addition, to a certain extent, some food 
crops are grown in the forest belt. 
In general, agriculture is the main occupation in 
the region and nowhere within its boundaries is less than 
60 per cent of the economically active population engaged 
in the primary traditional sector. In Senegal, about 85 
per cent of the working population was engaged in the tra-
ditional sector. 1 About l per cent was in fishing, 2 or 3 
per cent in animal husbandry while agriculture occupied over 
80 per cent. For Nigeria in 1959 1 , 78% of the population 
were engaged in the primary sector, 6% in the secondary, 
and 16 in the tertiary. In Ghana, the primary sector en-
gaged 61.5%. Mining absorbed 1.9%, and manufacturing 9.2%. 
The tertiary sector (service) occupied 23.8% while commerce 
took 14.5. The repartition of the economically active popu-
lation by industry in 1960 for Ghana, one of the most advanced 
1. by N.A. Cox-George, "Economic Structure of the West Afri-
can Countries". The Nigerian Journal of Economic and 
Social Studies. vol. 5, n. 1, March 1963. 
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countries in the region, is given in Table 2-2. 
All these factors reveal that the primary sector 
is, by far, the most important. 
There is need to stress the difference between the 
two levels of production: subsistence and export-destined 
production. From the subsistence crops, 'surplus' food 
might be taken to be sold on the market place. One other 
thing which might be worth taking into consideration is 
that, though by far the major occupation of the population, 
agriculture is not the most important source of "paid employ-
ment". There are only few large scale farms or plantations 
hiring employees. This is where the dilemma is. 
A phenomenon parallel to this one deserves attention. 
West Africa, home of agriculture, imports foodstuffs. It is 
worth noting the deplorable aspect of the situation. " .•. on 
the import side, it is surprising that countries which are 
largely agricultural countries, in which a high proportion 
of agricultural products is for home consumption should im-
port such a high proportion of foodstuffs ... ". 1 Twenty per 
cent of West African imports consists of foodstuffs and 
beverages. 2 The main imported foodstuffs would include milk, 
wheat, rice, sugar, etc •.. 
1. Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
2. N.G. Plessz, Problems and Prospects of Economic Integra-
tion in West Africa. McG1ll Univers1ty Press, Montreal 
1968, p. 45. 
TABLE 2-2 
Ghana: Economically Active Population by Industry, Sex and Age: 
Census date, 
sex, Age 
20 III 19 SO a 
Male 
15-19 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and over 
Female 
15-19 
20-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and over 
Total 
Economical-
ly Active 
Population 
1,682,730 
170,450 
244,190 
507,310 
353,390 
213,170 
113,260 
80,960 
1,042,120 
141,780 
166,700 
299,490 
199,860 
121,250 
70,140 
42,900 
Each Census, 1955-1964 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Hunting 
Fishing 
1,003,320 
86,630 
111,190 
269,750 
226,280 
151,250 
89,850 
68,370 
575,560 
59,760 
81,350 
163,520 
118,830 
75,940 
47,600 
28,560 
t-Uning 
and 
Quarrying 
45,910 
2,150 
7,780 
20,330 
10,110 
3,980 
1,150 
410 
2,520 
690 
570 
710 
250 
170 
80 
50 
Manufac-
turing 
Industries 
136,360 
18,670 
24,920 
45,150 
26,630 
12,750 
5,020 
3,220 
98,880 
17,680 
23,130 
30,620 
14,800 
6,600 
3,510 
2,540 
Commerce 
95,520 
5,280 
14,240 
34,110 
21,460 
12,030 
5,340 
3,080 
275,980 
27,260 
43,590 
82,220 
57,980 
33,660 
16,440 
9,830 
Source: UN - Statistical Office, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
Services 
124,010 
7,990 
23,950 
46,690 
24,350 
12,930 
5,170 
2,930 
31,080 
6,690 
7,170 
9,020 
4,260 
2,380 
1,010 
550 
Demographic Yearbook 1964. Sixteenth Issue. United Nations, N.Y. 1965, p. 241 
a) Data are based on a 10 per cent sample of census returns. 
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That West Africa imports foodstuffs is surprising; 
but that the value of the imported foodstuffs increases over 
the years is distressing. In this respect, the nature of 
imports is very significant. The percentages under considera-
tion include not only food and beverages, but also tobacco 
and tobacco products. West African countries do grow tobac-
co however. Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast 
are the territories where this activity is the most important. 1 
As for the export-destined production, the character-
istics are well known. Since the export crops have been 
developed, the national economies have been characterized by 
the predominance of one or two export plants. West Africa 
is known for its fats. Senegal and Gambia are reputed for 
their groundnuts: 
In the middle and late fifties, groundnuts 
constituted 93 - 97 per cent of the exports of 
Gambia; cacao some 56-57 per cent of those 
of Ghana and rubber constituted over 76 per 
cent of the exports of Liberia .•• In Nigeria, 
between 19 and 22 per cent of export earnings 
derive from cacao, 17-20 per cent from ground-
nuts, and 15-18 per cent from palm kernels. 2 
It is worth noting at once that Nigeria is the world 
~ . argest exporter of palm kernels. Other palm product pro-
ducers in the region include Dahomey, Togo, Ivory Coast, 
and Sierra Leone. Recently, a coherent industrial complex 
1. Cf. §116 UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/INR/141. 
2. N.A. Cox-George, Op. Cit. 
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was inaugurated in Dahomey. The oil mill of this industrial 
complex was established to serve the Mono region. 1 
The rubber plantations in Liberia are well known. 
Nigeria and the Ivory Coast have developed an important 
rubber production, but not to the same extent. 
In Togo, since 1964, the share of cocoa, coffee and 
phosphate in total exports has been fluctuating between 75 
and 84 per cent. In general then, all these economies rely 
heavily on the export of one, two, or three commodities. 
Cox-Goerge 2 put it very well: 
All these West African economies have developed 
as export economies. It is a true reflection of 
the structure of these economies that they are 
all without exception dependent on the export 
of primary commodities. They all export agricul-
tural produce and some export mineral produce as 
well. In some, as for example Sierra Leon~, there 
is a very strong tendency for mining products to 
outrun agricultural products in the structure of 
exports. In none of them is the export of manu-
factured goods of any significance where they 
enter into the returns at all. Indeed, it is 
truer to state that manufactures do not enter at 
all; not even in intra-African trade except for 
re-exports. This is significant. For even where 
some manufacturing feature in the structure of the 
.economy itself, such manufacturing is directed 
more at import-replacement than at the inter-
national market ... 
The considerable importance of agriculture is even 
more convincingly revealed by the industrial origin of the 
GDP. The figures for the year 1964 are given in Table 8 in 
l. Jeune Afrique, n. 532 - 16 Mars, 1971, p. 21. 
2. N.A. Cox-George, Op. Cit. 
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the Appendix. They show the weight of the primary sector, 
country by country. Nowhere, except in Liberia and Senegal, 
did it contribute less than 30 per cent. The origin of the 
GDP in 1966 has already been mentioned. It is shown in Table 
3a in t h e Appendix. 
Thus in the final analysis, primary production is 
the mainstay of the economy. Adedeji asserts that the aver-
age share of agriculture in total GDP is between 50 and 55 
per cent. One can however be optimistic and believe that 
this percentage has decreased, at least slightly in the nine-
teen sixties. If in Table 8 in the Appendix a percentage of 
54 was recorded for Togo in 1964, the share of agriculture 
in the 1966 GDP was 43.9 per cent. 1 
Animal husbandry is essentially important in the 
coastless countries. These countries are a source of supply 
of meat and livestock for most of the coastal countries. The 
five members of the Entente as described later in this study 
have agreed to "consider themselves one for taxation and cus-
toms duties on meat". 2 The Council of the Entente comprises 
two landlocked countries, namely Niger and Upper Volta. Other 
countries, Ghana, Nigeria, and Mali (the third 
1. Togo, Rapport Economique, Social, et Financier-Budget 
General:l970. Ministere des Finances, de L'Economie et 
du Plan. Lome - Togo, p. 5. 
2. Cf. West Africa, no. 2754, March 21, 1970, p. 321. 
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coastless country), attended the conference which led to the 
agreement and the arrangement will be open to them. 
Animal husbandry seems to be important in Mauri-
tania too, the source of supply of livestock for Senegal. 
Tropical Africa is fairly rich in forest. As far 
back as the colonial era, Europeans have exploited the for-
est on the coast and in the centre of the West African coun-
tries in the form of timber. This is particularly true of 
the English influence area, Ghana (the former Gold Coast) 
and Nigeria chiefly. 
Table 18 in the Appendix gives an idea of the West 
African share in roundwood production over the world. 
At this stage, the question is the importance of the 
West African agriculture, the mainstay of the regional 
economy, in the world. This can be measured only by the 
share of its crop exports to the world market. 
In the area of primary agricultural production, 
West Africa contributes more than 65 per cent 
of the cacao entering world markets - in 1957 
it went up to as much as 73 per cent by way of 
value. Over 76 per cent of the volume of palm 
kernels and 32 per cent of the volume of palm 
oil which enter into world commerce come from 
West Africa. The bulk of groundnuts entering 
international trade come from two countries in 
West Africa, Nigeria and Senegal. 1 
The region then has a significant share of world markets 
for some of its commodities. 
To sum up, agriculture is the main occupation of 
l. N.A. Cox-George, Op. Cit. 
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the West African population. It contributes, on the average, 
so per cent to the total GDP. It is characterized by a sub-
sistence and an export sector. In general, the degree of 
marketability is low. Self-employed peasants produce for 
their own consumption or grow industrial crops whose output 
aims at European markets. Finally, West Africa maintains a 
considerable share in the world sales of its industrial crops. 
For cocoa, the region accounts for more than 60 per cent of 
world exports and includes Ghana, the world first producer 
of the crop. For groundnuts, it includes Nigeria and Senegal 
counted among the world largest producers. 
To end, the question of the future of the West African 
agriculture may be raised. Today, the leaders in the region, 
well aware of the instability of their produce prices on 
world markets, are preoccupied with diversifying their ex-
ports to create a broader basis for the economy. The real 
problem is with the competitiveness of these exports. To the 
extent that, in addition to the measures now in application, 
efforts are not multiplied to increase producitivity in this 
agricultural sector, the problems faced today would hardly 
be solved. Increase in producitivity may be achieved through 
the introduction of measures designed,with the ultimate end, 
to release part of the huge amount of the labour force en-
gaged in the traditional occupation. The most effective of 
these measures lies in industrialization. 
So far, the annual growth rate of total agricultural 
production, as shown in Table 7a in the Appendix, is below 
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lO everywhere. For a considerable number of countries whose 
data are accessible, the rate of growth was higher over the 
period 1957-1965 than over 1961-1965. Whether or not at 
this rate West Africa can develop is a serious problem. 
Progress has been realised with the introduction of fer-
tilizers. When fertilizers were introduced in the Kaolack 
region in Senegal some years ago, groundnut output increased 
by 48 per cent. 1 Other examples can be given. But the use 
of fertilizers can be intensified. 
C) INDUSTRY 
Resource Endowment and Existing Industries 
Although prospection might not be complete, it can 
be argued that the region is fairly well endowed with miner-
al resources. The West African subsoil is fairly rich in 
iron, phosphate, bauxite, diamond, gold, manganese, copper, 
lead, etc .•• These minerals often constitute rich deposits 
awaiting their exploitation when transport problems in par-
ticular have been solved. 2 
1. Nations Unies, Commission Economique pour !'Afrique: 
Etude sur la situation economique de !'Afrique. Vol. 1: 
Afrique de !'Ouest - Afrique du Sud. E/CN .14/370. Nations 
Unies, New York 1966. p. 135. 
2. J.J. Poquin, Op. Cit. p. 3 "Le sous-sol de !'Afrique 
Occidentale renferme, parmi les richesses decelees: du 
fer, des phosphates, de la bauxite, du diamant, du cuivre, 
de l'or, du manganese, du plomb, de la cassiterite, 
gisements souvent riches et qui attendent leur exploita-
tion lorsque seront resolus, en particulier les problemas 
de transport " . 
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The extraction of minerals seems to have little im-
portance in West Africa as a whole. In 1966, mining contri-
buted 4.1 per cent to the regional GDP. 
And yet West Africa is a potentially resourceful 
region! Over 60 per cent of the world production 
of gold derive from Africa the bulk of which out-
side South Africa come from West Africa. 96 per 
cent of the world production of diamonds come from 
Africa the bulk of which outside the Congo (and 
indeed, in the wider sense parts of the Congo must 
fall within West Africa) derive from West Africa. 
Over 45 per cent of world output of manganese is 
produced in Africa nearly 34 per cent of which come 
from West Africa and West Africa produces 27 per 
cent of the African output of iron ore. Of this, 
there are unlimited reserves running through the 
veins of Birrimian system extending from Senegal 
through Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory 
Coast, to Southern Ghana. The African production 
of bauxite is as yet a small fraction of that wnch 
enters into world trade, about 3.5 per cent, but 
nearly the whole of this comes from West Africa 
and it is believed that there are yet consider-
able reserves of this mineral in the region. 
There are said to be extensive deposits of other 
minerals as well, the extent of which are not 
yet deterrninable. 1 
West Africa possesses some of the richest iron ore 
deposits of the world. 2 Since economic integration involves 
the inter-action of sovereign states, it would be appropri-
ate to locate some of the mineral deposits country by country. 
This would help to see the difference between the entities 
to integrate. Table 17 in the Appendix gives the production 
of some of these minerals. One of the most important depos-
its is gold in Ghana. Ghana is the second largest world pro-
ducer of industrial diamonds; she is third in the production 
of gem stone. She also has bauxite, but her manganese cannot 
1. Cox-George, N.A., Op. Cit., p. 18. 
2. UN-ECOSOC-ECA: E/CN.l4.246. Report of the West African 
Industrial Coordination Mission. 
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be ignored. 
Though considered a rich country, the Ivory Coast 
is not noted for her mineral resources. In the early nine-
teen sixties, her production was nearly limited to diamonds 
(the most important activity insofar as minerals are con-
cerned) , manganese and a minute tonage of colornbo-tantalite. 
In Dahomey, iron and chrome ores exist in the North, 
phosphate and lignite in the South, with oil deposits in the 
Centre. 
Liberia , Guinea, Mauritania , and Sierra Leone are 
famous for their iron ores to which reference has already 
been made. Guinea, in addition tofuis iron ore and her dia-
rnonds, exploits bauxite. Sierra Leone is the second world 
producer of gem stone. She also has bauxite, but is third 
in the world in industrial diamonds production. 
Senegal and Togo are reputed for their phosphates. 
Further prospections have revealed that in Togo the subsoil 
contains also limestone, chrome, iron ore. Senegal is 
second in the world in zircon production. 
ilmenite and others. 
She also possesses 
Mali and Niger, two landlocked countries, are both 
rich in rock salt. Niger has i n addition tin ore, and Mali 
bauxite, phosphates, and iron ores. 
The other landlocked country, Upper Volta, seems to 
offer great possibilities for mining, too. Among the de-
posits, gold, manganese, and bauxite are the best known. 
There are also copper and graphite. 
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Finally in Nigeria, mining goes not represent a large 
proportion of the total GNP. This vast country h a s been ex-
plaiting tin and is the only one in the region to have coal. 
columbite is another mineral of which Nigeria was producing 
90 per cent of the world supply in the early nineteen sixties. 1 
In addition, this vast political territory possesses lime-
stone, lead, zinc, and her petroleum is well known. 
Table 9 in the Appendix gives, on the basis of 1955-
1957 averages, the output of some of the principal minerals 
in West Africa. 
With respect to other resources, West Africa, as far 
as electrical power is concerned, has the physical possi -
bility of developing hydroelectrical energy from its rivers 
among which the largest are the Niger, the Senegal, and the 
Volta. Insofar as the utilization of this resource is con-
cerned, it is worth mentioning, in Ghana, the Volta River 
Authority administering the Akosombo dam on the Volta river. 
Reference will be made to this later. 
To close this section of resource endowment, it can 
be argued that the region under s t udy is fairly rich in 
minerals. Mining is more or less important, depending on 
the individual countries. In 1960, its contribution to GDP 
was evaluated to be between 8 and 9 per cent in Liberia and 
some 5 per cent in Ghana. 2 In Sierra Leone, mining and 
1. Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations - Africa. Editor 
and publisher Moshe Y. Sachs. (c) 1960 by Worldmark 
Press, Inc. 
2. UN- ECA, E/CN.l4/370 Op. Cit., p. 13. 
81 
quarrying contributed about 18.19 per cent to GDP in 1963-
1964; 18.57 per cent in 1964-65; and 19.22 per cent in 1965-
This contribution to GDP is considerable in other 
countries such as Guinea and Mauritania if the composition 
of their exports is to be taken into account. On the other 
hand, countries as Mauritania, Senegal, and Togo have become 
mining countries over recent years. However, the relative 
importance of mining is still not spectacular. In 1966, 
~his has already been shown, cf. Table 3a), mining contri-
bution to GDP in the West African region was only 4.1 per 
cent. 
Finally it can be added that Nigeria, Ghana, and 
Liberia seem to be the major exporters of minerals in the 
region. Their share was once evaluated to be 4/5 of the 
total regional mineral exports. 2 
With regard to the secondary sector as a whole, 
it can be seen from Table 8 in the Appendix that manufac-
turing seems to be relatively more important where the share 
of mining is relatively low. The best examples are the 
Ivory Coast and Senegal. However, in this field, for lack 
of sufficient data, further comments might be misleading. 
In the very early 1960's, it could be argued that the secon-
dary sector contribution to GDP was, everywhere within the 
region, below 15 per cent. 3 A look at Table 8 in the Appendix 
1. Sierra Leone, Central Statistics Office: National Account 
of Sierra Leone, June 1967, p. 5. 
~ ~. UN- ECA: E/CN.l4/370., Op. Cit., p. 48. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
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shows that this percentage varied between 11.1 and 36.0 per 
cent in 1964. The statistics for 1968 might draw a differ-
ent picture. 
However the problem of the relative importance of 
industry in West Africa can be raised. In Africa, that is 
Africa as a continent, industrial output in the 1960's was 
negligible. Peter Robson asserted in 1968 1 that in this 
area of the world, " ..• industrial output was insignificant. 
At present, Africa accounts only for about two per cent of 
world industrial production ... ". If this is the picture 
for Africa, then the importance of industrial production in 
West Africa where recently, 1966, agriculture alone contri-
buted over 53 per cent to GDP, can be easily seen; it is 
very slim. This percentage was the highest for agriculture 
on the continent. 
The African countries can be classified under 10 
industrial groupings. 2 This has been done on the basis of 
some 140-150 industries. The industrial groupings include: 
food, textiles and allied industries, forest industry, non-
metallic minerals, metals, chemicals and fertilizers, metal 
products, mechanical industries, electrical industries, and 
transport equipment. It is to be made clear that the list 
1. P. Robson, Economic Integration in Africa, (c) George 
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1968, p. 69. 
2. A.F. Ewing, Industry in Africa. Oxford University 
Press, 1966. 
83 
covers the already installed industries and also those that 
were likely to be possible over the following two decades. 
The main purpose was to show the actual and potential in-
dustrial structure in each individual country. The number 
of industries in each of the independent states in mid-1966 
varied fro~ 115 in UAR to 3 in Mauritania (a West African 
country) . The point of interest in this study is that, of 
the fourteen West African countries, only two, the Ivory 
Coast and Nigeria, fell in the top group which includes also 
Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Morocco, 
Rhodesia, Tunisia, and the UAR. Here, the number of indus-
tries installed in each country goes from 53 to 115. Yet, 
out of the nine countries classified in the lowest group, 
five (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta) are 
West African. The corresponding number of installed indus-
tries varies from 3 to 13. 
Another finding which is worth mentioning in this 
study is that, almost 
all African countries have installed or were 
in the process of installing the £allowing in-
dustries: flour milling, beer and beverages, 
clothing, boots and shoes, sawn wood and joinery, 
including wooden furniture, plastic manufactures, 
soap, liquid air, paint, metal products for con-
struction, household utensils, repair of motor 
vehicles, and where appropriate, repair of rail-
way equipment or small ships. 1 
But it should be made clear that these industries 
1. Ibid. pp. 21-49. 
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are not equally developed everywhere, neither should they 
be taken as existing all together in every country. 
Ewing's study distinguished also three main groups 
of 'industrial' African countries. The first is a set of 
countries "where industrialisation can hardly be said to 
have started". The West African countries in this category 
are Dahomey, the Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta. The West African 
countries in the second category where a certain range of 
industries have been already installed are Ghana, the Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, md Senegal. Unfortunately, none of the states 
of interest here falls in the last two country group (Tunisia 
and UAR). Here, the countries are said to have begun to 
change the structure of their economies and "to lay down on 
a significant scale intermediate goods and some capital goods". 
The discussion, so far, has drawn an industrial pic-
ture of West Africa, somehow in comparison with the rest of 
the continent. This study is relevant here for everything 
being intertwined in the real world, no economic entity 
should actually be considered in isolation. West Africa is 
just a subregion of a whole continent. The point will become 
clear in the following sections. 
It has already been said that integration presupposes 
the interaction of sovereign states. It is therefore not 
superfluous to give examples of industries country by count-
ry. The list does not however pretend to be exhaustive. 
Guinea and Mali are two dynamic countries which Ewing has 
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included among the first group of countries where industri-
alisation can hardly be said to have started. However in 
Guinea, the manufacturing industry comprises a range of 
first stage industries - textiles, cigarettes, matches, a 
cannery, a saw mill, bricks, and furniture. The sugar re-
finery planned together with a second cannery must be added. 
In Mali, industries under construction or being stud-
ied by 1968 include: cotton seed oil, refined sugar, dairy 
products, rice processing, saw milling, textiles, hosiery, 
sack making, plastics manufactures, cement, ceramics and 
refractory bricks, agricultural equipment and assembly of 
transistor radios. 
Togo also possesses a certain number of industries 
the most significant of which are: textiles, beer and bev-
erages, plastics, soap, oil mill, agricultural produce pro-
cessing and a considerable range of projects such as phos-
phorous fertilizers, matches, cement, building materials, 
etc ... 
In the second group characterised above, it should 
be noted that Nigeria has a wide range of industries, includ-
ing food and forestry particularly, a wide range of textiles 
and allied industries, cement and other building materials, 
and a fair range of metal products. Transport equipment is 
also assembled there. 
Senegal in the same group, was once the most indus-
trialised nation in French West Africa. She has her groundnut 
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oil, food processing, preservation of meat and vegetables, 
flour and biscuits, beverages. In addition, industrial 
plants such as textiles, shoes, tobacco, wood industries, pack-
aging, building materials, simple metal products, first 
stage chemicals, and repair assembly of transport equipment 
operate too. One should not forget the principal industrial 
projects of a phosphate fertilizer plant already mentioned, 
a sugar refinery, and a textile works. 
A particularity about Senegal is that Dakar, a com-
mercial and industrial centre, was the capital of the former 
French West Africa. "This had the original advantage, for 
a small country with a population of about 3.5 million, of 
providing some impetus to industrialisation, with the markets 
of other territories • • II 1 1n v1ew... • Thus some of the indus-
tries in Senegal owe their existence to the commercial im-
portance of Dakar. This is for instance the case of oil 
industries. 
As far as economic activity is concerned, the Ivory 
Coast is, today, by far the most dynamic country in West 
Africa. She works up agricultural products for exports (sawn 
wood, canned tunny fish, canned pineapple, soluble coffee, 
cocoa-butter, and palm oil). She also has light industries 
based on local agriculture, metals, textiles, cigarettes, 
and soap. Finally, she operates some industries very impor-
tant for the domestic market. These are based on imported 
1. The industries seem to be concentrated 1n the Cap Vert 
area. 
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raw materials such as flour milling, light metal products, 
assembly, and first stage chemicals. 
For Ghana, the energy derived from the Akosombo dam 
was designed to supply mainly an aluminium smelter. Among 
the considerable number of industries already in the country, 
one should cite the food and forest industries, textiles, 
building materials, scap melting and re- rolling, and some 
metal products, with the industrial centre at Tema which is 
more or less a pole of development. 
Some of the industries which could be developed on 
regional scale include among others, cement, energy, ferti-
lizers, chemicals, etc •.. As far as energy is concerned, 
Dahomey and Togo have already agreed on the creation of a 
common organism known as the Compagnie d'Energie du Benin 
(CEB) , to administer the interconnecting lines Akosombo-
Cotonou, via Lome. Furthermore, the agreement concerning 
the purchase of power from the Akosombo dam has been signed 
between Dahomey and Togo on the one hand, and Ghana on the 
other. This is the major form of cooperation in the field 
of power in tropical West Africa. The Niger and Senegal 
rivers offer many prospects. On the Senegal river, the 
Gouina dam is expected to produce about 2 billion kilowatt-
hours. 
As for cement, an agreement, a convention has been 
signed between the Ivory Coast, Togo, and le Groupe Lambert, 
creating the Societe des Ciments de !'Afrique de l'Ouest 
(CIMAO) which the other three members of the Council of the 
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Entente - Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta - were expected to 
take part in. However, Dahomey seems to be maintaining her 
own clinker factory plan. Togo 1 gave the Company a mining 
research permit to test limestone deposits in the centre of 
the country. The Company is planning to break down the 50 
million ton limestone deposits into clinker which would make 
cement production possible. 
The World Bank has agreed 2 to provide two thirds of 
the total capital required by the cement producing complex 
at Aveta (Togo) . The remaining capital would come from pri-
vate and public sources. Beside the Ivory Coast and Togo 
who are already committed, Niger and Upper Volta would cer-
tainly participate in the project. 
The subregional demand for cement has been projected 
to some 1,200,000 tons in 1972 and to 1,500,000 tons in 1975. 
In this specific context, subregion is defined as to include 
the five members of the Council of the Entente and eventually 
Ghana. 
For the region as a whole, the Economic Commission 
for Africa once estimated that cement consumption would be 
4 million tons in 1970. 3 Given the evolution of the modern 
construction industry, the regional cement consumption must 
l. 
2. 
3. 
Cf. West Africa, n. 2758, April 18, 1970. p. 444. 
Cf. West Africa, n. 
UN-ECA, E/CN.l4/370 
2797, January 16-22, 1971. p. 82. 
Op. Cit. p. 154. 
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be increasing cons i derably. Investment in this industry is 
expected to reach some US $3,000 million per annum by 1980. 1 
The need in cement in the years ahead is therefore consider-
able . 
A promising industry in the region is agricultural 
produce processing. This industry, needless to say, has 
already been undertaken. But even in the nineteen sixties, 
the processing industries in West Africa were mainly limited 
to national markets, and this appears to be their charac-
teristics. These processing industries can be intensified 
and developed at the regional level. 
What exactly is the stage presently reached in this 
economic activity? Presently or at least in the last decade, 
processing could be found at different stages, from the 
simple form of sorting to the advanced stages of finished 
products such as groundnut or palm oil, through intermediary 
stages. To give a more precise idea of the situation, it 
might be added that countries like Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo, 
Ghana, Senegal, and others possess facilities to extract 
gr@undnut oil, cottonseed oil, palm kernel oil, coconut oil, 
castor oil, sesame oil, or shea butter. 
By mid-nineteen sixties, this processing industry 
seemed to be concentrated in four major countries, namely 
Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. In 1963~ the 
two countries on top of the list sold 78 per cent of the 
l. UN-ECA, E/CN.l4/366. 2. ECA, E/CN.l4/370, p. 50. 
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regional agricultural products, processed and exported to the 
QECD countries. When the contributions of the last two, 
Ghana and the Ivory C?ast, are added to this figure, these 
four countries shared over 96 per cent of these exports from 
the region to OECD. 
It goes without saying that the intensification of 
processing called for would be beneficial only if it results 
in a promotion of exchanges within the region and with the 
rest of Africa. Processing is seen as a means to exploit the 
afore-mentioned complementarity between the belts of produc-
tion. Thus millet processed in Niger would be easier to ex-
port to the coastal areas where the market is. But it follows 
also from the preceding paragraphs that processing is al-
ready developed in these coastal countries. It is nonethe-
less true that the future of processing industriesm West 
Africa is considerable. The two belts do not have advantage 
in the production of the same food crops. Since the Nor-
thern belt is the grain belt, it should be the home of pro-
cessing. 
"The development of food processing and distribution 
industries would provide an additional outlet for employment 
as well as a stimulus for improvement in the quality and 
variety of agricultural food products". 1 One of the major 
1. UN-ECA, "The Development of Food Processing Industries 
in West Africa''. E/CN.l4/INR/76 and Annex. p. 2 
91 
problems facing the West African region is how to employ the 
considerable idle portion of its labour force, not to use 
disguisely unemployed. 
As far as chemicals and fertilizers are concerned, 
it can be said once again with respect to fertializers that 
the benefits to be derived are essential for agriculture. 
This is a case of typical large scale industry. Due to its 
vitality to agriculture, it deserves special attention. Chemi-
cals developed locally, must constitute a source of foreign 
exchange savings. 
For the textile industry, there should not be many 
problems with raw materials. This industry appears to pre-
sent a special case since it seems to be already dispersed 
throughout the whole continent. Is the dispersion for good 
or evil? Textiles are usually considered as an industry 
that can be developed on a small or a large scale. The ex-
periences of Togo in the field are worth mentioning, for 
they reveal the implication of this type of activity for a 
small domestic marketi these implications are coupled with 
other problems which are likely to arise in other parts of 
the region. 
The Industrie Textile du Togo (ITT) , besides finan-
cial problems, has to face competition from Japan whose ex-
ported textiles to the Togolese market cost less than the 
domestic ones. The ITT on the other hand, due to measures 
on borders taken by the governments concerned, cannot export 
to neighbouring countries, namely Ghana and Dahomey, which 
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used to be its fraudulent markets. A protective tariff can 
be effective against Japanese imports only if this measure 
is taken in concert with the other two bordering countries 
to protect each, its own individual infant textiles, or a 
subregional textile industry. 
Of course such a protective tariff, if it can 
effectively operate, would be an example of pure trade di-
version as discussed in the previous chapter. For pure sake 
of argument, it can be assumed that the three countries con-
cerned are prepared to act in concert against Japanese tex-
tile importers, but to protect each, their own infant indus-
try. The measures would help to prevent infiltration of im-
ported Japanese textiles from a bordering country into another. 
Under this state of affairs where imports of Japanese tex-
tiles would be discouraged, what could these new nations do about 
competition among themselves? Assuming Japanese competition 
is eliminated, each one would have better prospects for its 
output. This is a very good example here for textiles can 
be operated on a small scale and the countries would certainly 
prefer to have each their own textiles. If each state should 
have its own textile industry, then they would constitute 
competitive firms within a market and would have to be treated 
as such. 
Suppose that, contrary to all expectations, a sub-
regional or a regional textiles industry is established. If 
it can produce and sell cheaper than the Japanese textiles 
imported to the area, then there would not be any case of 
trade diversion and · a protective _tariff would not even have 
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to be ment ioned. Always for sake of argument, if it is 
assumed that the Japanese imported textiles would still be 
cheaper than the locally produced ones; that is produced 
at a regional or subregional level; then, the following prob-
lem might be discussed: should the eventual domestic pro-
duction be dismissed because of trade diversion? 
There is no doubt about the uninanimity among the 
theorists in the field of International Trade that the world 
would be better off if each trading unit specialised in the 
export of those commodities in the production of which it 
has a comparative advantage. Everyone is aware of the extent 
to which foreign manufactured products have invaded the West 
African regional market. One can rightly wonder what exactly 
provides enough foreign exchange for West Africa to pay for 
these imports, or even worse, what exactly West Africa manu-
factures, for at least, domestic consumption. 
Of course, it can be argued, as it has always been 
done, that by devoting its efforts to agricultural produc-
tion (because agriculture is the main stay of the economy 
today), West Africa would be better off in world trade. But 
how much wealth can be accumulated from agriculture is never 
really taken into consideration, or has always been purposely 
ignored. 
Before procseding, it should be made clear that the 
Preceding paragraphs are not incriminating the law of compara-
tive advantage. What is under criticism is the deliberate 
Policy of condemning the poor countries to the least 
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remunerative and the least dynamic economic activity, namely 
agriculture. This policy, put forth over the colonial era, 
is simply being defended in the name of comparative advan-
tage. 
During the colonial era·; not only was industry 
neglected in the region, but also were economic activities 
capable of leading to progress actually restricted. 
and Boahen 1 wrote: 
Webster 
... Development however, did not mean industriali-
zation, for this would compete with industries 
in the imperial country. For example , when 
groundnut oil mills in Senegal began exports 
to France in 1927 they were restricted because 
French oil millers complained of the competi-
tion. 
The British are said to be more liberal in their 
trade policy with their colonies; cases might be disclosed 
where products from the dominated territories were sacri-
ficed . Webster and Boahen 1 may be refeLred to again: 
... after the first World War the British placed 
special taxes on palm oil going to Germany, and 
in the 1930's excluded Japanese cotton cloth 
from colonies where it was underselling her own. 
The Nigerian Press was quick to point out that 
while Africans . were now forced to buy high priced 
English cloth, Britain continued to buy cheaper 
Norwegian whale-oil, in preference to Nigerian 
palm-aLl. When there was a burden to bear it was 
the cDlonies which bore it. 
There is no doubt that if the West African textile 
industry were allowed to disappear, Japan and the rest of 
l. by J.B. Webster and A.A. Boahen, with a contribution by 
H.O. Idowu, History of West Africa: The Revolutionary 
Years - 1815 to Independence. Praeger Publishers. New 
York. Washington, (c) 1967 by J.B. Webster and A.A. 
Boahen. 
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the world would be better off; but what about West Africa? 
It would import cheaper textiles, needless to say, but would 
not earn foreign exchange enough to pay for these cheap im-
ports. But when the industry is installed in West Africa, 
it would surely create employment outlet. The presently 
high rate of disguised unemployment would be reduced while 
producitivity in agriculture would increase. The newly em-
played population would buy food from the agricultural rural 
area, which would increase the money income for this sector. 
While dealing with creating employment in these new 
countries in the process of building themselves, one just 
feels like going back to those ages when Mandeville thought 
that: 
The great art to make a nation happy, and what 
we call flourishing, consists in giving everybody 
an opportunity of being employed; which to compass, 
let a Government's first care be to promote as 
great a variety of Manufactures, Arts and Handi-
crafts as human wit can invent; and the second to 
encourage Agriculture and Fishery in all their 
branches, that the whole Earth may be forced to 
exert itself as well as Man. It is from this 
Policy and not from the trifling regulations of 
Lavishness and Frugality that the greatness and 
felicity of Nations must be expected; ... 1 
The important point here is that an adequate government is 
to promote manufactures first. 
1. Bernard Mandeville. Cf. John Maynard Keynes, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money-.---
Macmillan & __ Co. Ltd., 1967, p. 361. 
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The issue of creating employment in the West African 
region is significant. It is one of the major problems the 
region is facing. However, solving the problem of employ-
ment has to be looked at in the general context of overall 
development rather than as an exclusive objective in itself. 
D) TRADE 
An important aspect of integrated markets is the 
relations between the constituents. The point in view is 
the commercial ties. This is why the organization, composi-
tion, and direction of the West African trade will be dis-
cussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
It is probably surprising to read that, in an economy 
of subsistence agriculture, a great deal of attention is de-
voted to trade. What can be traded in such an area, people 
would ask. For that reason, a general description of trading 
in the region is presented. If trade is simply exchange of 
goods, that is buying and/or selling goods, then West African 
people are just as trade-minded as they are agriculture-
minded. If one could count in the remote villages the Afri-
cans involved in trading, add them with the settled merchants 
in the cities and the 'itinerant' merchants, the percentage 
of the population engaged in commerce would be very close to, 
if not as important as the percentage in agriculture. 
But as one author has pointed out, the existence of 
a market place does not make a market economy. Thus a 'sub-
sistence trade', if the phrase could be used at all, would 
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hardly make a market society. What exists widely in West 
Africa is 'petty' trading. For the local population, petty 
trading is the road to prosperity. Most of the time, in 
the villages, trading is a part time job; agriculture usually 
comes first. 
But whatever be the name given to the activity, the 
importance of trading in West Africa cannot be ignored. It 
made the second highest contribution to the regional GDP in 
1966 (cf. Table 3a in the Appendix). Moreover, it goes back 
to time immemorial. At the time of the known empires of 
Ghana and Mali, West African traders went beyond the Sahara 
desert and reached as far as Tripoli where they exchanged 
their gold and kolanuts for manufactured goods. 1 
Today, it is not only the subsistence peasant, arti-
san, or craftsman who lets his wife, children, or relatives 
engage in 'petty' trading~ Even among prosperous citizens, 
one can find people somehow involved in petty commercial ac-
tivities. The justification is very simple. Trade is a 
source of revenue designed to supplement the earnings from 
the main occupation. Thus in most of the cases, trade is a 
supplementary activity. 
The relevance of these remarks is to make it clear 
for the reader, before they are introduced in the discussion, 
that the statistics, however accurate they might appear to 
1. cf. Aderigbe, A.B., "West African Integration in His-
torical Perspective". The Nigerian Journal of Economic 
and Social Studies. Vol. 5, n. 1, March 1963. 
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be, can underrate commercial activities within the region 
since all the transactions are not recorded. 
Domestic trade should be the most important aspect 
of commercial activities to be studied within the framework 
of this thesis. The generalities above seem to apply mostly 
to this category of exchanges. Hence, it would be appro-
priate to continue right away with internal trade. On this 
point, one can say that, even if the lack of statistics does 
not permit a confirmation of the expansion of internal ex-
changes, it is nonetheless true that within each country, 
trade is expanding. This is due in part to urban develop-
ment. The growth of cities has promoted an increase in the 
consumption of agricultural produce outside rural settlements. 
The demand of the rural population engaged in the cultiva-
tion of export crops is to be added. On the other hand, a 
variety of consumer goods are sold to the rural areas. 
Since the statistics of the internal trade (internal 
to each country) is not available, what about the domestic 
trade at the regional level; to put it in different terms, 
the intra-regional trade? On this point the first statement 
to make is that West African nations trade very little with 
one another. Unrecorded transactions might be going on aero S3 t:he 
borders. Indeed the statistics can cover only modern trade in raw 
materials and manufactured goods. It might include the re-
export of manufactures imported from overseas. It is probable 
that these statistics exclude overland trade in foodstuffs, 
salt, timber, and even animals. Nothing will be said about 
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smuggling, whatever be its importance. If all these omissions 
could always be included, the intraregional trade would cer-
tainly be more considerable than available data indicate. 
still, the distribution of the interstate trade, as shown 
below, would not be proportionally very different. 
With regard to the statistics, it might not be super-
fluous to recall this observation by the Banque Centrale des 
Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) in the early nineteen-
sixties: "At a time when the African Common Market has be-
come a very topical issue, one can only strongly wish more 
detailed and more precise information on trade flows and, in 
particular, a clear cut distinction between trade in transit, 
re-exports, and trade in domestic produce" (cf. BCEAO n. 93 
p. 5) • 
The two belts of production, spread in the East-West 
direction as previously described, depict very well intra-
regional trade. The bulk of transactions within the region 
takes place in the North-South direction; this is to say that 
the exchange of goods between the two belts is the most im-
portant commercial relationship at the regional level. Indeed 
trade in domestic produce is much greater in the North-South 
direction, both in value and in volume. 1 Whether this trade is 
growing <or not is irrelevant for the moment. 
The structure of the intraregional trade has been high-
ly influenced by the traditional specialization in agricultural 
1. N.G. Plessz, Op. Cit., pp. 32-37. 
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production, subject to climatic conditions; 1 in addition, the 
existence of preferential systems and monetary agreements be-
tween groups of countries within the region has subdivided 
this trade along the lines of these groupings. 
Vegetable, cereals such as corn, livestock, and meat 
constitute the bulk of the exchange. One can see the concen-
tration of this trade in primary products. It seems also 
that, since the exploitation of Nigerian oil, petroleum has 
taken a considerable share in the intraregional trade. In 
Table 10 in the Appendix, fuel is almost 10 per cent of the 
intraregional imports. 
As far as manufactured products are concerned, Table 
10 in the Appendix reveals that over 25 per cent of the intra-
regional imports was composed of manufactured goods. How-
ever, a high proportion of these manufactures might have been 
imported from outside the region and re-exported afterwards 
to neighbouring countries. 
The amount of raw materials and manufactures traded 
has increased recently. Account should be taken of the fact 
that Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria are the principal 
exporters of manufactured goods within the region. There are 
disparities in the degree of industrialization affecting 
trade at the regional level. Thus the relatively more indus-
trialized countries such as Senegal, in addition to those 
1. Nations Unies, Commission Economique pour l'Afrique: 
ST/ECA/109: La cooperation et l'integration ~conomiques 
en Afrique. Trois etudes regionales. Nations Unies, 
New York, 1969, p. 69. 
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already cited, can trade manufactured products. They export 
manufactured goods to, and import mainly foodstuffs and raw 
materials from the rest of the region. The reverse holds 
for relatively poorer countries. Dahomey for instance ex-
ports primary commodities to Senegal and to the Ivory Coast; 
she imports, in return, manufactured products. 1 
As Table 10 in the Appendix indicates, fats and non 
edible raw materials originating in the region constituted 
18.3 per cent of total imports at the regional level. It 
was the highest share for the period. The percentage was 
only 6.9 for foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco. 
Table lOb in the Appendix gives a better picture of 
the intraregional trade; it shows the origin and the destina-
tion of the intraregional exports. The real interest of 
the table is that it reveals the share of each country in 
the intraregional exports. This figure was comparatively 
high for five countries, of which three are landlocked. It 
was 15.1 per cent for Upper Volta; 20.4 per cent for Mali; 
and 14.5 per cent· for Niger. The other high percentages 
were registered in Nigeria (18.6), and the Ivory Coast (15.8) 
which are considered among the major exporters of manufactures 
within the region. Ghana~s share was only 7.5 per cent. 
Senegal, once the most industrialized country in the French 
influence area, had a share of only 2.8 per cent. It is 
probable that for some coastal countries, the high figure 
1. Un-ECOSOC-ECA, E/CN.l4/246 1963/64, Op. Cit. pp. 7-8. 
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was due to the phenomenon of re-export to neighbouring 
countries: - i.e. transit trade might have been included 
in the statistics. The coastal countries in general trade 
little with the rest of the West African region. The share 
of their exports to the region in total exports was low. It 
was 2.6 for the Ivory Coast; 1.4 for Nigeria; and 1.2 for 
Ghana. For the inland countries on the other hand, this 
share is usually considerable and is significant: 71.3 
for Upper Volta; 60.8 for Mali; and 32.1 for Niger. One can 
see clearly the implications of being landlocked. The rela-
tively poor coastal nations, for the period considered, 
registered levels pretty close to the relatively wealthy ones, 
except probably Dahomey where the share was 9.2. 
it was 2.7; and in Gambia, 1.4. 
In Togo, 
Another significant item of information included in 
Table lOb is the share of each country in the regional ex-
ports to the rest of the world. This is a matter of exter-
nal trade but it can be pointed out that the highest shares 
were those of the states classified in the group of the 
major exporters of manufactured goods: 19.0 for the Ivory 
Coast; 19.7 for Ghana; 39.7 for Nigeria. Senegal was the 
bridge between this group and the rest of the region. She 
had 9.1 per cent. 
There is a tendency for trade to increase among 
neighbouring countries and this is due to the general inade-
quacy of the transport system. 1 The best example is given 
1. Ibid., p. 7. 
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by the 1961 import statistics between Upper Volta and Ghana. 
ouring that year, trade among the two countries amounted 
to us $14.7 million. Of this, Ghana imported $9.4 million 
worth of goods from Upper Volta. This observation is con-
firmed by the figures of Table lOb in the Appendix. Here, 
Upper Volta exported $4,004 million worth of goods to West 
Africa. Of these, $1,594 million, that is 39.8 per cent , 
went to the Ivory Coast, the southwestern neighbour; 
$1,300 million, or 32.47 per cent went to Ghana, the south-
ern neighbour; and $0,159 million, or 3.97 per cent went to 
Niger, the eastern neighbour. 
To take another example, of the $6,596 million worth 
of goods representing Nigerian exports to West Africa, 
$4,728 million were sold to Niger, just across the northern 
borders. This represented 71.68 per cent of the Nigerian 
exports . to West Africa that year. 
That trade among the nations in question tends to 
concentrate between members of the same monetary group or 
between countries of similar economic systems is confirmed 
by Nigeria having exported 25.68 per cent, or $1,694 million 
out of her $6,596 million worth of West African sales to 
Ghana. Similarly, of the $11,886 million worth of Ghanaian 
exports to the region, 49.53 per cent were sold to Nigeria. 
The best example in the sterling area is Sierra Leone who 
exported $0,836 million worth of goods to Nigeria. That was 
73.01 per cent of her $1,145 million worth of total regional 
exports. In the franc zone, Senegal exported 61.28 per cent 
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of her regional sales to the Ivory Coast, and 26.72 per cent 
to Mali . Within the same franc zone, Mali and Senegal ab-
sorbed 52.4 and 2.7 per cent of Dahomey's exports to the 
region. They all belong to UDEAO as will be seen below. 1 
Togo, just beyond the western borders of Dahomey, shared 
only 0.4 per cent of these exports. Togo is not signatory 
of the UDEAO Treaty, 1 though in the franc zone. However, 
Nigeria's share of 10.3 per cent supports the first obser-
vation that trade tends to concentrate among neighbours, 
because of the state of the communication network. Maybe 
it should be recalled that Nigeria is the giant eastern 
neighbour of Dahomey. Table lOb in the Appendix supports 
the trends observed in West African trade. There may be 
minor deviations as the case of Dahomey-Togo; but these de-
viations are insignificant. 
The picture of trade between groups of countries of 
somehow similar economic systems is better drawn in Table lOc. 
But here, it is not only the intraregional trade which is 
under consideration; it is rather the total exports and im-
ports. It can be shown by the first four columns that, as 
far as exports are concerned, the French speaking territories 
linked by the provisions of the UDEAO Treaty, as explained 
below, s~ld_ ~ore to the fourteen country West African region 
than did the English speaking ones. This is by way of per-
centages; that is to say that a higher percentage of the 
l. For the organization, and composition of UDAO, UDEAO, Entente, 
BCEAO, UMOA, cf below Section on Economic Integration: 
Historical Perspectives. 
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exports of the first group of countries mentioned is bought 
within the region, than of the second group. The same obser-
vation is true for imports. The UDEAO countries bought more 
from the region than did each one of the other groups. 
UDEAO sold more of its exports to the West African 
countries of the British Commonwealth than did the English 
speaking countries to UDEAO. The percentages were 2.4 for 
UDEAO and 0.3 for the Commonwealth countries. On the import 
side, UDEAO bought one per cent of its imports from the 
commonwealth members, and 4.9 per cent from the region as a 
whole. The English speaking countries also bought one per 
cent of their imports from the UDEAO members. 
In terms of Table lOc in the Appendix, the West African 
region sold only 2.8 per cent of its exports to West African 
countries and received from them only 3.5 per cent of its 
total imports. 1 
The most recent accessible statistics support the ob-
servation outlined above. 2 Table 11 in the Appendix shows 
the percentage of total imports purchased by each individual 
country from West Africa and from Africa. The point of inter-
est here for the time being is the imports from West Africa. 
As in the previous analysis, the landlocked countries regis-
tered the highest figures. Upper Volta again bought nearly 
one third of her imports from West Africa and is, in this 
l. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/370, Op. Cit., p. 93. 
2. For the 1966 statistics, see A. Adedeji, Op. Cit., 
pp. 213-231. 
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matter, far ahead of any other country; Niger bought 11.5 per 
cent, and Mali, 10.2. Dahomey and Togo came next with the 
figures of 10.4 and 7.4 respectively. This is to say that, 
apart from Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, and Mali, all the 
west African countries purchased less than one-tenth of their 
imports from the rest of the region. 
Table 12 in the Appendix,built on the model of Table 
lOb, gives nearly the same information for only the year 1966. 
It also confirms the observation that trade tends to concen-
trate between bordering countries or between members of the 
same or similar economic and/or monetary systems. Thus, 
44.8 per cent of the imports of Togo came from Ghana while 
only 8.2 per cent carne from Nigeria, a larger country, but 
more distant from Togo. To illustrate the second point, 
namely that trade is concentrated among countries of similar 
economic or monetary systems, the Ivory Coast bought 67.4 
per cent of her imports from Senegal and only 0.1 per cent 
from Ghana, though Ghana is just across the borders in the 
East. 
For 1966, the trade balance of each state with re-
spect to the rest of the region is illustrate d in Table 
2-3. 
Out of the number of countries for which all the data 
are accessible, only four had a positive balance of trade with 
all other countries in the region taken collectively. Ghana's 
negative balance of trade within the region can be explained. 
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Table 2 - 3 
West Africa - The 1966 Trade Balance for Each State 
% of % of 
Intraregional Intraregional 
countries Exports Exports Imports Imports Balance 
Mauritania 97 0.15 869 1.36 772 
senegal 12,397 19.38 7,815 12.21 4,582 
Mali 7,059 11.03 5,254 8.21 1,805 
Ivory Coast 21,957 34.32 7,885 12.32 14,072 
Upper Volta 4,799 7.50 13,409 20.96 -8,610 
Dahomey 1,603 2.51 3,427 5.36 - 1,824 
Niger 2,121 3.32 5,038 7.87 -2,917 
Guinea 288 0.45 
Sierra Leone 285 0.44 1,819 2.84 -1,534 
Liberia 1,040 1.63 
Ghana 3,961 6.19 12.726 19.89 - 8,765 
Togo 1,355 2.12 3,872 6.05 -2,517 
Nigeria 6,726 10.51 1,866 2.92 4,860 
Gambia 292 0.46 
The figures are in $000, and in %. 
Source : cf. Table 12 in the Appendix 
It has been noted that livestock, meat, corn, and other cereals 
constituted the bulk o£ exchange within the region. The 
Ghanian market is , by far, the most considerable for these 
commodities. 1 
What the examination of these figures reveals is that , 
given the intraregional trade, the important exporters were 
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria. A middle category 
existed and consisted o£ Upper Volta, Ghana, and also, but 
down the scale, Niger, Dahomey, and Togo. The rest contributed 
an insignificant part to the intraregional sales. 
1. UN - ECA: ST/ECA/109, Op. Cit., p. 69. 
108 
On the other side, the large importers from the 
region were Upper Volta, Ghana, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast. 
In the middle of the ladder came Mali, Niger, Dahomey, and 
Togo. 
Within the framework of this study, the intraregional 
trade should constitute the core of the discussion. But this 
intraregional trade can obviously be characterized in these 
few words: very little trade takes place between the coun-
tries concerned. It has been shown that in their first years 
of independence, the inland countries traded more heavily 
with other countries in the region; that four relatively 
wealthy coastal countries export manufactured goods to others 
in the region ; that they import, in return, foodstuffs and 
raw materials; and that some unfortunate coastal countries 
such as Dahomey tend to follow the pattern of the inland 
nations. It has also been observed that trade within the 
region tends to concentrate along the lines of the economic 
and monetary systems, or between bordering nations. 
West Africa , separated from the rest of the world 
by the vast desert of the Sahara in the North and by thousands 
of miles of sea in the West and in the South, should devote 
special attention to internal trade. But West Africa is 
contiguous to the rest of the continent in the East. What 
is the importance of trade carried out between West Africa 
and the rest of the continent , or the other African regions? 1 
l. Because of the importance of trade in economic integration, 
it is probably necessary to split West African and African 
trades from that with the rest of the world. The increase 
in African trade called for requires such a study. 
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Due to their level of economic development, the Afri -
can c o untries carry very little trade among themselves. So, 
by way of deduction, the West African trade with the rest 
of the continent can only be small. 
What would they trade? "At present", wrote Peter 
Robson 1 , "Africa accounts for only about two per cent of 
world industrial production". It is then not surprising 
that, as in intra-West African trade, foodstuffs account for 
a large proportion of the exchanges at the continental level. 
In Kamark's words, "Normally only around 8% of the trade of 
African countries is with other African countries". 2 And 
the West African countries account for almost fifty per cent 
of the total intra-African trade. 3 
The last column of Table 11 in the Appendix gives 
the percentage of total imports into West Africa from the 
rest of Africa. On the whole, those countries thatin intra-
West African trade purchased the most from West Africa regis -
tered the highest percentage in their exchanqe with the con-
tinent. Thus Upper Volta purchased one third of her imports 
from Africa; Mali, 18.1 per cent; and Niger, 14.0 per cent. 
It should probably be recalled that these are the landlocked 
1. P. Robson: Op. Cit. , p. 6 9. 
2 · Andrew Kamark: The Economi·cs of African Development. 
Praeger 1967, p. 21. 
3. UN-ECOSOC-ECA: E/CN.l4/246. 1963/64. Op. Cit., pp. 7 and 
8. This is an indication of the importance of trade in 
West Africa. 
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countries within the region. 
The statistical figures reveal that the relatively 
wealthy coastal countries bought more highly from the rest 
of Africa than they did from West Africa. The percentages 
were, for Senegal, 4.3 from West Africa and 10.4 from Africa; 
for Nigeria, 0.3 from West Africa, and 1.1 from Africa; for 
Ivory Coast, 2.3 and 8.9; only for Ghana were the figures 
pretty close: 3.3 from West Africa and 4.0 from Africa. 
Table 13 in the Appendix gives details of the West 
African exports to and imports from the rest of Africa, but 
only for the year 1963. West Africa exported only 4.20 per 
cent of its world sales to countries in the West African 
region, and even less to the rest of the continent; in this 
last case, it exported only 2.76 per cent. 
The relevant information in Table 13 in the Appendix 
can be summarized as follows: (the figures are in percantages). 
Exports to-+ 
West Africa 
Other African 
Countries 
Whole Africa 
West Africa 
4.20 
0.60 
1.31 
And on the import side: 
Imports from+-
West Africa 
Other African 
Countries 
Whole Africa 
West Africa 
3.55 
0.68 
1.33 
Other African Countries 
2.76 
7.78 
6.80 
Other African Countries 
2.09 
7.94 
6.60 
Whole 
Africa 
6.96 
8.38 
8.10 
Whole 
Africa 
5.64 
8.62 
7.94 
An examination of these percentages seems to suggest 
TABLE 2-4 
West Africa: Trade Matrix 
Exports 1963 
Other Total Other Total 
From -+ West Africa Africa Africa To i- West Africa Africa Africa 
t-lauri tania 1.71 21.98 23.69 Mauritania 0.0004 O.OOOB 
Senegal 12.14 9.14 21.28 Senegal 0.03 0.16 0.13 
Mali 50.04 3.65 53.69 Mali 0.32 0.05 0.10 
Ivory Coast 5.60 7.26 12,86 Ivory Coast 0.49 0.13 0.20 
Upper Volta 73.68 2.16 75.84 Upper Volta 0.85 0.009 0.17 
Dahomey 12.79 1.47 14.26 Dahomey 0.30 0.01 0.07 
Niger 14.23 3.00 17.23 Niger 0.32 0.007 0.07 f-1 
Gambia 1.67 1.67 Gambia 0.04 0.003 0.009 f-1 f-1 
Guinea 0.85 15.47 16.33 Guinea 0.08 0.06 0.06 
Sierra Leone 0.81 0.03 0.85 Sierra Leone 0.07 0.02 0.03 
Liberia 0.32 0.11 0.43 Liberia 0.08 0.01 0.02 
Ghana 1.45 0.12 1.57 Ghana 1.33 0.08 0.33 
Togo 10.75 , 2. 58 13.31 Togo 0.21 0.009 0.05 
Nigeria 2.11 0.39 2 .. so · Nigeria 0.09 0.06 0.06 
Source: Cf. Table 13 in the Appendix. 
(cont.) 
TABLE 2-4 
Imports 1963 
Other Total Other Total 
From + West Africa Africa Africa To + West Africa Africa Africa 
Mauritania 0.10 0.10 Mauritania 0.005 0.02 0.02 
Senegal 0.27 6.11 6.38 Senegal 0.77 0.17 0.30 
Mali 14.04 8.41 22.45 Mali 0.30 0.006 0.70 
Ivory Coast 4.23 4.65 8.89 Ivory Coast 0.74 0.28 0.38 
Upper Volta 33.83 1.46 35.28 Upper Volta 0.39 0.003 0.02 
Dahomey 13.28 2.60 15.89 Dahomey 0.09 0.003 0.02 
Niger 20.81 1.95 22.77 Niger 0.16 0.01 0.04 
Gambia 4.46 1.29 5.75 Gambia 0.008 0.002 
Guinea 1.81 5.70 7.51 Guinea 0.03 0.14 0.12 f-1 
Sierra Leone 1.21 1.11 2.33 Sierra Leone 0.04 0.0001 0.009 f-1 
Liberia 0.85 0.51 1.37 Liberia 0.01 0.001 0.004 tv 
Ghana 5.38 1.39 6.77 Ghana 0.25 0.006 0.06 
Togo 10.80 1.83 12.63 Togo 0.11 0.008 0.03 
Nigeria 0.23 0.59 0.82 Nigeria 0.64 0.03 0.17 
Source: Cf. Table 13 in the Appendix. 
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rather that trade was more heavily carried out among other 
African countries excluding West Africa. This cannot be 
confirmed because of lack of data for other years. 
It is not superfluous to show in percentages, the 
exchange which took place between the individual countries 
of West Africa on the one hand, and the following entities 
on the other: Other African Countries (excluding West 
Africa), and the Whole of Africa. This is still based on 
Table 13 and is illustrated in Table 2-4. 
In Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest 
1966, 1 the evolution, over the years 1963, 1964, and 1965, 
of the trade of the UMOA (Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine) 
with the other African countries is as follows: 
1963 1964 
Imports Exports Balance Imports Exports Balance 
Value 
% of 
Total 
UMOA 
Value 
% of 
Total 
UMOA 
6,892 7,714 882 
5.97 7.68 
1965 
Imports Exports Balance 
8,268 8,207 -61 
6.23 6.42 
8,885 9,558 
6.60 7.35 
The absolute values are in millions of francs cfa. 
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l. Rapport de la Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest - 1966 , p. 19. The absolute figures are in millions 
of francs cfa and do not include exchange betwee n the UMOA 
members. Furthermore, the 1965 figures were estimated. 
Cf. Table 6, p. 19 of the above referred document. 
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All the statistics brought into the discussion so far 
support the observation that very little trade takes place 
among African countries. It is then not necessary to discuss 
this further. The next problem is what can be said about 
external trade of West Africa, that is trade between West 
Africa and the rest of the world. 
Foreign trade: The characteristics of the West Afri -
can foreign trade must have been clear from the previous dis -
cussion. It is in order to go over the main characteristics 
here. First, the precariousness, the instability of this trade 
is obvious. Earnings from foreign trade in these countries, 
exporters of primary produce and raw minerals are highly af-
fected , not only by the various fluctuations demand can be 
subject to overseas, but also by local factors acting upon 
supply. In the field of agriculture, the price elasticity of 
supply is very low. When a higher price for cocoa induces 
the farrner · to increase his output , the new plants will not 
start producing until after some years when other factors 
have already caused a drop in the price. 
Each individual country has one, two, or three com-
modities accounting for the bulk of its exports. The case of 
cocoa in Ghana is well known ~ It has already been referred 
to. It can still be added that cocoa is the major source 
of government revenue. "Between a half and two thirds of 
Ghana's exports earnings come from the sale of cocoa". 1 
1. The Economy of Ghana - A Study of Contemporary Ghana -
Vol. 1. directed and edited by W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt, 
and E.N. Omaboe. (c) George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966 
p. 236 and 333. 
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The importance of cocoa in the exports of Ghana is given be-
loW where the value of selected domestic export goods are 
shown in percent of total exports. 1 
Cocoa Timber (logs 
beans and sawn) Manganese Diamonds Gold 
1951 68 5 8 6 9 
1952 62 5 10 6 ll 
1953 63 7 10 4 11 
1954 75 6 5 4 9 
1955 68 8 5 6 9 
1956 59 11 8 9 9 
1957 56 11 10 10 11 
1958 60 11 8 8 10 
1959 61 12 6 8 10 
1960 59 14 6 9 10 
1961 61 13 5 6 10 
1962 60 11 5 7 10 
Source: cf. footnote l. 
The example of cocoa in Ghana might be an extreme 
case. Most of the countries under study generally rely on 
two or three commodities; but this does not mean that they 
are better off than Ghana. The role of cocoa, coffee, and 
phosphate in Togo over recent years has already been stated. 
With respect to rubber production in Liberia, it is worth 
noting that " ... rubber has not come up to original expecta -
tions, and no longer contributes more than half the export 
trade. " 2 
To take another aspect of trade, it is interesting 
1. The Economy of Ghana - A Study .of Contemporary Ghana -
Vol. l. Directed and Edited by W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt, 
and E.N. Omaboe. (c) George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966. 
pp. 236 and 333 . 
.... 
L. Larousse Encyclopedia of World Geography. 2nd Edition, 
1967, {c) Auge, Gillon, HOllier, Larousse, Moreau & Cie. 
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to examine the exports and imports in per cent of GDP. 
has been done for certain countries for the year 1961. 
TABLE 2 - 5 
west Africa: Exports and Imports as % of GDP - 1961 
(Selected Countries) 
This 
country Imports as % of GDP Exports as % of GDP 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Ivory Coast 
Dahomey 
Mauritania 
Niger 
13.8 
22.5 
19.9 
31.9 
9.9 
2.8 
7.7 
Source: UN. E/CN. 14/370 1966. p. 76. 
17.6 
27.5 
25.0 
28.3 
17.4 
39.4 
9.4 
Table 14 in the Appendix gives the same shares, but 
on 1963-64 average basis. The exports contributed 45 per 
cent of GDP in Liberia and imports 46 per cent in Gambia. 
It is not necessary to discuss these percentages in greater 
detail for the information they give is very limited. If, 
as some economists have put it, 1 a high rate of exports to 
gross domestic product means that resources are not used to 
satisfy domestic needs, then it follows that landlocked less 
developed countries as Upper Volta, Niger, and Mali devoted 
more of their resources to their own satisfaction than did 
countries as Ivory Coast , Ghana , Nigeria , and Senegal, the 
most industrialized countries in the region. This rate of 
exports to gross domestic product can hardly be taken as an 
1. UN - ECA: E/CN.l4/370. Op. Cit. p. 75. It is however true 
that the less developed countries in the region were the 
larger importers, confirming the second part of the con-
tention. 
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indicator of the level of development. 
An examination of Table 10 in the Appendix reveals 
that manufactured products other than machines and transport 
materials constitute the bulk of the imports of the region. 
on 1962-65 average basis, they accounted for over 45 per cent 
of total imports. The next commodities in importance were 
the machines and transport materials. The weight of food-
stuffs, beverages and tobacco has already been reported above; 
almost 20 per cent. Surprisingly, fuel took only a little 
over 6 per cent. 
Naturally, since the colonies were to support economic 
progress in the dominating European powers, they exported 
mainly to their mother country. Thus~ over three quarters 
of the trade of the French African territories were with 
France. These territories had few markets, steady and import-
ant in the outside world. 1 This statement will be supported 
by the statistics below. 
The second half of Table lOc in the Appendix shows 
the origin of the imports to and the destination of the ex-
ports from the region. France alone absorbed more than 50 
per cent of the exports of the UDEAO countries. UDEAO sent 
only about 15 per cent of - its exports to the rest of the 
European Economic Community; only a little over 8 per cent of 
its sales went to the United States of America; and 2.1 per 
cent to the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the UDEAO 
1. J.J. Paquin , Op. Cit., p. 94. 
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members bought over 57 per cent of their imports from France, 
8 .3 per cent from the rest of the European Economic Community, 
and insignificant fractions from the United States (5.2) and 
the United Kingdom (1.9). 
If these percentages do not constitute enough evidence 
that the former colonies trade mainly with the metropolitan 
countries, a look at the figures for the British Commonwealth 
members concerned will confirm the observation. Though they 
seem to have spread their trade over the world, these count-
ries deal primarily with the United Kingdom. Thus over 33 
per cent of their exports went to this European power alone 
while only 25.4 per cent went to the five partners of France 
in the European Common Market. The United States bought more 
from them than it did from the French speaking countries: 14.0 
per cent. France absorbed only 4.0 per cent. On the import 
side, the West African British Commonwealth members bought 
over 31 per cent of their imports from the United Kingdom; 
only 17.4 per cent from the five members of the European 
Community . excepting France; even less from the United States 
of America, 11.0 per cent, 
came from France. 
Only 3.4 per cent of their imports 
Over the period 1962-65, the region as a whole, that 
is the fourteen nation West Africa traded more with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain than it did with any other economic 
power. These fourteen nations altogether sold over 23 per 
cent of their exports to the United Kingdom. France bought 
less, 18.9 per cent; when the United States came far behind, 
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onlY 12.3. Even the imports statistics reveal that the United 
Kingdom was the major source of supply for the countries in 
the region. She provided 22.2 per cent of their purchases 
when France supplied 20.3 per cent, and the United States, 
only 9.1 per cent. 
The importance of the United Kingdom in the regional 
trade, at least over the period considered here, 1962-65, can 
be explained by Table lOb. It follows from the concentration 
of trade along the line coloniser - colonised. Hence in Table 
lOb, Nigeria alone contributed almost 40.0 per cent to the 
regional exports to the rest of the world. This was the high-
est share. Another British Commonwealth member, Ghana, con-
tributed nearly 20 per cent. The major contributor among 
the French speaking countries was the Ivory_ Coast who was 
third with 19.0 per cent. Except Senegal whose share was 9.1, 
the rest of the French speaking countries contributed less than 
2.0 per cent each. This is to say that by way of percentages, 
the English speaking countries, though fewer in number, con-
tributed more to the regional exports to the rest of the 
world. Account should be taken of the fact that the table 
excludes Liberia and Guinea for whom data were not available$ 
It follows from the statistics thu~ far presented that, 
whatever happens, Western Europe is by far the most important 
market and source of ~ supply for the West African region. 
An interesting phenomenon is taking place. Exports 
to and imports from the mother - lands have been decreasing 
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through the course of time. 1 
and 1963 will be examined. 
To show this, the data for 1950 
When in 1950 the former French West African possess-
ions exported nearly three fourths of their sales to France, 
in 1963, they sold to the Metropole just a little over one 
half of their exports. Their trade with the United States of 
America went from 3 to 8 per cent over the same period; 
their exports to Japan and the socialist bloc, though still 
small, started to grow. 
Over the same period, Ghana's exports to the United 
Kingdom decreased by one half; but her exports to socialist 
countries went up almost seven times. Even Nigeria cut down 
by half her exports to the United Kingdom and her exports to 
the European Economic Community went up ten times. 
The following table summarizes, on the exports side, 
the statistics in favour of the observation. 
What then about the imports? For the ex-AOF (ex-
French West Africa), the imports from France decreased just 
a little bit; 67.6 per cent in 1950 and 55.3 in 1963. Togo 
too purchased less from France, and more from Britain in 
1963. 
Similarly, Ghana purchased less from the United King-
dom but her imports from the Common Market more than doubled. 
With the socialist countries, the imports were multiplied by 
10. Nigeria too purchased less from the U.K. but imported 
three times more from the EEC; the origin of her imports were 
l. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/370., Op. Cit., pp. 86 - 91. 
TABLE 2-6 
Destination of West African Exports: 1950 and 1963 
(in million u.s. $ and in %) 
EEC EFTA 
of of 
which which Planned 
Countries World Total France Total U.K. Economies U.S.A. Japan Africa 
million $ Percentages 
Ghana 1950 213.8 14.6 0.2 43.7 40.1 2.3 30.1 1.4 
1963 267.6 32.4 0.4 23.0 19.8 15.2 17.6 3.9 1.2 
Nigeria 1950 252.6 3.4 0.4 79.6 79.5 0.4 14.6 1.7 1-' 
1963 509.1 37.5 8.7 43.9 39.7 0.9 9.5 1.3 2.0 I:\) 1-' 
Liberia 1951 52.1 5.9 0.8 92.5 
1961 61.9 38.1 0.5 10.0 8.9 1.0 46.2 0.5 
Sierra 1950 19.5 5.1 80.0 80.0 7.2 3.1 
Leone 1963 71.3 4.6 71.0 71.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Togo 1949 5.9 86.4 77.9 10.2 
1963 18.3 74.3 51.4 2.2 1.6 1.1 7.7 3.3 4.9 
Gambia 1950 6.4 96.9 96.9 3.1 
1963 8.7 68.9 27.6 26.4 2.3 
EX-AOF 1950 176.9 72.0 70.6 3.4 2.1 3.2 10.1 
1963 442.1 68.9 54.3 3.6 1.1 2.9 8.3 0.6 12.9 
Source: UN. International Trade Yearbook 1963; CEA, Statistiques africaines (annexe au 
Bulletin economique pour l'Afrique, vol. II, No. 1. Janvier 1961, E/CN.l4/125/Add.l 
Cf. E/CN.l4/370 1966, p. 85. 
TABLE 2-7 
West African Imports by Country: 1950 and 1963 
(in million US $ and in %) 
EEC EFrrA 
.of ot 
which which Planned 
Countries World Total France Total U.K. Economies U.S.A. Japan Africa 
million $ Percentages 
Ghana 1950 134.3 11.5 0.9 57.7 56.1 1.4 5.6 5.2 9.2 
1963 354.9 25.3 2.0 35.6 32.8 10.8 6.4 6.2 5.6 
Nigeria 1950 173.2 8.5 1.0 61.5 59.8 1.2 4.0 9.4 1.1 1-' 1963 574.5 21.9 3.6 39.9 34.5 3.9 8.7 13.1 0.8 f\,) 
f\,) 
Liberia 1951 17.1 11.1 0.6 11.1 11.1 65.5 2.9 
1961 90.7 21.9 1.7 19.8 12.5 0.1 49.1 3.0 0.2 
Sierra 1950 18.9 3.7 0.5 65.6 64.0 0.5 2.1 2.1 5.8 
Leone 1963 83.6 17.6 3.8 42.9 41.4 3.0 6.3 1.9 2.4 
Togo 1949 10.3 70.9 68.9 2.9 1.9 1.0 7.8 6.8 
1963 29.0 48.6 33.4 11.4 10.0 4.8 4.1 9.0 12.8 
Gambia 1950 8.2 3.7 1.2 61.0 59.8 2.4 4.9 11.0 
1963 11.8 9.3 2.5 43.2 41.5 6.8 3.4 11.0 5.9 
Ex-AOF 1950 240.9 69.3 67.6 1.4 1.4 9.3 9.8 
1963 548.6 65.3 55.3 3.2 2.1 6.9 5.5 0.6 11.1 
Sources: Cf. E/CN. 14/370 1966, p. 89. 
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more spread over the world. 
Thus , from the accessible statistics, the West African 
trade was being diversified during the early 1960's. 
This diversification is to be seen not only in the 
destination of exports or origin of imports as indicated 
above , but also in the composition of the commodities exported. 
Hence, cocoa, groundnuts, palm products, rubber,and coffee 
represented in value, over 72 per cent of total exports in 
1950 , but only a little over 60 per cent in 1963. 
But diversification over a short period of time is 
not indicative enough. Has the tendency been sustained since 
1963? This is the issue. 
As far as the French speaking countries are concerned, 
Table 15 in the Appendix is a record of their trade since 
1963, but only with the major industrial powers. UMOA (Union 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine) is a local monetary grouping among 
7 francephone countries. Over the period considered , 1963- 68, 
the EEC has remained the major client and supplier of these 
countries linked among themselves by the franc cfa (Com-
munaute Financi~re Africaine) . 
But in BCEAO 1968 the importance of France in the 
trade of the EEC with UMOA is given in Table 2 - 8. 
From here, it can easily be concluded that the period 
1967/68 inclusive, France is still the major trader with the 
UMOA countries which comprises all her former West African 
territories except Guinea and Mali. France dominates tre-
mendously the exchange EEC - UMOA. However, the share of 
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TABLE 2 - 8 
Share of France in EEC - UMOA Exchanges: 1963/64- 1967/68 
Share of 
France in 
EEC Ex-
changes 
with UMOA 1963/64 
Imports by 
EEC 73.1 
Exports 
EEC 84.1 
1964/65 
66.4 
81.6 
1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 
66.2 64.4 61.2 
79.6 77.1 73.6 
Source BCEAO 1968, STEFF IMP. Paris, p. 37. 
France in this trade is decreasing. It is nonetheless true 
that France still carries the major proportion, at least 
up to 1967/68. Nowhere through the period considered has 
she contributed less than 61 per cent, and once, 1963/64, 
that is after independence, she went as far as to contribute 
84.1 per cent to EEC exports to her former West African de -
pendencies. 
Thus, at least for the French influence area, with 
the possible exception of Guinea and Mali , though it is ob-
viously true that the share of the Metropole is decreasing, 
this Metropole still dominates the commercial relations of 
these new states. 
To make a comparison between the information con-
tained in Table 16 in the Appendix and what was said before , 
always within the framework of decreasing trade with the 
metropolitan powers, an average could be found for the 
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percentage exports in Table 16. Thus, the ex-AOF (that is, 
in Table 16 in the Appendix, Section A excluding Togo but 
including Guinea from Section D) , exported on the average 
50.49 per cent of their sales to the EEC countries includ-
ing France. The British Commonwealth countries concerned 
sent, on the average 42.15 per cent of thcirs to the United 
Kingdom. 
If this constitutes enough ground, then it follows 
that the former French territories, though still selling a 
higher percentage of their exports to France, are selling 
less and less on their metropolitan market. The British 
Commonweaith territories sell less of their exports (but not 
an insignificant proportion) in the United Kingdom, but the 
decrease in these sales over years is not spectacular. The 
1965 statistics would rather show an increase in the average 
percentage of the exports of these countries to the UK: 42.15 
in 1965 against 39.23 in 1963. 
Though this information is statistically true, it 
would be wise to compile more data before drawing any defini-
tive conclusion. 
What about the composition of the exports? As far as 
this is concerned, Table 2-9 gives an idea of the situation. 
No definite statement can be made from the table. 
The share of cocoa in total exports declined in 1963 relative 
to 1950; it declined further in 1965. The share of coffee 
in these total exports maintained a rising trend; i.e. it 
can be represented by a positively sloping line over the 
TABLE 2-9 
West Africa: Certain Commodities Share in Total Exports: 
(1950, 1963, and 1965) 
Total West Africa Share of each Commodity in 
Total West African Exports 
Commodity 1950 1963 1965 1950 1963 1965 
million us $ Percentages 
Cocoa beans 234.1 333.7 366.4 32.5 22.8 20.25 
Coffee 41.8 109.9 152.3 5.8 7.5 8.42 
Gold 26.4 32.8 3.7 2.2 
Manganese 14.0 13.0 1.9 0.9 
1-' Timber 21.6 109.7 79.3 3.0 7.5 4.38 l'V 
Industrial 0'1 
Diamonds lO.Oa 61.2a 18.9 1.4a 4.2a 1.04 
Bauxite & cones. 0.6 1.4 0.1 0.1 -
Peanuts 82.6 185.2 55.5b 11.4 12.7 3.07b 
Palm kernels 70.5 78.8 9.8 5.4 
Rubber 54.2 58.4 59.6 7.5 4.0 3.29 
Petroleum 190.7 10.54 
Peanut oil 30.7 58.9 53.2 4.3 4.0 2.94 
Iron ores & 
cones. 4.3 48.7 0.6 3.3 
Phosphate 9.6 0.7 
Fish 1.1 21.2 0.2 1.4 
Live Animals 2.6 14.3 14.6 0.4 1.0 0.8 
Bananas 5.8 18.6 17.7 0.8 1.3 1.0 
Cotton seeds 0.7 4.3 0.1 0.3 
Total West Africa 
TABLE 2-9 
(continued) 
Share of each Commodity in 
Total West African Exports 
Commodity 1950 1963 1965 1950 1963 1965 
Tin 
Palm oil 
Diamonds 
(excl. indus-
trial) 
Oil seeds and 
nuts 
million US $ 
16.9 
36.7 
3.3 
28.3 
51.7 
205.9 
Percentages 
2.3 
5.1 
0.2 
1.9 
Source: UN. EC. 14/370 Tableau 49, p. 83. Etude sur la situation economique 
de l'Afrique 1966, Vol. 1. African Affairs 1970, Vol. 68-No. 270 
January 1966, p. 27 Table 1: "Exports propsects for Africa South of 
the Sahara" by David Wall. 
(a): Some precious stones included in industrial diamonds. 
(b): Does not show figure for Nigeria. 
2.86 
11.39 
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same periods. Thus these two products considered, coffee was 
gaining weight in the regional exports. Unfortunately else-
where, timber and banana for instance, the trend initiated 
over the period 1950-1963 has been disturbed. With regard 
to 1950, the share of these two commodities in total exports 
increased in 1963; in 1965, these shares decreased in relation 
to 1963. 
However, the composition of the exports exhibits more 
diversification than in the early years. The heavy reliance 
on one or a few products has been progressively declining. 
Considering again the same group of commodities which in 1950 
represented over 72 per cent of total exports, but on~y a 
little over 60 per cent in 1963, it can be shown that the 
same products, namely cocoa, palm products, rubber, coffee, 
peanuts, including oil seeds and nuts, and other peanut pro-
ducts, represented in 1965, only about 51 per cent of total 
exports. The progress in diversification is then considerable. 
The findings on foreign trade so far can be summarized 
as follows: The regional economy, formerly heavily dependent 
upon the export of one or a few commodities is being more and 
more diversified. The external trade, though still important 
with the respective metropolitan power is being more and more 
spread over the world. These are the two major aspects of the 
plague from which the regional economy has been suffering. 
Whether the countries should accentuate the variation in the 
composition of their exports to the outside world or rather 
emphasize the diversification of the destination of these 
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exports is an obsolete problem. An intensification of both 
policies seems more appropriate. 
The problem of market for West African products is 
an i mp ortant issue at a time when the effects of metrocen-
trism is still relatively strong, and impedes a more liberal 
trading policy. It is still one of the fundamental conditions 
for economic development in the region heavily dependent upon 
foreign trade. Itlli a non negligible precondition for economic 
independence which these new states are in search of. 
This, of course, does not mean that the volume of 
trade with the metropoles should necessarily decrease abruptly. 
Such a drop would create very serious problemsfur the new 
states. What is needed is rather a very low marginal pro-
pensity to trade with the respective former colonial powers, 
i.e. a very low disposition to carry on further trade (ad-
ditional trade) with the mother lands. Thus the best stra-
tegy would be to divert more rapidly to other markets addit-
ional output being produced for trade. Of course, this in-
valves a lot of problems which go beyond the scope of this 
study. 
On the other hand, further variation in the composi-
tion of sales would certainly reduce the intensity of the 
effects of world market instability. 
However, the real solution to the problems of the 
West African trade lies within Africa. The domestic trade, 
that is the intraregional and continental trade is too small. 
Ways and means s hould be found to increase the proportion of 
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this trade in total exchanges. It was statistically shown 
that in 1963, West Africa did not sell even 5 per cent of its 
exports to West African countries and that hardly seven per 
cent of its exports, that is total exports, were sold in 
Africa. The import statistics showed even more deplorable 
figures. In short, West Africa generally conducts a very 
small percentage of its trade with countries within its 
boundaries. An approach to the dilemma would be to increase 
the domestic trade so as to promote development from within. 
This can be done only through industrialization whereby more 
goods would be created for exchange within the region and 
with other African regions. 1 
West Africa depends heavily on foreign trade, and 
exchanges almost entirely primary products for manufactured 
goods. Recalling the low income elasticity of demand for 
1. A.F. Ewing: Op. Cffit., p. 99: 
" .•. The relatively limited scope for increase export of 
primary products, except for some minerals, was pointed 
out •.. There is scope for a higher degree of processing 
primary products for exports. But the only real way to 
increase African trade is by more intra-African trade ... ; 
the relevant point here is that if new links among African 
countries are to be viable, there will have to be a large 
increase in the volume of goods to be transported. 
All the arguments lead to the same conclusion. Intra-
African trade is limited because nearly all African 
countries produce the same few products. If trade is to 
be increased, there will have to be available more tradable 
goods, which means diversification of the economies and 
thus extensive industrialization. In African conditions 
industrialization is impossible without increased trade 
among neighbours. Specific provisions for trade expan-
sion has to be made in national development plans .•• " 
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most of the regional products and the high income elasticity 
of demand for manufactures, it can rightly be stated that 
" ... the long-run prospects in terms of existing patterns 
for the earning of foreign exchange, and hence development, 
are poor". 1 Here again, an increased intra-African trade is 
to be called for. 
" ... ,the essence of the matter is that there can 
be no real increase in trade unless there is 
a wider range of goods to trade in, especially 
industrial. There is no way of obtaining a 
growing volume of industrial goods without pro-
ducing them in Africa, thus propelling develop-
ment from within .•. ". 1 
In short, West Africa is to create more goods within 
its boundaries if it wants to progress at all 
SUMMARY 
At this stage of the discussion, the point is reached 
where, by way of summary, an attempt can be made to point out 
the similarities and dissimilarities between national units 
within the area. 
As far as the dissimilarities are concerned, it is 
obvious that the economic entities under study here are un-
equal in size measured by population or by territorial ex-
tent. The disproportion in the national income, and hence 
in the per capita income, is considerable. 
The countries are unequally endowed with mineral 
1. A.F. Ewing: "Prospects for Economic Integration in Africa". 
Journal of Modern African Studies: 5, 1. pp. 53-67. 
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resources, though prospection might not be complete at this 
stage. 
Obviously, due to their historical background - they 
all (except Liberia) have been under the colonial r~girne of 
two different European powers - the economic and commercial 
policies differ from country to country. Rather, it would 
be preferable to state that differences in these policies 
are noticeable between the countries of the British Common-
wealth on the one hand, and the countries of the Union 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine on the other. This cleavage is 
important for, as it was shown in the analysis of the intra-
regional trade, commercial relations seem to follow its lines. 
The natural disadvantage of the inland countries corn-
pels them to trade heavily within the region. In certain re-
spects, some of the poorer coastal countries tend to follow 
their path. 
Though all are underdeveloped, the economies reveal 
a high degree of disparity betweenthe level of their achieve-
ments. This is measured by the level of their industrial de-
veloprnent and is very significant in their relations. 
As far as the similarities are concerned, production 
for export and even for domestic use consists chiefly of pri-
mary commodities (i.e. food and raw materials). It follows 
that the major proportion of manufactured goods consumed with-
in the region is imported from overseas. Everywhere agricul-
ture occupies the majority of the population. 
In commerce, the direction of trade of each country, 
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formerly heavily concentrated in favour of its metropolitan 
industrial power - France and the United Kingdom depending on 
the case; and the United States for Liberia - is being diver-
sified. 
While dealing with diversification, it should be re-
called that the composition of the national outputs is being 
varied too. Thus, instead of relying on one primary product, 
these economies have started to develop broader bases. 
The trade of each West African country with other West 
African countries is a negligible proportion of their total 
trade. Each West African nation trade with other African 
countries is similarly insignificant. 
Finally, it will be shown below that each state de-
rives its public revenues mainly from import and export duties. 
Since each country derives a substantial part of its national 
revenue from foreign trade, the "West African Territories 
are peculiarly susceptible to economic fluctuations origi-
nating abroad" . 
It follows from the characteristics exhibited above 
that the region concerned includes within its boundaries 
typically less advanced countries. Their prosperity, the 
development of their economies, requires an expansion of ex-
changes within the region. This is so because the small size 
of the individual domestic markets does not permit a high 
degree of specialization and an efficient producti on at a 
large scale to reduce costs. Obviously, exchange cannot be 
multiplied if subsistence agriculture remains the dominant 
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characteristic of the economies. The expansion of trade 
therefore calls for industrialization which would provide 
commodities to exchangP-. But industrialization can be pro-
fitable only if the size of the market is large enough to 
permit large scale production. Consequently, the appropriate 
solution to the development problems here lies in the creation 
of a large market, i.e. in integration. This, the West 
African leaders seem to have understood. What their en-
deavours in that activity have led to is the subject matter 
of the subsequent section. 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA 
A) A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
When practical issues of economic unification in 
west Africa are raised, it is probably wise to talk of 
economic cooperation even though various economic organi-
zations aiming at integration have existed in the region. 
The riparian nations of the Senegal and Niger rivers see 
that it is to their advantage to cooperate in the development 
of their river systems; also the members of the Council of 
the Entente have agreed to coordinate their policies for 
taxation of meat. When it comes to economic integration, it 
can be argued that the various attempts have failed for even 
if they are progressing, they are doing so very timidly. 
Before attacking the problem itself, it is indispen-
sable to make it clear that one cannot talk of economic co-
operation or integration in West Africa without reference to 
the colonial era. Even if colonization has split, and is 
still tearing West Africa into pieces, it is an undeniable 
fact that the imperial regimes had laid down the bases for 
economic cooperation among their respective colonies within 
the area. Of course, it is well understood that where they 
brought their territories close together, the nineteenth 
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century invaders principally aimed at facilitating their ad-
ministration. It is nonetheless true that, in general, the 
territories emerging from the same imperial power feel closer 
to one another than their geographically close st neighbours 
formerly administered by another colonial power. 
In British West Africa, the colonies were not con-
tiguous. However, a common currency circulated among them. 
Indeed, a West African Currency Board existed for Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. These territories shared 
common marketing boards and common airlines. But with inde-
pendence, these arrangements became defunct and each new state 
created its own currency. Ironically, it is commonly held 
that these territories as colonies were much more open to one 
another than as independent sovereign states. However, they 
are still all members of the British Commonwealth. Wrote 
Adebayo Adedeji: 1 
" ... It is paradoxical but nevertheless true that 
resources, particularly capital and labour, moved 
more freely from one country to another within 
the region during the colonial era than they now 
do. Thousands of West Africans lived and worked 
in countries other than their own for years 
unmolested during the colonial period. They freely 
brought capital from their native lands to their 
adopted countries and were free to repatriate their 
profits and capital horne •... Since independence 
this has become increasingly difficult .•• ". 
In the former French West Africa, cooperation inherited 
from the colonial ties has not been dissipated. This does 
l. Adebayo Adedeji, "Prospects of Regional Economic Coopera-
tion in West Africa". The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 8, N. 2, July 1970, p. 229. Adedeji was 
writing on West Africa as a region. 
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not mean that xenophobia is absent here. Under the colonial 
regime, Dakar (eapital of Senegal) was the federal capital 
of the F rench West African 'Empire' (Afrique Occidentale 
Fran~aise, or AOF). The regional colonial administration, a 
federal administration in its structure, brought these former 
French territories much closer to o ne another than the Brit-
ish colonies. These territories, Senegal, Ivory Coast, 
Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, and Guinea , 
were not only politically bound around Dakar, but were also 
closely linked by economic relations expressed in the form 
of their common currency, the franc CFA (Communaute Financiere 
Africaine), closely tied to the French franc. Togo shared the 
common currency with these countries. 
When finally political independence was being won in 
Africa in the second half of this twentieth century, the 
desire to stay together within the same economic system was 
concretely expressed by the French speaking states. The 
peculiar cases of Guinea and Mali who adopted their own na-
tional currencies constitute minor deviations and need not 
be discussed in detail here. 
In the general case, even before complete political 
independence was gained, seven francophone countries, on 9 
June, 1959, reassembled under UDAO (Union Douaniere de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest). The agreement was signed in Paris. 
UDAO is usually described as a pure and simple extension of 
the colonial ties of Paris with the participants, namely 
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, 
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and Niger. The Paris June 1959 convention pointed at a com-
plete customs union. All duties (customs and fiscal) , on 
trade between member states were to be abolished. The agree-
ment foresaw a redistribution of revenue from customs duties 
through a system of refund so that each state gets its share. 1 
But after independence, UDAO could not meet the needs 
of the new states. Indeed, shortly after its institution, 
UDAO ran into difficulties on the distribut~on of customs 
revenue between the member countries on account of growing 
disparities between their indirect tax systems. When states 
started to adjust the customs duties so as to meet their bud-
getary needs and protect their own domestic industries, and 
when finally in 1962, after the Decision 53/UD/62 du Comite 
de l'UDAO, the exchange of products originating in the region 
was subject to fiscal duties, the future of the union was de-
finitely impaired. So, on the whole, budgetary difficulties 
coupled with problems of customs administration were to work 
to undermine the union, to weaken it, and to finally lead to 
its collapse. And on 3 June, 1966, a few years after its 
establishment, UDAO had to give way to a new union, UDEAO. 
The agreement of the Union Douaniere des Etats de l'Afrique 
de l'Ouest, UDEAO, superseding the paris June 1959 agreement 
was signed in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). The new agreement offic-
ially came into effect in December 1966, to be effective only 
1. Ivory Coast, Chambre de Commerce de la Cote d'Ivoire, 
Bulletn Mensuel,Mars 1968, p. 19. 
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in 1967. 
The convention of this new Customs Union of the West 
Afric an States (UDEAO), makes provisions for the definition 
of a preferential fiscal system applied internal~y, for the 
definition of a common tariff, and for the establishment of 
the administration of the union. 
In that respect, the convention provides in its arti-
cle 6(1) that 
"products originating in UDEAO countries and 
brought into member states shall be subject 
to fiscal taxation, of whatever form, the 
total of which shall be equal to 50 per cent 
of the aggregate of the most favourable taxa-
tion applicable to similar imported products". 
It adds, article 6(3): 
"whenever a similar industry is set up in another 
member state, that state shall be authorized by 
the Council of Ministers of UDEAO to raise the 
fiscal duties defined above to 70 per cent of 
the total rate provided for in the first para-
graph of the present article". 
A criticism of this type of provisions is made below with re-
spect to problems likely to arise from the appropriate loca-
tion of certain industries. 
In general, commercial relations between UDEAO countries 
have been regulated by a set of unintel l igible dispositions 
that could only endanger the functioning of the union. The 
Abidjan June 1966 convention impeded the distribution of pro-
ducts b etween member countries whereas, in principle, it aimed 
at facilitating it. In the provisions stated above, how 
should one understand the phrase 'aggregate of the most favour-
able taxation'? In the absence of agreement on a precise 
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definition of this term, relations were determined bilaterally 
among member countries. For instance, the circular n. 1967, 
dated 24 April 1967 and issued by the Customs Directorate of 
senegal, and the circular n. 37, dated 29 April 1967, issued 
by the Customs Directorate of the Ivory Coa st, regulate trade 
relations between the two countries. The two Ministers of 
Finance agr~ed that the expression 'aggregate rate of taxation' 
covers all duties collected on products imported from the 
European Economic Community. 
Besides this deal, the Ivory Coast on her part, by 
ordinance n. 66-593 dated December 14, 1966, stipulated that 
the provisions concerning the reduced fiscal taxation at 50 
per cent of the aggregate rate of the most favourable taxation 
would not apply to her imports from Niger and Upper Volta. 
The trade agreement signed at Abidjan on 19 February 1966 be-
tween Ivory Coast and Upper Volta was to b e implemented; and 
the trade agreement signed at Abidjan on 19 March 1963 be-
tween Ivory Coast and Niger was to be maintained. 
Senegal, on the other hand, had achieved complete 
customs union with Mauritania. 
The government of Dahomey defined its position with 
regard to the UDEAO Convention in the circular n. 3/61 dated 
24 February 1967. 
Other exa~ples can be given. What is important is 
that, from the standpoint of an individual member country, 
products originating in the territories of its partners were 
subject to a diversity of taxation, probably hard to administer. 
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where is the union! Why determine relations bilaterally or 
even unilaterally? 
As for relations with third countries, article 8 of 
the convention stipulates: 
"products originating in third countries, not 
consumed in a member state, and sent to another 
state, shall be subject to all entry duties and 
taxes applicable to them by virtue of their origin". 
This is to say that they are subject to a second taxation! 
"The said products shall be admitted to the 
country of consignment only on presentation of a 
customs document certifying that the duties and 
taxes paid in the member state will be repaid to 
the consignor. This document must be accompanied, 
unless exceptions are granted by the state of 
consignment, by an invoice showing directly the 
amount of duties and taxes previously paid in 
the member state reconsigning the goods. Any 
other system of repayment shall be left to the 
discretion of the member states". 1 
The Decision n. 24 UD 66 states the duties and taxes 
collected on entry and which are to be repaid to the consignor 
by the state of origin. 
The Convention recognizes the Council of Ministers 
(composed mainly of the Ministers of Finance) as the supreme 
institution of UDEAO. This Council alone has the power of 
decision. A Committee of Experts, as it is called, groups 
representatives of the member states, studies the suggestions 
of the Secretary'· General, makes proposals, and recommends 
policies. The Secretary General does not decide, but provides 
a liaison between member states and the other institutions, 
l. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/WA/EC/2 Add. 1, p. 3. 
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and implements the decisions of the Council. 
These are, in the main, the provisions of UDEAO. 
Before considering any other organizations for 
economic cooperation or integration in West Africa in the 
nineteen-sixties, it is indispensable to note that, owing to 
dissatisfaction with the working of UDEAO, a summit of the 
union was held at Bamako on 20-21 May, 1970, to reconsider 
closer integration of the national economies. The summit was 
attended by the Heads of state of the member countries. A 
protocol adopted at the conlcusion of the meeting created a 
West African Economic Community (CEAO: Communaute Economique 
de !'Afrique de l'Ouest) which is, in essence, an institution 
of economic, industrial, and customs cooperation. 1 The new 
organization aims at improving the infrastructure for distFi-
bution, transport, transit, and communications; at promoting 
and accelerating industrialization of the member states and 
developing a harmonious economic balance between them; at 
increa sing commercial exchange in agricultural and industrial 
products. 
The community will have a Conference of Heads of state, 
a Council of Ministers, and a Secretariat General. The com-
munity, said the communique issued at the end of the confer-
ence, is open to any West African state. The Minister of 
Finance of the Republic of Togo attended the summit as an ob-
server. 
1. Africa Digest, August 1970, pp. 77-78. 
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This is, in short, the evolution of integration at 
customs union level among the French speaking West African 
territories since 1959. 
But it is not the only endeavour towards economic in-
tegration or cooperation in West Africa. Again in the French 
influence zone, the Federation of Mal~ and the Conseil de 
l'Entente date back to 1959. It is generally argued that, 
when in January 1959 the leaders of Senegal, the French Soudan 
(now Mali) v Dahomey, and Upper Volta decided the formation of 
the Federation of Mali, they actually intended to establish 
a new form of Federation among the French speaking West Afri-
can states. Unfortunately, only Senegal and the French Sou~ 
dan finally formed the Federation; but they had to part com-
pany ~l1urtly ctfter, in 1960, owing to political incompatibility. 
The grouping initiated in 1959 by Abidjan is still 
existing. This group, known as the Conseil de l'Entente, 
hereafter called simply the Entente, initially united around 
Abidjan 1 Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta. The Entente, then 
a four country or.ganization, started as a loose political in-
stitution to evolve into an institution of economic cooper-
ation and expresses today the most effective form of cooperation 
within the area. When Togo became a member in June 1966, 
the Entente was promoted as a "model of a realistic, gradua-
list approach to the achievement of greater unity in Africa". 
Whether or not its promise will be realized remains to be seen. 
Though political in nature, the Entente was conceived, 
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even in 1959, as an economic organization. The provision of 
the 1959 agreement to harmonize the development plans of the 
member countries has not yet materialized. However, a joint 
fund was devised to support development projects in the member 
countries. Each state was paying into this fund one tenth of 
its budgetary receipts; as for the reallocation of the pro-
ceeds, only one sixteenth was going to the Ivory Coast and 
five-sixteenths to each of the other three partners. 1 
This Solidarity Fund through which the Ivory Coast 
was in fact subsidizing the budget of the other members has 
been transformed, since June 1966, into a Mutual Aid and Loan 
Guaranty Fund, (Fonds d'entraide et de garantie des emprunts, 
as it is called), to assist the member states and guarantee 
their borrowings abroad. Still, the Ivory Coast is the major 
source of finance. She is to contribute annually more than 
77 per cent of the resources of the Fund (500 out of the 650 
million francs) 2 when Niger, Dahomey, and Upper Volta would 
contribute each around 6 per cent (42 mn francs); and Togo 
around 4 per cent (24 mn francs). The Ivory Coast was not to 
draw on the Fund for the first five years. 
Before leaving economic groupings among the French 
speaking territories, UMOA, l'Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine, 
deserves comment. UMOA is the monetary union instituted by 
l. Adebayo Adedeji, Op. Cit., p.222. 
2. Ibid., p. 222. Also Peter Robson, Economic Integration 
in Africa. Op. Cit., p. 247. 
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the Paris 12 May, 1962 Treaty among six former AOF countries -. 
These countries are: the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Dahomey, Niger, 
Upper Volta, and Mauritania. By the Nouakchott 27 November 
1963 Convention, the Republic of Togo formally joined the 
Union. BCEAO, the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de 
1'0uest, · is the international public organization adminis-
tering the common cur~ency, the franc CFA (Communaute 
Financiere Africaine), which is closely tied to French franc. 
Other forms of organizations have been established 
in the region. The famous Ghana-Guinea union, instituted in 
1958 and joined in 1961 by Mali but finally liquidated in 
1963, can only be cited as a first attempt at unification be-
tween French and English speaking West Africa. It has never 
been effective insofar as economic activities are concerned. 
Within the same category of barrier-breaking organi-
zations c~n be classified an attempt of first stage integra-
tion among Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. 
These four states have proposed the establishment of a West 
African Free Trade Area embracing their national territories. 
An Interim West African Organization for Economic Cooperation 
was created by the heads of state concerned in August 1964, 
with headquarters in Monrovia, was instructed to study the 
most appropriate form of economic association among the mem-
bers, and to recommend a draft convention for that purpose. 
Since then, no one knows for sure how much progress has been 
realized in that field. 
In other endeavours, there exist in West Africa a lot 
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of river basin organizations which intend not only to develop 
hydroelectric power from the river the member states share, 
but also to exploit the river basin as much as available 
technology permits. Mention will not be made of the Mono 
project which requires the collaboration of both Dahomey and 
Togo. These two countries have agreed to purchase power 
from the Akosombo dam in Ghana. The Mono river can still be 
exploited profitably for irrigation purposes, and even in 
the long run, for hydroelectricity. 
The riparian states of the Senegal river, namely 
Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania, have been planning the 
development of their common river basin for quite a long 
time. Since 1964, an intergovernmental committee, known as 
the Committee for the Improvement of the Senegal River, has 
been concerned with the exploitation of this river basin, 
building a dam at Gouina for various purposes and realizing 
other developments. Gouina is expected to develop into an 
iron manufacture centre. 
The Republic of Senegal has the natural advantage of 
having access to another river, the Gambia. Indeed, the pro-
posed Sene-Gambia Federation has been strongly defended on 
ground of the many possibilities of development the exploita-
tion of the Gambia river offers both countries. In would, 
among other things, permit easy transport of Senegal peanuts. 
A storage dam on the Gambia river would make it possible to 
develop land through irrigation and at the same time to save 
the estuary as rice land. 
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Another basin, that of the Niger river, offers many 
prospects. There exists, since 1963, a Niger River Commission 
which groups Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, Upper Volta, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria and intends to improve the Niger basin. 
The success of these river basin commissions depends 
on the confidence each state has in the other members ... It 
is highly desirable that the geography of West Africa, par-
ticularly the nature of the river systems, promote economic 
and political integration, just as historically similar geo-
graphical advantages have contributed to the unification of 
China. 
What should not be ignored while dealing with econo-
mic groupings in West Africa is the many efforts the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (Un-ECA), founded in 1958, has 
been making in the subregion of the geographical area it is 
responsible for. The Secretariat of the Commission has made 
many studies and suggestions concerning economic integration 
in the West African subregion. But the ECA can only play the 
role of consultant. The main task should not be left to this 
institution. 
When in October 1966 the representatives of the 14 
West African countries met in Niamey, they were to discuss, 
as drafted by the ECA Secretariat, 1 the articles of a treaty 
associating them into a community. The aims of this community 
1. Adebayo Adedeji, Op. Cit., p. 223. 
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were to be: 
i) to promote through the economic cooperation of 
its Member States a coordinated development of their economies, 
especially in industry, agriculture, transport, and communica-
tions, trade and payments, manpower, national resources ; 
ii) to further the maximum possible interchange of 
goods and services between its Member States and, to this 
end, to eliminate progressively customs and other barriers to 
the expansion of trade between them as well as restrictions 
on current payment transactions and on capital movements; 
iii) to contribute to the orderly expansion of trade 
between the Member States and the rest of the world and , to 
this end, to take measures which render their products rela-
tively competitive with goods imported from outside the com-
munity, and seek to obtain more favourable conditions for 
their products in the world market; and, 
iv) by all these efforts and endeavours to make a 
full contribution to the economic development of the continent 
of Africa as a whole. 
Since then resolutions have been passed and meetings 
held at Acdra, Dakar, and Monrovia to discuss the establish-
ment of a 14 country West African economic community. As of 
4 May, 1967, that is at the conclusion of the Accra Confer-
ence (24 April - 4 May, 1967), the following countries have 
signed a protocol of Association into a West African Economic 
Community: Dahomey, Ghana, Upper Volta, Liberia, Mali, 
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Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and 
the Ivory Coast. 
The Accra Protocol set up an Interim Council of Min-
isters, article 5(3) 1 to draft a treaty regulating the Com-
munity. This Interim Council of Ministers even examined a 
first draft of this treaty at its first meeting in Dakar, 
21-24 November, 1967. 1 In this draft treaty, the aims of the 
community are the same as those listed above. 
What the author of the present study does not seem to 
understand is that, most of the West African states that in 
May 1970 signed the Bamako Protocol to decide on the estab-
lishment of CEAO, the Economic Community of West Africa, had 
already signed the Accra Protocol. It is well understood 
that the Bamako Summit was designed to put life into UDEAO. 
What is not yet clear is the future of the two West African 
Economic Communities. Does West Africa need two large com-
munities overlapping in their membership? 
Whatever be the case, the West African economies can 
develop better through integration. In light of all economi-
cal conditions, the 14 country West African economic community 
is the most viable economic institution to develop in the 
area. It promises economies of large scale and specialization 
as discussed earlier. The following section is an attempt to 
devise the best possible approach to integration within the 
region. 
l. Un-ECA, E/CN.l4/WA/EC5, 30 October 1967. 
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B) AN APPROACH TO INTEGRATING THE WEST AFRICAN 
ECONOMIES 
The Barriers to Integration in the Region 
The foregoing discussion of West Africa's economic 
structure and its attempts of economic integration indicates 
that the major barriers to economic unit of the region include: 
i) the heavy weight the customs duties have as a 
source of revenue; 
ii) artificial barriers between French and English 
speaking West Africa (these will be analyzed within the frame-
work of international affiliations) ; 
iii) an international power struggle by national lead-
ers to establish dominance beyond their borders; and 
iv) the generally inferior transportation network of 
the area. 
This list is not, and cannot pretend to be exhaus-
tive. To start with, monetary problems must be eliminated 
from the discussion. West Africa need not adopt a single 
currency to start integrating. What is required is the con-
vertibility of the different national currencies . That is 
to say that the Guinean franc, the Ghanian cedi, the Niger-
ian pounds, and the francCFAmust be mutually convertible. 
The non-convertibility of the national currencies can only 
impede trade among the states. 
The adoption of a single currency can be discussed 
when the partners agree to proceed to an economic union. As 
things stand today, negotiations for a complete economic union 
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in west Africa offer little prospect of success so that it 
is preferable to leave monetary discussions out of the study. 
The limited amount of international trade the West 
African states have among themselves is, in part, a result 
of their infrastructure. It is not necessary to review again 
the state of the existing infrastructure since it has been 
fully explained with respect to the impact of colonialism on 
the region. It is however not superfluous to state some of 
the problems which would be solved as a result of an improve-
ment in the infrastructure. The volume of the intraregional 
trade would undeniably increase if the transportation net-
work was made to serve this purpose. Without this improve-
ment the transport difficulties will continue to increase 
costs inside the region and thus discourage exchange of re-
gional products. It should also be recalled that minerals 
invite exploitation once the problems of transportation are 
solved. Certainly, the infrastructure in West Africa has im-
proved over recent years. But the statement by Lugard 1 that 
"the material development of Africa may be summed up in one 
word- transport", seems to hav.e some validity. It is ob-
vious that improved infrastructure reduces transportation 
costs. 2 
Statistics are given above which indicate that the 
1. Kamark, Andrew M., The Economics of African Development. 
Praeger 1967. p. 175. 
2. A Permanent Transport Committee has been set up with 
Technical Subcommittees to deal with the problems of 
transportation. Cf. UN-ECA, E/CN.l4/366, Niamey, Oct. 
10-22, 1966. 
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small volume of the intraregional trade which occurs in West 
Africa is more or less concentrated among countries of simi-
lar economic systems - that is among countries that have emerged 
from the same colonial rulers. The divi sion is on the basis 
of language. Maybe this lingual cleavage should be termed 
cultural. The former colonies are so attached to the culture 
transmitted to them by their colonial administrators that they 
tend to ignore their geographically closest neighbours and to 
deal with more distant countries having the same educational 
background, countries with which they seem to have more in 
common. Countries of different language groups feel alien to 
one another so that cooperation within the same language group 
seems to be relatively easier. The apparently more successful 
subregional group - the Entente is among countries that have 
adopted the same working language and that have the same eco-
nomic system. Ghana, which is not a member of the Entente, 
is completely surrounded by members of this institution. 
The cleavage among these two groups is even better 
depicted in their international affiliations both politically 
and economically. Economically, Ghana and Nigeria, so it 
seems, deviate a little from the trend since they are said 
not to grant reciprocal preferences to British goods. Only 
Sierra Leone and Gambia in the sterling zone grant reciprocal 
preferences to Britain though these preferences are taken to 
be moderate in the case of the first country and insignificant 
in the case of the second one. This is the situation among 
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the Anglophones. 1 
The Francophones, with their special relationship to 
France, have been associated with the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and grant reciprocal preferences to members of 
this institution of the Western World. Though the escape 
clauses make it possible for the Associates to form customs 
unions even with third countries provided the union is not 
"incompatible with the principles or provisions of the Con-
vention", 2 some imprecise issues might still remain to be 
solved. 
What would happen if a West African customs union is 
formed between Ghana and French-speaking nations which are 
affiliated with the EEC. Will Ghana automatically receive 
the same preferences from the Common Market? When actually 
is a customs union incompatible with the provisions of the 
Convention? 
MoEe acute than the issue above, and most detrimental 
to West Africa is the lack of cordial relations among the 
two language groups. They seem to mistrust each other. This 
atmosphere of non-confidence is an expression of their 
1. Onitri, H.M.A., "Towards a West African Economic Community". 
Op. Cit., p. 48. "None of the former British West Afri-
can territories gives preferential tariff treatment to 
British goods and none of them now derives any significant 
benefit from the system of Imperial Preference. Unlike the 
countries of the French Community, therefore, the West 
African members of the British Commonwealth are not handi-
capped by any special commercial relationship with their 
former colonial masters." 
2 . Ibid. p. 4 7 . 
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international affiliation. It seems that each group would 
like to keep for themselves advantages so far acquired. 
This is a major criticism of the existing relationship be-
tween the Francophones and the European Economic Community. 
The Anglophones complain that the Francophones obstruct their 
own association with the EEC because they do not want to 
share the advantages which they obtained for themselves. 
Wrote Adebayo Adedeji: 1 
" ... In fact, the association of these countries 
with the European Economic Community not only 
seems to have strengthened the hold of France 
on their economies, but another unfortunate as-
pect has been that some of them have opposed the 
admission of some other African states to asso-
ciate status. Their governments have been press-
ing for even more exclusive advantages and are 
'very reluctant to water down the very real gains 
they derive from trade discrimination by admitting 
other African competitors to the charmed circles'. 
Yet these same leaders have assembled in Monrovia, 
Lagos, Niamey, Accra, Dakar, and other capitals to 
agree with the anglophone countries on the need 
for an African Common Market, a West African Econo-
mic Community, or what-have-you." 
It is quite obvious that this climate raises obstacles 
·to the establishment of a genuine economic community in West 
Africa. But to admit that this obstacle exists does not 
necessarily imply that economic integration in the area is 
impossible. 
Before searching ways and means to prepare the estab-
lishment of the community, a few more words should be said 
1. Adedeji, Adebayo: "Prospects of Regional Economic Co-
operation in West Africa". The Journal of Modern Afri-
can Studies. Vol. 8, N. 2, July 1970. p. 226. 
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about the problem itself. In the nineteen seventies, an 
apparent rapprochement seems to be taking place between the 
two groups. They have been expressing the desire to co-
operate among themselves more than before. 1 In addition, 
Yaound~ II 2 encourages Africans to coordinate their efforts 
towards development. In that respect, regional groupings 
with third countries should not raise serious problems. 
But it might be noted in passing that the Anglophones, 
to be consistent, might have to explain their quest for asso-
ciate membership with the EEC. The Association has made it 
possible for foreign industrial powers to strengthen their 
hold on the economies of the Associates. Why do the critics 
of the associate status seek this associate membership? 
Whatever be the case, the European Economic Community 
seems to be opening its door to the United Kingdom. If it 
does, the proposed West African Economic Community might be 
one of the beneficiaries, because the associate membership 
might be granted to its four British Commonwealth partners. 
11 The entry into operation of the Convention has come at the 
end of a month in which an assurance was formally given to 
the United Kingdom that 9 Commonwealth African countries will 
1. cf. Nigeria-Senegal: "Building a Special Relationship". 
West Africa N. 2810 of 23 April, 1971. p. 441. Cf. also 
Communique issued at the end of General Gowan's visit to 
Senghor early 1971. 
2. Yaounde I and Yaounde II refer to the Conventions of 
Association of the Francophones with the EEC. Yaounde 
I, the first Convention of Association, was signed in 
Yaounde (Cameroun) . 
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be offered associate membership of the EEC if Britain joins 
II 1 These nine African countries include all the four West ... 
African states of the Commonwealth, namely Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. But should West Africans wait for 
European unification to develop their own viable economic com-
munity? 
To end this discussion, it is the belief of the author 
of this thesis that a beneficial West African economic com-
munity ought to include both groups. The four most proper-
ous countries capable of spreading their positive effects 
all over the area are divided evenly between the two groups: 
Ghana and Nigeria in the sterling zone; Ivory Coast and Sene-
gal in the franc zone. An industrial grouping of the African 
countries was presented in the previous chapter. Only these 
four states, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Senegal were 
the West African nations classified in the category where a 
modest range of industries have already been installed. Their 
inclusion in the eventual community would please the propo-
nents of the view previously stated that the least developed 
countrres should undertake integration with the sem-industrialized 
ones within their area. An examination of the economies of 
the individual states within the region under consideration 
has shown that, at least at the regional level, Ivory Coast, 
Ghana, and Nigeria can be classified as semi-industrialized. 
1. West Africa., N. 2795 January 2-8, 1971. p. 7: "Yaounde 
Landmarks". The Convention refers to the 2nd Convention. 
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Besides, they are the major exporters of manufactured goods 
within the region. 1 Senegal, once the most industrialized 
country in French West Africa, still h a s her industries. In 
1964, she enjoyed the third highest per capita income in the 
region after Ghana and the Ivory Coast. 
Moreover, these four countries, Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Nigeria, and Senegal contributed together more than 40 per 
cent to the intraregional exports over the period 1962-1965. 2 
They also had the greater share in the regional exports to the 
outside world, over 87 per cent. In 1963, they sold over 96 
per cent of the regional agricultural processed products ex-
ported to OECD. This has been discussed in the study of the 
West African economic structure. 
For these reasons, it can be argued that a viable re-
gional community - ought to ~nclude the combined market of these 
four countries. The community ought to be on a regional scale 
and not on lines drawn ~y the former colonisers. Ghana and 
Nigeria have a sizable population (66.18 per cent of the re-
gional population in 1967). Ivory Coast and Senegal, with 
their UDEAO partners, have the advantage of extending over a 
contiguous territory. Economies can be realized if neither 
group is eliminated from the eventual community. Rapproche-
ment among the language groups seems to be underway; however 
1. UN-ECA, ST/ECA/109, 
miques en Afrique. 
La coop~ration et l'int~gration ~cono­
Op • cit . I p • 6 9 . 
Ibid. I p. 93. Table 12. 
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no Anglo phone attended the Bamako Conference of May 1970. 
Though the Conference grouped the members of UDEAO, the en-
tire world expects the Anglophones to join . _ 
In the pure world of politics which is beyond this 
stu dy, one thing that is disturbing economic unity in West 
Africa is the power struggle among the leaders. Interna-
tional power struggle is quite a common phenomenon (it is 
not limited to West Africa); but when e mphasized much more 
than economic power as it is in West Africa, it becomes harm-
ful. In West Africa, Nkrumah would have been very pleased to 
see Africa politically united around him. Pierre Biarnes 1 
asserts that the Federation of Mali was constituted around 
Dakar; that the Council of the Entente is centered around 
Abidjan. Political rivalry in West Africa is prejudicial to 
both unity and economic development. Plessz put it very well: 
"In principle, or rather in words, every government of the 
region favours economic integration, but in practice it tends 
to refuse arrangements in which antagonistic governments par-
ticipate; and very frequently such antagonistic governments 
happen to be its very neighbours". 2 
On the whole then, West African politicians seem to 
favour economic integration. What they seem not to have under-
stood is that an effectively integrated economy necessarily 
1. Biarnes, Pierre: "Industrialisation et unite de l'ancienne 
Afrique Noire Fran~aise". Revue Franyaise d'etudes 
politiques africaines. N. 10 Octobre 1966. p. 48. 
2. Plessz, N.G. Op. Cit., p. 24. 
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limits, to a certain extent, the independence of the partici-
nating countries which therefore would not be free to pursue 
,..-
divergent policies. 
The problem of politics in West Africa goes beyond the 
scope of this study. It is sufficient to note that as long 
as the whole movement of integration is seen in terms of poli-
tics, integration will never be achieved. Economic integra-
tion in West Africa requires a coordination of economic policies. 
What is needed is a supranational body which sovereign member 
states respect but to which they are not enslaved. 
It has been suggested that the moment is not yet ripe 
for West Africa to undertake a genuine integration at the re-
gional level; then the right steps would consist in forming 
subregional unions which might, in the long run, merge into 
a West African economic community. This would be a very good 
approach if "we are 'not' all dead in the long run". 
Many people, including the author of this study, strong-
ly support the view that conditions remain to be fulfilled for 
the establishment of a West African economic community. This 
community has to be prepared through decades of hard work. 
This is undeniable. Perhaps, however, it is not the best 
strategy to form subregional groups in the hope that they will 
merge into a West African community. This view minimizes the 
negative aspects of subgroups, negative aspects which are 
likely to be emphasized by the international power struggle 
under discussion. When the subgroups are constituted, they 
will be around certain centres. An acute power str~ggle might 
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develop between these centres. How can the consolidated cen-
tres be expected to surrender their sovereignty when their 
prestige will have increased through the influence they have 
learnt to exert in their respective subdivisions! There is 
no evidence that once the various subregional uni ons are 
constituted, the centres will learn to subordinate their 
sovere i gnty to a respectful supranational body. In addition, 
it follows from the discussion so far that West African sub-
unions are unlikely to be as prosperous as a regional inte-
grated economy. They do not offer many prospects except pro-
bably for the centres, if they happen to be the relatively 
more advanced ones. 
It is quite true that unity among large number of 
units is harder to realize than unity among small number of 
units. But in West Africa, there is no evidence that unity 
at the most advantageous scale will be realized if subgroups 
are constituted. The subgroups might simply increase rivalry 
among the centres. 
This does not mean that integration should be expected 
abruptly at the regional level. Integration has to be pre-
pared. It does not mean either that subregional unions should 
be discouraged. Far from it! It means that efforts should 
be multiplied at the regional level to prevent the constitu-
tion of cells which might be hard to break afterwards. Sub-
groupings present positive and negative effects. If the posi-
tive effects can predominate so that a small numb er of large 
units can later on merge into a consistent whole at the 
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regional level, then everybody would be better off. But if 
the negative effects predominate and unbreakable cells are 
constituted within the region (which is more likely in West 
Africa), then development will hardly be achieved. It might 
result in a situation worse than the present one. 
It is important to add that if it were not because of 
the power struggle, the author of this study would have strong-
ly favored subregional unions. And it can be seen fro m the 
type of industrialization programme described below that sub-
regional markets are not ignored. The point is contrGlling 
subdivisions in such a way as to neutralize what is called 
here negative aspects of subgroups. 
As far as c ustoms duties are concerned, a nation, 
when it discontinues or rather restricts the production of 
certain commodities, loses revenue and other forms of taxes. 
When a community is constituted, it means that a member will 
import duty free from the other partners commodities that 
they now produce locally because customs duties might make 
the import of the same commodities from outside the community 
more expensive. This member loses the import duties which 
it would otherwise collect on these imports. 
The case must necessarily be acute in countries prac-
ticing, before t he formation of the community, transit trade. 
Transit trade as ,practiced in West Africa constitutes an im-
portant source of revenue for a modest range of countries 
within the region. States falling in this category can only 
be reluctant to enter regional economic groupings where a 
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major source of their revenue would be extinguished unless 
theY can be compensated otherwise. 
Import and export duties can be levied for revenue or 
protection purposes. Import duties increase cost to the final 
consumer. Most of the time, heavy import duties are justi-
fied on the ground of the infant industry argument. That is 
to say, domestic industries, at their beginning, cannot com-
pete effectively unless they are properly ' protected against 
foreign competitors which are already established and pros-
perous, against the already deep rooted foreign industries 
which provide goods to the domestic market. These import 
duties discourage import and promote domestic industries. 
In West Africa, revenue from customs duties collected 
for revenue or protection purposes raises problems for the es-
tablishment of a regional community. All the West African 
states rely heavily on customs duties as the major source of 
their revenues. It should be clear from the economic struc-
ture depicted above that the import duties must principally 
come from foreign trade. If the proportion which the intra-
regional trade in local products contributes could be computed, 
it would be very slim. 
exists in West Africa. 
In fact, free trade substantially 
This is especially true of foodstuffs 
which constitute the bulk of the intraregional trade. In 
Africa, local produce is mostly exempted from duties. "In 
many English-speaking countries, the exemption is written in 
the tariff. In some French-speaking countries, it operates 
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through tolerances." 1 
It is easy to conclude from this fact that , since free 
trad e substantially exists in Africa, West Africa would have 
an advantage in forming a free trade area. All that is re-
quired is the extension of the exemptions to those manufac-
tured products which are not traded freely. The author of 
the present thesis contends that a free trade area, a s defined 
in the Introduction, would not be beneficial in West Africa. 
A genuine economic community which can pay attention to re-
gional problems is more desirable than a free trade area. A 
free trade area may ruin some of the member states because of 
disparities in their level of development. Industries will 
establish themselves in the reiatively more advanced countries 
from whence they will invade the regional market. The 
commodities to be taxed in accordance with the principles 
discussed earlier can easily be smuggled into the other 
partners' territory. In that respect, the borders are very 
permeable. This is where those principles might be ineffec-
tive, to the detriment of the small and/or poor nations. In 
addition, because of rivalry among the states, West Africa 
under a free trade area might become the theatre of a tariff 
war. Who will lower most the import duties! But this is not 
the issue at hand. 
1. UN-ECA: Standing Committee on Trade, "Infra-African 
Trade in Local Produce". Addis-Ababa, 12-22 September 
1962. Document E/CN.l4/STC/7 August 1962, p. 2 note 2. 
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The point of interest for the moment is that all the 
west African states rely heavily on customs duties as a major 
source of revenue. Thus for Dahomey, 1 in the 1967 budget, 
43 per cent of the government revenue was produced by customs 
collections. In Ghana, i n 1961/62, customs duties constituted 
over half of total revenue; 2 the percentage was 53.55. In 
Guinea, the percentages:' were in 1960 and 1961, 26.28 and 
57.28 respectively. For Liberia, the 1962 revenue was esti-
mated at $30,000,000 of which only $7,895,000 or 26.31 per 
cent were customs duties. But import duties alone amounted 
to $6,400,000; that is 21.33 per cent. Niger has s een the 
importance of her customs revenue increase considerably be-
tween 1958 and 1961. It jumped from a percentage of 7.21 to 
20.35. Nigeria, for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1962, 
collected 67 per cent of her revenue in the form of customs 
and duties, when in Senegal in 1962/63, the percentage was 
56.9 of which 45.3 was to come from import duties and 10.6 
from export duties. Sierra Leone ordinarily derives 60 per 
cent of her revenue from customs duties especially from duties 
on imports. In Togo, in 1966, 3 57 per cent of the ordinary 
receipts came from imports duties; that was 38.08 per cent of 
l. Verbit, Gilbert 
Countries. (c) 
p. 30. 
P.: Trade Agreements for Developing 
1969 by Columbia University Press, N.Y. 
2. All the figures in the paragraph, unless otherwise indi-
cated are taken from Worldmark Encyclopedia of the 
Nations-Africa. Editor and Publisher: Moshe Y. Sachs. 
Edited by L. Barron (c) 1960, 1963, 1965 Worldmark 
Press, Inc., Harper & Row, N.Y. 
3. Togo,Comptes Nationaux 1966: Ministere du Commerce, de 
l'Industrie, du Tourisme, et du Plan. Lome, Togo. Juillet 
1969. p. 31 
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total receipts. The case for import duties alone in Upper 
volta presents as follows: 1959, 3.45 per cent; 1960, 10.49 
per cent; and 1961, 13.41 per cent. The percentages are of 
totals except extraordinary receipts. 
If a conclusion can be drawn from these statistics, 
it follows that customs duties, in those years, were more im-
portant in the coastal countries than in the landlocked ones, 
at least in those two (Niger and Upper Volta) for which data 
are accessible. It does not mean that the coastless countries 
will not be affected in their receipts 
are collected at the regional level. 
if customs duties 
At this point it is logical to inquire how to over-
come the various economic and political obstacles to the for-
mation of a West African community, the difficulties posed by 
established tariff policies, by political rivalry etc. That 
is, not to say that all these obstacles must be completely 
removed at the very beginning. If West Africa expects to 
eliminate all these obstacles at once, it is not likely to 
get very far. These obstacles constitute constraints and 
ought to be treated as such. 
First, the customs d~ties might be considered. If the 
history of today's more advanced industrial countries is re-
levant, reliance on customs duties as a major source of re-
venue seems to be typical of lower stages of economic develop-
ment. As development progresses, the plague of customs duties 
characteristically is swept away. The somewhat peculiar case 
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of Japan is well known. During a critical stage of Japanese 
economic development, land tax was the major source of govern-
1 ment revenue. Here, while the land tax was decreasing in im-
portance in the central government taxation revenue and the 
weight of the income tax was increasing - this is the normal 
trend expected - the relative weight of customs duties in-
creased too. Even in this case, the argument above would 
still hold, because even though the per cent contribution of 
customs duties increased, these duties were not the major 
source of government revenue. "The greatest defect of cus-
toms duties", says John F. Due, 2 "is their tendency to dimin-
ish in importance as a revenue source as economic development 
continues. Instead of facilitating their use, development 
tends to destroy them as a major revenue source.~ Therefore 
the problem in West Africa is how to bring about integration 
which will lead to development. 
Insofar as the international division between Anglo-
phones and Francophones is concerned, one might want West 
Africa to get rid of these barriers at the very beginning to 
clear the way for a relatively easier creation of the desired 
viable regional market. On this issue, the contention of the 
author of this thesis is that the creation of interdependence 
between the nations of the region will help solve this problem 
1. Ohkawa and Rosovsky: "The Role of Agriculture in Japan's 
Development". Leading Issues in Development Economics-
Selected Materials and Commentary. By Gerald M. Meier. 
N.Y./Oxford University Press/1964. p. 310, Table v, cover-
ing 1888-1937. 
2. Due, J.F.: Government Finance: Economics of the Public 
Sector. Fourth Edition 1968 Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Home-
wood, Illinois, p. 459. 
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more easily. It is precisely because there exists no inter-
dependence between these new states that these language bar-
riers persist on very solid and deep roots. As they stand 
today, these barriers cannot be eliminated otherwise. 
The issue then is how to create that interdependence 
necessary to undermine the unnecessary division on language 
lines. To do this, measures should be ~vised to promote ex-
pansion of regional markets. This may involve new products 
and new methods of marketing that lend themselves to the de-
velopment of a more progressive market economy. The creation 
of these products will be studied in detail below. 
As for the international power struggle, it is only 
necessary to note that when countries provide markets for one 
another, the search for political hegemony would be, at least 
to a certain extent, minimized. Hence again, the interdepen-
dence of the national economies is the solution. An analogy 
can be made with the European case when it was argued that 
the Common Market might tend to extinguish Franco-German ri-
valry. 
When it comes to problems with existing infrastructure, 
it might be argued that West Africa cannot be expected to 
build a regional transportation network before undertaking an 
integration programme. When the infrastructure starts improv-
ing, integration has started. The existing infrastructure was 
not constructed to serve intraregional exchange. Thus the 
transportation network needs to be completely rebuilt to suit 
intraregional trade. 
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But it is not enough to build roads and railroads, or 
whatever might be put 1n this category. The point is to build 
those that are necessary and capable of supporting increased 
traffic at the regional level. Developing a picturesque in-
frastructure throughout the region is not sufficient to gener-
ate that kind of economic activity capable of promoting and 
sustaining development all over the area. What is needed is 
appropriate links between the production centres and the 
markets. Moreover, the production centres themselves must be 
appropriately situated. The appropriate policy is to situate 
the industries properly so that they spread beneficial effects 
over the entire area. 
It is true that, to a certain extent, industrializa-
tion goes hand in hand with the appropriate infrastructure 
and cannot progress without it. It is not true to maintain that 
countries should always industrialize before developing the 
appropriate transportation network. Industrialization by its 
nature calls for an adequate transportation network. They 
are somehow complementary. They should be developed simul-
taneously. 
Hence, in West Africa, the development of infrastruc-
ture can be undertaken only when preliminary agreement has 
been reached in the field of integration. When agreement is 
reached on how to go about integrating, hence industrializing, 
the development of the infrastructure would be the second step 
to take. 
A serious and really challenging difficulty raised 
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here is what is to be the source of funds, the source of capi-
tal. Who is going to pay for the new transportation network? 
The community will not have any resources of its own. Any 
loans obtained for the purpose will have to be paid back. 
possible sources of finance to be considered could include 
Yaounde II and other possible foreign sources of funds such 
as long term soft loans from the World Bank. The repayment 
of the loans will come from the common funds described below. 
I Yaounde II offers a prospect because here Africans 
are encouraged, incited to undertake 'inter-African regional 
cooperation'; 1 and the EDF is prepared to give favourable 
attention to regional projects. It might then be possible 
that the eight states, signatory of the Convention, and of 
course located within the region under consideration, pool 
their efforts to negotiate the financing of part of the 
intra-regional infrastructure. Assuming capital can be ob-
tained from this source, it will, undeniably, have to be 
supplemented. Furthermore, what will happen to territories 
not associated with EEC! This is why soft loans from other 
international sources are being suggested. 
In sum, the realization of a viable industrial pro-
gram for West Africa would call for the development of an 
adequate infrastructure. Industrialization would create 
goods to be exchanged and would, by instituting an atmosphere 
1. Africa Report, Feb. 1970. p. 28: "The EEC's New Deal 
with Africa ... " by William Zartman. 
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of interdependence, bring the countries closer to one another. 
It will help diversify the sources of revenue for the states 
which will then be able to rely less on revenue from customs 
duties. Then the key to the West African dilemma is indus-
trialization, to create more goods within the boundaries of 
the region. As it was stated earlier, this can be achieved 
more effectively through integration. The issue then is how 
to bring about integration, given the constraints and ob-
stacles analyzed above. 
An Approach to Integrating the West African Economies 
The answer to the above question, how to bring about 
integration is simple. A great help in solving this problem 
is that, today, no single state located within the region 
would deny the importance of integration to their individual 
economies. Many political speeches show this. Each state, 
large or small, rich or poor, recognizes the need for a re-
gional market. This is denoted also in the many meetings 
held so far to discuss the issue. As Adebayo Adedeji has 
already observed in his aforementioned articler 1 
"The 14 countries have attended the regional meetings 
on economic cooperation in West Africa held in 
Niamey (October 1966), Accra (April/May, 1967), 
and Dakar (November 1967) , as well as the Monrovia 
Conference of West Afr ican heads of states (April, 
1968). It is the governments of these same 14 
countries that have supported in principle the es-
tablishment of the Economic Community of West Afri-
ca and have been involved in negotiating a treaty 
under which the community will formally come into 
being." 
Each one of these 14 countries, it should be added, recognizes 
1. Adedeji, Adebayo: Op. Cit., p. 214. 
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the importance of the regional market and attends the regional 
meetings ; but at the same time each one is reluctant to en-
danger its national economy and hesitates to take part fully 
in the creation of the community. No one, of course, would 
like to lose revenues from customs duties or subsidize indus-
trialization in another political territory, which perhaps, 
is antagonistic. What is left to be done is to create that 
atmosphere of confidence necessary for the existence of a 
union. What remains to be done is a matter of procedure to 
have the effective participation of the nation states. The 
solution to the dilemma consists in devising those policies 
that would guarantee a proportionate gain to each prospective 
member of the proposed community. 
How can this goal be achieved? This goal makes the 
strict coordination of industrial development the centre of 
the integration programme. The industrialization advocated here 
is not therefore an industrialization left at the discretion of 
the nation states. As has been indicated all along in this 
study, it is only through the channel of coordination that the 
interdependence required can be created. As has already been 
pointed out, integration among states at different stages of 
their development may not benefit each member equally. This 
is an important consideration. Without a strictly coordinated 
regional industrial programme for the union, the proposed 
community will lack that confidence indispensable for 
its implementation; or, put into different woras, the 
proposed community will continue to suffer from the plague 
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of its beginning and will remain and die on paper where it 
took birth. If there are no explicit agreements concerning 
regional balance, the richer nations are likely to develop 
at the expense of the poorer nations. Without these explicit 
agreements, it should be added, the more fortunate countries 
will not have the confidence of their prospective small and/ 
or poor partners. This problem is the reason for slight pro-
gress towards integration, although integration is so much 
desired in the region. 
As long as the institutional framework is not de-
vised to promote development everywhere, within the national 
boundaries, i.e. not to increase only the regional GNP taken 
in its totality; as long as assurance E not given that a 
coordinated industrial development will be the basis, the 
sole justification of the common economic policies; in sum, 
as long as there is no evidence that each state will reap 
a proportionate benefit from the community, i.e. a fairly 
equitable distribution of the increase in total GNP to be 
generated, there will be reluctance on the part of the indi-
vidual states to participate fully in the community. By 
'taking part fully in the community' is meant adopting the 
common resolutions and implementing them. 
On the distribution of the increase in total GNP, 
it might perhaps be noted in passing that the Paretian optimum 
does not apply during the process of integration. No nation 
is likely to join a union to make other nations better of£ 
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just so long as it is not made worse off. There is always the 
possibility of other arrangements that offer better prospects. 
only after it has committed itself to an economic union is a 
nation likely to accept policies that make partners better off 
without making itself worse off. The purpose of an economic 
union, presumably, is to ~romote policies that will make all 
participants better off in an absolute sense. Wealthy trade 
partners generally are profitable trade partners. This is 
the basis on which an economic union has to be sold to all 
participants. 
The disparity in the level of industrialization of the 
West African states was mentioned while dealing with the struc-
ture of the regional economy. The problems connected with re-
gional imbalances are well known all over the area. It has 
been observed that integration among nations at different 
stages of their development may not benefit members equally, 
or rather proportionately. External economies might direct 
or guide the benefits towards the more advanced countries at 
the beginning of the process of integration. 
The region has already experienced the failure of 
UDAO - and why not, UDEAO - over the allocation of the pro-
ceeds of customs duties. In this context, perhaps the init-
ial difficulties of the East African Economic Community on the 
other coast of the continent should be carefully watched. It 
is well known that in the East African ease the initial bene-
fits accrued to Kenya, the relatively more advanced state in 
that region. 
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To have regional specialization, it is necessary that 
the decision-making centres, dependent on different countries, 
be actually associated; 1 thus, that the decision-making power 
be effectively shared by the members. How are the decision-
making centres to be fully associated! Here, the issue of 
equitable distribution of the benefits between the centres 
should be dealt with explicitly. In other words, the prob-
lem is not only who is undertaking integration; it is more 
the following question: at whose expense or for whose bene-
fit is the integration being undertaken. 2 
It is important to make it clear that the issue is 
not to eliminate the disparities before any integration pro-
gramme is implemented. It is rather that at the very begin-
ning of the integration programme, the appropriate measures 
be devised to counteract the accentuation of these disparities. 
The question now is the specification of the coordi-
nation programme itself. In what specifically consists this 
coordination, the foundation for a viable West African Econo-
mic community? A nation state will give up an unprofitable 
activity within its boundaries for a more profitable one. 
This is simply to say that each country, or sub-group of 
l. Wrote Henry Bourgignat, Op. Cit. pp. 264-265: " ..... Pour 
que la coproduction existe vrairnent, et pour qu'elle soit 
davantage qu'une co-exploimtion, il faut et il suffit que 
les centres de decision relevant de pays differents soient 
reellement associes, et done, que le pouvoir de decision 
se trouve effectivement partage entre parties a l'accord •.• ". 
2. cf. Perroux, Fran9ois. "Integration economique. Qui 
integr?? Au penefice de qui s'opere !'integration?" 
Econom1e Appl1quee, No. 3-4, 1966. p. 1 
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countries whenever required, will specialize in the production 
of given commodities, in the production of which it has a 
comparative advantage owing to resource endowment or acquired 
skill. It will produce this commodity for the regional mar-
ket and, if possible, for export. For instance, Senegal and 
Togo will produce phosphorous fertilizers to be used by ag-
riculture. These two countries, as they were described above, 
possess and are exploiting rich deposits of phosphate. West 
Africa requires considerable fertilizer. Thus Mali can be 
expected to join the club if her phosphate is sufficiently 
rich. 
As another example, Nigeria produces cementm limited 
amount. If CIMAO is successful in achieving its objective, 
cement may become a considerable factor in the regional trade 
of West Africa. CIMAO should develop to its optimum size. 
While dealing with coordinating industrial develop-
ment within the boundaries of West Africa, the special case 
of the inland countries is to be taken seriously. The most 
prosperous industries in these areas would include shoe-making, 
and for reasons already given, agricultural processing. Their 
advantage in the shoe-making lies in ready access to the 
leather that animal husbandry provides. The production of 
leather over and above the domestic needs could even be ex-
ported. 
As stated in the section on economic structure, these 
three completely landlocked countries - Mali, Niger, and Upper 
Volta - are producers of livestock in the region. It is a 
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valuable resource that can be profitably exploited. These 
countries are already exporting live animals and meat to the 
rest of the region. When the transportation network is im-
proved and the intraregional marketing made easier, thereby 
reducing costs, the export of meat from these countries could 
be expanded. These inland countries can even undertake the 
production and sale of perishable dairy products. These pro-
ducts could be extensively transported by truck or rail to 
the regional urban centres where they are usually imported 
from overseas for consumption. 
Similarly the development of the infrastructure would 
help towards an easy distribution of the region where the lar-
gest market is. Niger for instance can process millet while 
Upper Volta, with the help of fertilizers, can expand her pro-
duction of so~ghurn. With a multi-purpose darn on the Niger 
river near the common border of these three coastless count-
ries, irrigation might be made possible which might enable 
Mali to produce more rice. 
On the other hand, to leave for a while the unfortu-
nate coastless countries, textiles, which already have spread 
over the entire region, can be left to the discretion of the 
individual states. This approach follows from the belief that 
this type of industry can be developed on a large or a small 
scale. Thus it can be developed with a regional or a national 
market in view. Each country can consume its own production 
and a portion of its partners' output. But how does this 
policy of the possible existence of the textiles in each 
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member country help solve the somewhat subregional problem 
raised before, with regard to this activity in the description 
of the structure of the regional economy! Of course, no speci-
fic policy would be devised for this particular problem but 
it would be solved in the course of integration. In fact, 
when a common external tariff, sufficiently high, is estab-
lished to protect the regional market, there will be an end 
to the present situation whereby Japanese textiles enter the 
region and undersell some of the regional products. In other 
words, textiles would be protected at the regional level 
against foreign competition. 
West Africans can always have recourse to quotas, or 
other restrictive means, to set a limit for foreign competi-
tion. For a specific value of textiles exported to West Afri-
ca, the competitor might have to import a specified value of 
West African commodities. Thus, instead of having the domes-
tic traders purchase domestic textiles in certain proportion 
to their imports, West Africa would have the overseas compe-
titors buy some of its produce directly. This would enlarge 
the market for West African produce. All it amounts to is 
that West Africa enters into long term contracts with over-
seas producers for the exchange of certain commodities. 
In addition, and this is not only true for textiles, 
it is not because other countries are more advanced than West 
Africa that West Africans should prefer all imported products 
to the local goods. Domestic consumption of the local fabric 
can be increased if its production is improved. Moreover, West 
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Africa would not develop a textile industry just to supply 
the domestic market with the type of materials Europe, Japan, 
or others are already selling within its boundaries. It is 
by improving the local fabric and making the best use of the 
local designs that West Africans can make their products 
appreciated by themselves and known to the rest of the world. 
National pride can be a powerful force in promoting 
economic development. In any case, historically, new centres 
of vigorous economic development have generally been associated 
with new products and new way of doing things. The German 
innovation in steel technology and chemicals can be given as 
an exampl~, as can the Japanese introduction of silk to world 
markets, and at a later date their own insights about the pro-
duction of ships and electronic equipment. What will a more 
developed West African economy produce? It is hard to say at 
this point. But it is likely to be something new and differ-
ent. It need not be an electronic equipment. Will it be 
something as seemingly trivial as Scotch Whisky or English 
biscuits? Why not African gin? In artcraft and design the 
West African originality is undeniable. If encouraged, it 
can promote tourism and help preserve some features of local 
cultures. 
As for the policy of promoting the textiles in the 
individual countries, it follows from West African conditions 
whereby textile mills are already spread all over the region. 
The only fear is that, in East Africa, each country has its 
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own textile mill. 1 The result is a regional overproduction 
which can only be harmful. This fact is well known; but it 
is not realistic to advise the West African countries to 
share two, three, or four mills when the industry is already 
spread over the entire area and, in any case the consumer 
appreciates the variety of products he is presently offered. 
For these reasons, textile production can hardly be restricted 
to a few producers within the region. The market forces 
would help to correct the tendencies of overproduction or 
underproduction if either ever prevails. 
It might seem proper to let each country develop its 
own textile mill because it can sell on the national and 
eventually on the regional market; but a problem still per-
sists. Is this economic activity very beneficial to each 
country in West Africa? As it seems, Senegal does not grow 
cotton on her territory; in addition, her textile industry 
appears not to be very prosperous. It has been shown that 2 
the level of wages and salaries in this industry in Senegal 
is very high compared with the other relatively more advanced 
countries in the region. It was $1,195 in Senegal in 1959; 
$804 in Ivory Coast in 1961; and $549 m Ntgeria in 1963. Such 
a comparison has to be carefully conducted for the general 
level of wages and salaries ought to be taken into considera-
tion and the comparison made between data of the same years. 
1. Jeune Afrique, No. 504 du Mardi ler Septembre 1970, p. 30. 
2. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/INR/129. 
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It is nonetheless true that the situation of the Sengalese 
textiles, at least in the nineteen sixties, was not very 
prosperous. On the whole, the industry has been operating 
at extremely low levels of output per machine. 1 Though the 
precise causes of the low level of output are unknown, it 
can be argued that with an enlarged market, the level might 
be raised. But peanut products are much more beneficial and 
many other industries such as chemicals would be much more 
advantageous to develop in Senegal than anywhere else in the 
region. 
On the other hand, under present circumstances, it is 
unlikely that in Mali, a peanut undustry can be developed to 
the extent that it can undersell or compete effectively with 
the same activity in Senegal. But Mali does grow cotton. 
Thus if the cotton prints for instance are left for 
Mali, in Senegal savings would be realized on the imports of 
the raw materials while in Mali, employment would be created 
for some hundred men presently unemployed. In the absence of 
information on any aspect of cost of production, the locally 
grown cotton in Mali is taken as an advantage. Senegal on the 
other hand would develop chamicals and expand her peanut in-
dustry. 
This type of arrangement raises difficulties. It 
might imply that, since these two industries would be exchanged 
l. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/INR/l29. 
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bilaterally, Senegal prefers Malian cotton prints and Mali 
prefers Senegalese peanut products to their partners' simi-
lar products. Unless the preferences are shown, the trade 
off of industries on this type of basis will lead to a catas-
trophy. To avoid this catastrophy - which would consist in 
competition from the other partners on the subregional mar-
ket - should restrictions be imposed on their similar pro-
ducts? 
In this specific case of Senegal and Mali, once they 
can circulate duty free all over the region, the Senegalese 
peanut products, needless to say, will undersell other simi-
lar products on Mali's domestic market, because Senegal has 
already established a reputation in this activity. Moreover, 
Mali is just across the border, so that transportation would 
not be a problem when the regional network is adequately de-
veloped. So, there is no fundamental problem to be solved 
for the Sengalese peanut industry. The difficulty is with 
Malian cotton prints. It can easily be undermined by other 
partners on the Senegalese market. This is being assumed for 
sake of argument in the absence of information on production 
costs in Mali and elsewhere. 
But before the analysis can proceed, it should be made 
clear that if Mali faces difficulties on the Senegalese mar-
ket, she will face similar competition on her domestic mar-
ket for each partner is allowed to develop the textile indus-
try and distribute the products throughout the union. There-
fore, restrictions of any forms cannot be imposed in Senegal 
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on the other partners' textiles in favour of Mali. In case 
Mali faces difficulties on the Senegalese market for her 
cotton prints, the best approach would be to help the indus-
try in Mali to compete effectively. To start with, Senegal 
could help in the marketing of the products. In addition, 
Mali as an inland poor country should have facilities to 
benefit from the common funds as described below. Loans with-
out interest could be made available for financing irrigation 
operations to improve cotton cultivation. Restrictions under 
any forms would constitute an impediment to the smooth develop-
ment of the communtiy. They would be contrary to the idea of 
an economic community 
In sum, in the particular case of cotton prints dis-
cussed here, the author of this thesis believes that just 
as any other partner will be producing textiles and still be 
consuming similar products from the other members, (thus fac-
ing competition from them), Mali would be producing for two 
national markets, benefiting from assistance outlined above, 
or in any other form~ and would not need to impose restric-
tions on the other partners' textiles anywhere. Restrictions 
of any kind deviate from the goal pursued. It does not mean 
that the above arguments against disparities are ignored. 
They are being used. 
The East African Community allows restrictions under 
the form of transfer taxes. 1 A transfer tax is that tax the 
l. UN-ECA: ST/ECA/109. Op. Cit., p. 30. 
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least industrial members of the community impose on the im-
port of goods manufactured in the other partners but of which 
they themselves can supply at least 15 per cent of their na-
tional market requirements. The June 1967 Kampala Treaty 
makes provision for such a tax but let it run for eight years, 
and suppresses it completely after fifteen years. In addit-
ion, only those countries registering a deficit in the intra-
regional trade of manufactures can apply the tax; also the 
importer imposes the tax on the manufactures of those coun-
tries it has deficit with. This is _quite an interesting 
and well devised mechanism to fight against imbalances with-
in an economic corarnunity. But what would happen once the 
transfer tax comes to an end? The previously protected in-
dustries would have to leave the place to the most efficient 
ones! Is there any evidence that under this form of protec-
tion, the beneficiary industries will produce at a lower 
cost? When it is being used, the transfer tax protects 
national markets against more advanced industries of the 
economic community. It could sustain high cost production. 
This is against the ideal community. In fact, under a sys-
tem of transfer tax, (if I understand this tax properly) 
trade creation cannot take place. Consumers in the least 
industrialized countries would continue to purchase more 
expensive local manufactures, when these manufactures are 
available at a lower price on the other partners' market. 
The best approach would be to help the poor partners to pro-
duce at a lower cost. 
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The UDEAO provisions concerning restrictions on simi-
1ar activities in its member countries has already been 
stated. The West African Customs Union, 1 in article 7 section 
1 of its treaty allowed its members to impose quantitative 
restrictions if it were to remedy imbalances within the 
economy. In this case, the Council of Ministers was to be 
informed. 
Here again, it is appropriate to make provisions for 
eliminating disparities. But this particular measure for 
instance risks a division of the union over simple issues as 
the determination of disparity or the degree of disparity re-
quiring restrictions or the relative strength of the restric-
tions. In an economic union , promotion, subsidization of 
industries for regional balance is generally more manageable 
than is regional tariff. 
In the final analysis, what is required is the dis-
tribution of the industries among the partners so that each 
one has its share; these industries, of course, are the large 
scale industries to be undertaken at the regional level. As 
far as the small scale industries aEe concerned, when the 
basic necessities are provided - not only roads and rail-
roads, but also other basic facilities such as power - they 
can be expected to develop in appropriate areas. 
An important issue arises when there are two or more 
1. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/WA/EC/2 Add. l, 9 November 1967. 
pp. 2-3. 
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countries in the region specializing in the production of the 
same commodities. Textiles can be given as an example of this 
case. Another case will be discussed where many countries 
are producing the same commodities but the specialization of 
one or two countries in these commodities is more advantage-
ous for the community. This issue will be raised in connec-
tion with palm produce processing. 
The discussion might start with a third situation, 
the case where the same activity is profitable in two or more 
countries, and a trade off is not necessary. In this case, 
it should do no harm to allow two or more countries to spec-
ialize in the same activity, as for example Nigeria and Sene-
gal in peanut products. In this particular case, it is un-
likely that either one of the two states, Senegal or Nigeria 
alone, can supply sufficient peanut products for the regional 
market and, at the same time, keep the overseas markets. Thus 
this activity would continue if not expand in these two 
countries. In general, as long as the regional producers 
can supply both the domestic market and the outside world, 
there will not be anything to worry about. Under present cir-
cumstances, overproduction cannot be envisaged in peanut pro-
duction. To promote peanut production in both Senegal and 
Nigeria is likely to produce a desirable competitive climate. 
Generally throughout West Africa too small-scale production is 
a problem. Competition among larger firms should be promoted 
since in larger firms it is easier to innovate and specialize. 
However, this does not mean that each country should 
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install similar industries so that competition among giants 
can take place. What it means is simply that, as has been 
argued at the beginning of this section, each country, or sub-
group of countries whenever necessary, should specialize in 
the production of those particular commodities where it has 
comparative advantage, and produce those commodities in 
quantities sufficient for the regional market and for export. 
Certain industries are such that they cannot be re-
stricted to one, two, or three producers. In that respect, 
West Africa consumes a substantial amount of tobacco products. 
Foreign exchange would be saved if domestic manufacturing 
were undertaken or expanded to restrict the purchase of those 
tobacco products imported into the region. This can be done 
only if the local production is varied enough to give satis-
faction to the tobacco consumers. Cigarette manufacturing 
is an example of industry that cannot be limited to one pro-
ducer. Nigeria's tobacco seems to be for internal consumption. 
Nigeria already has a cigarette factory. Cannot its produc-
tion be expanded to conquer the regional market! Besides , 
as already discussed in the description of the region~eco­
nomic structure, Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast 
are the major West African tobacco growers. If they under-
too~ the manufacturing of tobacco products - or expand it 
where it already exists as in the Ivory Coast and Guinea -
they can easily supply the regional market at the expense of 
overseas producers. Cigarette importation makes the region 
lose a lot of foreign exchange. Unfortunately in the 
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statistics, tobacco products are generally classified with 
foodstuffs so that no figure can be given here. 
In other activities, forestry notably, West Africa 
is sufficiently rich to meet at least its domestic needs des-
pite poor conservation under colonialism. It follows from 
the structure of the economy previously depicted that such 
countries as the Ivory Coast, Liberi~, Ghana, and Nigeria, 
have the best chance of specializing in the forest industry. 
Foreign exchange would be saved if West Africa would stop 
exporting wood cheaply and importing in return expensive 
finished products made from that wood. Furniture industry 
offers prospects in these coastal countries where timber is 
a valuable resource. 
It has already been noted in the discussion of the 
regional economic structure that Nigeria seconded by Dahomey 
produces a lot of palm produce. Instead of exporting to 
Europe the palm produce which will be processed and sold back 
to West Africa at high prices, these two countries could 
benef i cially undertake to supply the region with the majority 
of these palm by-products. They can produce soap and candles 
for instance. But a certain range of West African countries 
are already producing soap as has already been pointed out. 
It can be added that the present production seems to be 
limited to the national markets. In other respects, it is 
not only the two neighbours, Dahomey and Nigeria, which pro-
duce palm products. The structure of the regional economy 
previously depicted shows that Dahomey does not lag far 
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behind Nigeria. Moreover, the output of certain other small 
countries such as Togo and Sierra Leone is not negligible. 
Furthermore, palm produce processing exists, to a certain ex-
tent, in each of the producer countries. Now, the question 
is, even if it is true that processing is limited to the 
different national markets, once the manufacturing is under-
taken at an advanced level at the regional scale by two coun-
tries, what would happen to these industries in the other 
various producing countries. It is not simply because a West 
African country might produce for instance soap from palm oil 
for the enlarged West African market that very difficult prob-
lems arise. Problems already exist because Europeans are 
taking palm produce and selling the products back to West Afri-
ca at high prices. West Africans should protect the regional 
market for the local producers against the European invaders. 
They can present a common front to negotiate higher prices 
for the extra exportable produce. The difficulties lie in 
getting capital to improve the quality of the commodities 
which are produced locally. 
Nevertheless, the problem of specialization of each 
country in the production of a given commodity remains acute 
because at the present time each of the West African states 
has established almost similar industries. How are they to 
go about restricting, or rather neglecting a particular econo-
mic activity within the boundaries of a sovereign state! This 
poses problems especially when the industry is based on local 
agricultural produce. An economic activity, when intensified 
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and officially supported in a given area, will slowly decay 
in certain other areas. But the agricultural sector resists 
changes. In addition, suppose that countries A and B trade 
off industries X and Y, both based on local agricultural 
produce. Thus for instance country A agrees not to contin-
ue to develop industry Y within its boundaries while 
country B agrees to do the same for industry X. It is 
possible that industry X in country A will not be developed 
in the same geographical locality where Y was in country A. 
This will cause problems for agriculture in that region of 
country A. Of course, country A will be better off (be-
cause industry X is more profitable at the national level), 
but what would happen to the farmers formerly producing the 
raw produce for industry Y? They will be made worse off 
unless they can export their produce. The only possible 
answer to the question is that these farmers will continue to 
produce the raw produce for the partner country now develop-
ing industry Y. 
The countries will specialize in different industries 
according to the law of comparative advantage. The industries 
to be neglected would be the unprofitable ones. This is 
where the idea of partial free trade at the very beginning 
of the process of integration is valuable. As partial free 
trade in certain basic commodities is instituted, the present 
intraregional trade will take a new direction. It will help 
to develop the regional resources most efficiently. Indus-
tries will redistribute themselves to areas where production 
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is cheaper. A partial free trade area, in contrast to a 
free trade area, is less likely to provoke problems connected 
with reduction of tariffs. Therefore the possibility of fail-
ure discussed above concerning the establishment of a free 
trade area in West Africa still holds. 
To go back to palm produce more specifically, it is 
not possible to restrict its primary processing to any par-
ticular country. Even to talk about it would be trivial. 
Hence the first stages of processing would continue to exist 
in these countries which might then sell their semi-processed 
products to their regional partners who will then proceed to 
further stages of processing, just as the Europeans are doing 
at the present time. On a common f~ont, they could negoti-
ate higher prices for the exportable surplus. 
Because of her rubber plantations, Liberia is well 
endowed to supply the region with rubber products. Fire-
stone in Liberia already has a tire retread plant. Nigeria 
is also producing rubber goods. Over recent years, the 
rubber industry seems to have made considerable progress in 
Nigeria. But rubber production is increasing in the Ivory 
Coast too. The use of rubber seems to have expanded over 
the recent years. These countries can then expand production 
in this field without worrying about overproduction. 
The sugar industry presents a case similar to that 
of the textile industry. In ''Industrial Development in 
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west Africa: an Integrated Analysis", 1 it is recognized that 
the concentration of this sugar industry would make it pos-
sible for economies of scale to be exploited. However, the 
authors would not object to allowing this industry to develop 
in a number of countries because, in their own words, "the 
sugar industry can be decentralized into units small enough 
for the production to be absorbed by national or even local 
markets". 
In the framework of the present thesis, it is believed 
that the gains to be derived would be much greater if this 
sugar industry were concentrated in Senegal, and Guinea 
where the sugar refinery planned in the nineteen sixties 
already must be well advanced. The Ivory Coast, because of 
the importance she attached to this activity during the same 
period must be added to the list. This concentration is 
advantageous not only because it permits economies of scale 
to be realized and exchange of industries to take place, but 
also because it makes it possible to avoid overproduction as 
in the case of the textile industry in East Africa. Further-
more, the sugar industry does not seem to have spread over 
the entire region as yet; so, it can be concentrated in 
these three countries. 
In a manner conducive to the best possiale allocation 
of resources, Ghana seems to have already conquered the 
l. UN-ECA: E/CN.l4/INR/l41: Subregional Meeting on Economic 
Cooperation in West Africa - Niamey, 10-22 October, 1966. 
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subregional market for plastics (household utensils mainly) 
around her. She could expand her production of these plastic 
goods not only for this subregional market, but also for the 
rest of the region. She would buy in return for instance 
beer from Togo whose beer has won not only domestic consumers 
at the expense of foreign beer, but also neighbouring con-
sumers - Ghanaians in particular. 
In other activities, an iron and steel plant easily 
constitutes a pole of development because of the gxeat at-
traction it offers many other industries. An integrated 
West Africa needs an iron and steel plant. Buchanan (Liberia) , 
and Gouina (Guinea) seem to offer the best sites for this 
industry because of their rich iron deposits. In light of 
"all technical and economical conditions", 1 the best possi-
ble location for the regional iron and steel plant is 
Buchanan. 
Mauritania is suitable for fishing. The fish pro-
cessing establishments at Port-Etienne could be expanded. 
Mauritania could get long term interest free loans from the 
common pool for the promotion of the fish processing activity. 
The processed fish could be distributed to the whole region 
and to other parts of the continent. As with the hinterland 
countries, Mauritania could intensify her activities in ani-
mal husbandry to increase her export of livestock to the 
1. Un-ECA:E/CN.l4/INR/141: Subregional Meeting on Economic 
Cooperation in West Africa - Niamey, 10-22 October, 1966. 
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Senegalese market. With the improvement in the Senegal river 
basin, Mauritania would be better off in agricultural activi-
ties and hence agricultural processing, in the strip of land 
along the river. 
Sierra Leone is mainly a mining country. Some of the 
existing industries could be expanded. Such could be the 
case for the mineral water factories, nail factories, and 
p~nts making tiles, shoes, and furniture. An enlargement of 
the market could permit an efficient expansion of these ac-
tivities. 
As for the Gambia, this small enclave in the Senega-
lese territory, it has already been stated that peanuts con-
stitute her main export. Can Gambia compete effectively with 
Senegal in the peanut industry! It is a problem that cannot 
be solved without precise information on the costs of pro-
duction. The improvement in the Gambia river basin would 
make it possible to increase rice output, which could be pro-
cessed and distributed to Sierra Leone who was importing rice, 
the staple food, in the nineteen sixties . 
. To state that this or that country produces, or speci-
alizes in the production of a specific commodity and sells 
it to its partners overly simplifies the matter. One can 
possess natural resources and not be able to take advantage 
of them. The ·technically qualified labour must be available, 
and above all, capital must be accessible to finance industry. 
First,~ providing the qualifi e d labour, the pop ulation 
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must be tra~ned to a certain extent. The West African econo-
mic community,of course, is expected to provide for a free 
movement of the factors of production. This sounds as a 
chimera in the context of West Africa where xenophobia is 
acute. Indeed, the Ghanaian government's order on 19 Novem-
ber, 1969, that within two weeks aliens (including West Afri-
cans) without residence permits should leave Ghana 1 is well 
known. Nearly a decade before then, aliens, mainly West 
Africans, were expelled from Abidijan (Ivory Coast). 2 Dis-
positions should be enacted to stop these incidents. When 
the community enters effective operation, the governments 
will be committed to not expelling fellow West Africans from 
their territories. 
The community would provide for free movement of la-
bour - as a factor of production. Hence a certain level of 
education, of technical training, must be secured for each 
citizen of the region. The provision of education at the 
primary and secondary levels is obviously the responsibility 
of the individual governments. At the highest le~el, at 
least under present circumstances, it is not very urgent to 
build universities in each nation. Observation shows how-
ever that the English-speaking countries are well endowed 
with universities. But some of the French influenced countries 
1. cf. West Africa, n. 2742, Dec. 20, 1969. 
2. Other examples of West Africans expulsion from territories 
in West Africa can be given. 
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do not have universities of their own. What is presently 
needed is not building universities as such; it is rather 
devising, in the already existing ones, programs designed 
specifically to promote knowledge of the region, that is to 
say an intensification of West African studies. It would 
help more toward the regional development than building 
campuses for very few students. It is quite true that the 
enrollment is increasing very rapidly in West Africa; but 
if each country were to have its university or universities 
now 1 very few would bring together students from the various 
corners of the region and regional studies would not be pro-
moted to the extent required. 
But it is not only education at the university level 
which is needed. More efforts should be made to create more 
technical schools. This would allow better exploitation of 
local resources. For instance, if a carpenter school existed 
to train qualified carpenters, less wood cut in West Africa 
would go to Europe in the form of timber and come back as ex-
pensive finished products. It would be transformed on the 
spot, making the products cheaper for West Africans. 
Now the discussion must turn to the financing of the 
operations. All the sectors of the economy, including education, 
require capital. Capital requirements have not been ex-
plicitly discussed in this paper up to this point. As the 
situation was presented, the size of the national markets was 
considered one of the limitations to industrialization in the 
region. The non-availability of capital was not explicitly 
discussed except in connection with the transportation network. 
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Now, let us suppose, the market is enlarged. The nations 
concerned have agreed to combine their resources for the best 
possible industrial development at the regional level. Where 
is each state going to get the necessary funds to undertake 
that portion of industrial production which it is expected 
to provide forfue regional economy. Here again, as in the 
case of the infrastructure, foreign capital is a possible 
source of financing. 
On obtaining loans from ab~oad, a common agency would 
have to be created. This common agency, perhaps an Investrnet 
Bank, would be supported by all the member countries. Con-
tributions to this common fund would be unequally made but it 
would guarantee borrowings to finance the regional industries. 
The contributions would be made according to the capacity of 
individual countries to make contributions. A predetermined 
percentage of each individual national budget would be paid 
in. The rich coastal countries, having much more considerable 
budgets, would necessarily contribute more. But when it comes 
to the use of these funds, preference would be given to pro-
jects involving inland poor countries ever all other projects; 
second would come porjects involving inland poor and coastal 
small and/or poor states. For instance the Investment Bank 
could finance entirely a multi-purpose dam on the Niger river 
near the common border to the coastless countries, allowing 
irrigation in each of these poor territories. This can be 
done through long term interest free loans. But the Invest-
ment Bank cannot afford to finance in this way a road connecting 
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for instance Ghana and the Ivory Coast. 
More specifically then, the purpose of the Investment 
Bank would be to secure funds with very low interest when-
ever possible, for the financing of projects for the less 
fortunate countries of the community, at least in the very 
first years, and to guarantee borrowings abroad for other 
regional projects. 
But the resou~ces of the Investment Bank are coming 
directly from the national governments. What happens to 
revenue collected collectively at the common customs? If ex-
port duties are collected, they would be allocated to the 
government of the exporter. This sounds very easy, but in 
West Africa it might raise problems. A farmer might reside 
in co~ntry A and grow cocoa in country B. This is quite 
possible. The duties, if this case arises, would be allo-
cated to the country of residence of the farmer because of 
the importance of the human factor in production. 
As far as the import duties are concerned, they would 
be collected by the common customs services. Their proceeds 
constitutE common revenue and should be allocated to the In-
vestment Bank. But under the circumstances analyzed above, 
this is impossible. Customs duties, one should remember, 
constitute the bulk of public revenue for the states in the 
region. Thus revenue from import duties would have to be 
redistributed to the individual sovereign states. The di-
vision of this revenue among the partners is a very serious, 
if not the most serious problem, for the community. UDEAC, 
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the Central African Customs and Economic Union, at the present 
time redistributes the proceed of the customs duties and 
taxes among its members in accordance with the proportion of 
the imported goods consumed in each individual country. This 
system of division of the common revenue inevitably requires 
an extensive statistical control and a really complex customs 
administration. This is so because the phenomenon of re-
export from one member country to another member country can 
hardly be kept up without a systematic internal border con-
trol; and the refund, if refund there is, would not be made 
if the statistics are not kept up-to-date. 
Unless the appropriate measures are taken to control 
the phenomenon of re-export, the former territories which 
used to practice transit trade weuld continue to profit from 
this activity and the union would be beneficial to them alone. 
Indeed, they would keep all the revenue from import duties. 
However, insofar as this phenomenon of re-export is 
concerned, there is a tendency to overestimate the natural 
disadvantage of the inland coastless countries. In UDEAC 
once again, because of a possible underevaluation of re-
exports from the coastal countries, the two inland partners, 
namely the Central African Republic and Tchad, benefit more 
than the coastal countries from the Fonds commun de solidarite. 
The Fonds comrnun de solidarite is that organism of UDEAC set 
up to redistribute equitably common revenue as for instance 
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revenue from customs duties. 1 
Even if making inland countries benefit more from 
the Fonds cornrnun de Solidarite can be judged fair in Central 
Africa, in West Africa, it can be unfair to some of the 
coastal countries. It is true that it had been maintained 
in this thesis that inland coastless countries of West Afri-
ca benefit more from the resources of the Investment Bank. 
This is not to be justified on ground of re-exports. The 
type of re-export that can affect the landlocked countries 
negatively can be determined as explained below. They bene-
fit more from the common fund simply because they happen to 
be among the less developed countries of the region. If it 
is argued that the analysis of the intraregional trade had 
1. Biarnes, Pierre, in his already cited article: nindus-
trialisation et unite de l'ancienne Afrique Noire Fran~aise" 
(cf. Revue Fran9aise d'etudes politiques africaines, 10, 
Octobre 1966) wrote: 
"Le Fonds commun de solidarite permet de repartir 
equitablement entre les Etats membres le produit des 
droits et taxes peryus sur les marchandises importees. 
En principe, ce produit, per9u par les bureaux de douanes 
comrnuns, est reparti entre les Etats au prorata de la 
consornrnation dans chacun d'eux des marchandises de 1' 
espece. Mais cela necessite un contr~le statistique 
difficile a realiser parfaitement et il est done necessaire 
de compenser !'inevitable sous-evaluation des marchandises 
reexportees des Etats c6tiers vers ceux de l'interieur. 
Il est juste aussi de tenir compte des avantages retires 
des activites de transit par les premiers. Ce sont la 
les raisons pour lesquelles, tandis que le Fonds est 
alimente par !'ensemble des cinq membres de l'Union, la 
Republique Centrafricaine et le Tchad en sont pratiquement 
les seuls beneficiares. Un climat de confiance reciproque 
est ainsi cree, favorable au renforcement de !'Union, 
notamrnent a !'elaboration d'une politique industrielle 
commune " . 
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revealed that they exchange more with the rest of the region 
and that the negative effects of the phenomenon of re-export 
would be more acute for them, attention should be brought 
to the fact that the same analysis of the intraregional trade 
has shown that a class of coastal countries trade too heavily 
with the region. Then all countries affected by re-export 
should be granted the same advantages. 
The whole point is that the negative effects of re-
export cannot affect solely the coastless countries. In West 
Africa, it might be possible to distinguish two types of re-
export or rather resale. It might come from an organized 
export-import agency. It might also be under the form of re-
sale practiced by individual retail traders. This second type 
of resale is difficult to control; but it can be detrimental 
to certain unfortunate coastal countries as well as to the 
inland ones. 
There is one way to deal with the ~etailers. The 
interstate customs services will not be required to tax, but 
to ascertain only the direction of all foreign goods circu-
lating within the community. The refund can then be made as 
in the case of the organized re-exports. 
The organized consignment presents no problem of con-
trol. And there exists no other effective means of dealing 
with this case than through inspection. A mechanism has to 
be devised through which the distribution, inside the region, 
of goods originating in third countries can be determined. 
In this sense, the founders of UDEAO were very perceptive when 
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they provided that "The said products shall be admitted into 
the state of consignment only on presentation of a customs 
document ... This document must be accompanied, ... by an 
invoice showing directly the amount of duties and taxes pre-
viously paid in the member state reconsigning the goods .•. " 
The author of the present thesis thinks the arrange-
ment of UDEAO are not very adequate. The duties and taxes 
collected on entry of products originating in third countries 
instead of being repaid to the consignor by the state of 
origin, could be redistributed at the level of member states . 
The state of consignment, when it presents all the customs 
documents required, receives from the state of origin, all 
the duties and taxes collected on the first entry of the 
said goods. 
In the system under discussion, goods originating 
in third countries and imported to the community are taxed 
only once at their first port of entry. They then can cir-
culate within the community so long as their re-export with-
in the territorial boundaries of the union is being reported 
so that the state where they are finally consumed gets the 
refund. It is conceivable that import duties, once imposed 
on these goods, would be passed on to the second purchaser 
so that the residents of the country of first entry are not 
made worse off. 
It is possible to argue that, as a result of the 
improvement in the transportation network, the import trade 
might increase because it might become cheaper to transport 
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imported goods inside the region. Thus the import duties 
might continue to be important as a source of revenue. This 
is quite possible; but if it does happen, then the community 
has failed. The transportation network to be developed is 
not to link the sea to the consumption centres but rather 
these consumption areas to the local production centres s o 
that if any trade is to increase as a result of a better 
transportation network, it is the intraregional trade. 
In the final analysis, the system of refund helps 
restrain re-exports. The refund at the level of the nation 
states makes it possible for the consignors not to go through 
slow, complex administrative procedures to get reimbursed. 
However, the system does not eliminate the difficult prob-
lem of customs administration. The personnel must be 
trained for the services. It is at the level of the customs 
services that the refund is allocated. 
When development proceeds and in the long run the 
states cease to rely heavily on customs duties, all revenue 
from these duties might be given to the Investment Bank. 
Other common revenue to be distributed would come 
from taxes on the regional industries. These taxes would 
be collected in the form of sales taxes at factory exit. 
The rate would be negotiated industry by industry, but would 
be uniform throughout the community. The revenue from these 
taxes would be distributed among the partners on the basis 
of consumption without any further distinction. Low tax 
rates should apply to the processing industries. 
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These taxes on the whole would not discourage produc-
tion because the market would be guaranteed and the taxes 
would not be exhorbitant. Furthermore, these taxes would 
be passed on to the consumers, a practice which would justi-
fy the distribution of their proceed according to the resi-
dence of the consumers. 
It is only through this kind of coordination that 
integration can come about in West Africa. It follows that 
if this integration is to be effective, the institutional 
framework must be devised for it. Thus, the most vital in-
stitution of the community should be a coordinating commis-
sion which would always work in close collaboration with all 
other common institutions, whatever be their rank. The co-
ordinating commission, composed of experienced technicians 
rather than politicians, should be the heart of the envisaged 
community. 
This, however, does not mean that the coordinating 
organism would literally lie above the whole organization; 
it c an play the role of a supervisory committee; and effi e-
iency requires that it does so. But no one can ignore the 
importance of politicians in implementing decisions, and 
their eagerness to do so need not be discussed. Thus, 
within the structure of the community, the politicians might 
inevitably occupy the highest rank. Hence, the policies 
recommended by the coordination commission will, without 
any doubt, require the approval of the Council of heads of 
states or of responsible ministers, depending upon the 
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provisions of the treaty instituting the community. Never-
theless, and h~re lies the issue, the coordinating committee 
would have to be as free as possible. It would have to be 
free as much as possible from any kind of social, economic, 
or political affiliation, internal as well as external. 
Within the framework of the community, no decision shall be 
implemented before its comments, 
are known and carefully studied~ 
as objective as possible, 
This means that at the 
level of the community, the coordinating commission must al-
ways be fully informed of the economic and social policies 
which affect the regional economy. It would pronably be 
wise to state that any other institution of the community, 
whatever be its rank, would have to work in very close con-
sultation, or collaboration, with the coordination commission .• 
The objectivity of the recommendations of the commis-
sion raises the issue of its composition. It is agreed that 
the members would be qualified and experienced technicians 
in various fields. For instance, a darn on the Niger river 
which would be designed to serve the coastless countries would 
require advice from expe rts in many disciplines. It is com-
monly observed that there are not enough technically quali-
fied citizens to fill these kinds of positions. But West 
Africans should be employed as much as possible. 
The coordinating commission functioning properly, 
no policy would be undertaken for the benefit of a particular 
state or group of states which is eager to influence the 
community. In other words, this commission would guarantee 
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harmonious development of the area. 
It then follows that the main task, the main respon-
sibility of the coordinating commission is the problem of 
diversifying the regional economy and coordinating the in-
dustrial development for the rational solution of the region's 
problems. In essence, this commission gives technical super-
vision to the community. 
Before proceeding, it might be necessary to emphasi z e 
once again the point that what this thesis stresses is the 
risk of accentuating the disparities existing in the levels 
of development of the prospective members of the community. 
The merit of this approach, centered around coordi-
nated industrialization, is that it would not only avoid the 
difficulties analyzed above, but it would also, and above 
all, help promote agriculture, vital for the survival of West 
Africa. 
It might be argued that West Africa has a comparative 
advantage in agriculture and that in consequence the best 
approach to its development lies in concentrating all efforts 
on agriculture first. The answer to this is that the indus-
tries ad~ocated in this thesis would, while propelling a manu-
facturing sector, help bring necessary cultural changes into 
the region, and simultaneously would develop the agricultural 
sector. Almost all the industries advocated here are agri-
cultural based. The local farmer would necessarily be made 
better off. In other words, agriculture is developed as 
basis for the industries. 
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The economic structure of the region c alls for this 
approach. Coordination, it can be easily seen, is the cen-
tral theme of the approach. The issue then is how to over-
come nationalism in economic matters not by transferring 
national sovereignty rights to a supranational body, but by 
renouncing the use of these sovereign rights in industrial 
development and intraregional trade. 1 This is not different 
from the conclusion about the political aspect of West Afri-
can unity. It was stated that the soven=ign states were not 
being requested to become slaves to a supranational body, 
but just be respectful to it. 
The answer is that the sovereign states would not 
renounce the use of their sovereign rights in industrial 
development and intraregional trade unless interdependence 
is created among them. This interdependence can come about 
only if these countries develop each large scale industry 
for the regional integrated market, which can be done only 
if certain conditions are met: i.e., a strict coordination 
of industrial development. Each state in the region is 
willing to adhere to the regionally enlarged market. What 
is left to be done, is the elaboration of the industrial 
development programme that suits each sovereign state. 
Equally important is an institutional framework capable of 
1. R. Sannwald, and J. Stohler, Economic Integration - Theo-
retical Assumptions and Consequences of European Unlfica-
tion. Translated by H.F. Karreman. Foreward by A. Coppe. 
Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1959. 
pp. 86-87. The issue is "How to overcome nationalism in 
economic matters, not by transferring national sovereignty 
rights to a supranational body, but by renouncing the 
use of these sovereign rights in foreign trade policy ••. " 
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realizing this programme, and which the states can trust. 
Political unity without economic power leads nowhere. 
It must be clear that this thesis is not advocating 
a West African 'industrial revolution'. What has been argued 
is simply that West Africans , should understand that they 
bear the major responsibility for the development of West 
Africa. As long as the States in West Africa do not re-
consider their present miserable conditions and pool their 
efforts, their raw products will continue to sustain expan-
sion in Europe at their own expense, and West Africa will re-
main undeveloped. The manufactures in view are those that 
the West African states are capable of undertaking. Diver-
sification in the composition of agricultural output and 
broadening the market for raw produce surely constitutes pro-
gress. But it is not enough. 
For development to really take place, more products 
must necessarily be produced in West Africa and be largely 
traded within its boundaries and with the rest of Africa. 
It is the only condition whereby West Africa can secure a 
better standard of living for its population. 
The previous discussion of the concept of a customs 
union pointed out that the rationale of a customs union lies 
in its ability to develop a certain number of industries 
capable of growing and capable of resisting foreign compe-
titian. Industrial development is necessary for a viable, 
integrated, regional economy in West Africa. 
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A Concise and More Comprehensive s ·tatement· ·of ·the Approach 
This paper calls i:for a method of planning that aims 
to avoid regional disparities: in any case, regional dis-
parities should not be made worse. This is seen as a guar-
antee for the small and/or less prosper:ous nations. They do 
not want to risk absorption or domination by their more 
wealthy and more powerful neighbours. Also a program that 
aims to solve problems of regional disparity is necessary 
for the relatively rich states to get the effective cooper-
ation of the smaller and/or poor states. 
This is why a coordinating organization should be 
set up at the very beginning of the preparatory stage. The 
problem of coordinated industrialization, the problem of 
economic diversification is, it has been said, the responsi-
bility of this body. 
As preliminary agreement ±s reached in this field 
the construction and improvement of the transportation net-
work can be undertaken. As has been argued, intraregional 
trade would increase if appropriate infrastructure is built 
to serve it. 
But, and here lies the dilemma, the states are not 
likely to put their resources in the improvement of this 
transportation network if there is no evidence for success 
of the community in the near future. Therefore, as the 
infrastructure is improving, agreement should be reached on 
free trade in certain basic commodities which are produced 
and traded within the region. This is designed specifically 
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to increase trade among the participating nations, and 
would build the foundations for a better distribution of 
regional industries. 
But here too arises a serious problem. To promote 
exchange within the region is the aim of the proposed di-
versification programme. In what sense then is the trade 
to increase at the very first stage of the integration pro-
cess? If success is to be had, the increase in domestic 
exchange must be undertaken at the very beginning. Free 
trade in a few commodities, not all commodities, might be 
an appropriate start. 
When a stage is reached where the infrastructure is 
prepared for an adequate distribution of the goods through-
out the region, and when partial free trade in certain basic 
commodities has operated towards a reorientation and an in-
crease in the regional trade, then West Africa can proceed 
to further advanced stages of integration. 
For underdeveloped nations that want more rapid 
economic development, expansion of the public sector is often 
an attractive option. In West Africa, development of infra-
structure, particularly traansportation, is likely to be 
made a government responsibility. Moreover, in some West 
African states, new industries are often established under 
goYernment ownership. One might expect these tendencies to 
continue. This need not mean that a full-fledged socialism 
is bound to develop in West Africa. But certainly, govern-
ment encouragement and financing of specific industries seems 
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necessary to establish a momentum for development. It might 
be argued that once a few modernized industries become es-
tablished on a good footing, conditions will be generated 
that will be favorable for the establishment of new, moder-
nized industries in the private sector. 
It has been argued in this thesis that an economic 
community will promote economic development in West Africa. 
It is not easy to provide a completely detailed program for 
a perfect West African Economic union. A complete economic 
union in West Africa involves many complex problems. The 
Francophones need to free themselves of the pressure from 
Paris. As is the case with most successful organizations, 
details of organizations are the result of a protracted 
process of trial and error. 
To end the discussion, it might be added that the 
coordination advocated requires integration at a level 
between a common market and an economic union as defined 
earlier. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
An appropriate solution then to the West African 
problem of underdevelopment lies in the creation of a regional 
market for which each individual sovereign state would be 
producing given industrial goods on a large scale. It follows 
from the regional economic structure and problems analyzed 
above that as long as interdependence is not created among 
the West African states - that is as long as they do not pro-
duce for one another - the West Africans would remain di-
vided and economic development would be hard to achieve with-
in the boundaries of the region. 
By the end of the first development decade, the 
principle of a West African economic community was adopted. 
What is left is devising an adequate coordinated industrial 
development programme, and a well structured and trusted in-
stitution to carry it out. It is time West Africa realizes 
that development cannot be achieved through words alone. 
Words are mere expressions of desire whereas deeds are ex-
pressions of actual involvement in actions leading to the 
fulfillment of the desire. Eloquent speeches and protocols 
alone cannot produce an integrated West African economy. 
The most urgent and indispensable step is the elaboration and 
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adoption of a programme of integrated industrial development. 
It is also time the very ambitious politi c al leaders under-
stand that proposals for integration or cooperation on their 
terms alone cannot win the effective collaboration of their 
neighbours. 
There are many possibilities for producing import 
substitutes and products for export. An integrated West 
Africa would be able to negotiate, on a common front, higher 
prices for the products it has a significant share of in the 
world markets. This is a path for a more rapid economic 
development of the West African region. 
APPENDIX 
STATISTICAL TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Population, Rate of Increase, Birth and Death Rates, 
Area and Density for Africa, Major Areas: Selected 
Years 
Annual Rate 
Major Regions Estimates of Midyear Population of Population Birth Death 
(Millions) Increase Rate Rate 
1930 1940 1950 1960 1963 1967 1968 1960/8 1963/8 1960/8 1960/8 
Africa 164 191 222 278 297 328 336 
West Africa 48 58 67 88 94 104 106 
Eastern Africa 46 54 63 77 82 90 93 
Northern Africa 39 44 53 66 71 79 81 
Middle Africa 21 23 25 29 31 34 34 
Southern Africa 10 12 14 18 19 21 22 
Source: UN Demographic Yearbook 1968 - 20th Issue 
U.N. New York, 1969, p. 83. 
2.4 2.4 45 21 
2.4 2.4 50 26 
2.4 2.4 42 18 
2.6 2.7 45 19 
1.9 2.0 42 23 
2.4 2.4 40 16 
Area Den-
km 2 sity 
1968 1968 
30313 11 
6143 17 
6331 15 1\.) 
~ 
w 
8525 9 
6613 5 
2701 8 
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TABLE 2 
West Africa - Some Selected Indicators (by country) 
Country 
Ivory Coast 
Dahomey 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Upper Volta 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
West African 
Economic 
Community 
Italy 
Area 
000 
km 2 
322 
113 
11 
239 
246 
274 
111 
1202 
1031 
1267 
924 
196 
72 
56 
6064 
301 
Population 
(million) 
Midyear esti-
mates 1964 
3750 
2300 
324 
7537 
3420 
4750 
1041 
4485 
1030 
3250 
56400 
3400 
2240 
1603 
95500 
51090 
Population 
Density (in-
habitants by 
km 2 ) 
11.6 
20.4 
29.5 
31.5 
13.9 
17.3 
9.4 
3.7 
1.0 
2.6 
61.0 
17.3 
31.1 
28.6 
15.7 
170 
Gross Do-
mestic Pro-
duct(a) 
(mill. US $) 
1010 
177 
26 
1901 
275 
229 
280 
305 
111 
263 
4307 
674 
343 
156 
10104 
49520 
Per Head 
GDP 
us % 
269 
77 
80 
252 
80 
48 
269 
68 
123 
81 
76 
198 
156 
97 
107 
969 
Source: Annuaire Statisque, 1965; Annuaire de Statistiques des 
Comptabilites nationales, 1965. Publications des Nat1ons 
Unies, (no. de vente: 66.xvii, 1 et 66.xvii, 2); 
sources nationales. 
(a) GDP: at market prices - 1964; 1963 for Mauritania. 
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TABLE 2a 
Economically Active Population and Activity Rates by Age: 
Each Census, 1955 - 1964 
(PeJ.:centages are the numbers economi·::::ally active in each 
age group per 100 total population in the same age group) 
Continent Country Census 
Date and Age (in years) 
Economically Active 
Ghana: 20 III 1960 
All ages 
15 and over 
Guinea:African popula-
tion 
15 I-31 V 1955 3 t 4 t 5 
All ages 
14 and over 
Niger: African popu-
lation 
Age 
15 
14 
X 1959- III 1960 7 , 8 
~11 ages 14 
14 and over 
Senegal:IV 1960-VIII 1961 9 , 10 , 11 
All ages 14 
15 and over 
Togo: XI 1958-XII 1960 12 
All ages 
Total 
6,726,820 
3,730,680 
2,570,219 
1,527,041 
2,611,473 
1,506,486 
3,109,840 
1,789,160 
1,439,800 
Number Percent 
2,724,850 
2,724,850 
1,315,900 6 
1,315,900 6 
1,443,072 
1,443,072 
1,317,5?0 
631,790 
40.5 
73.0 
51.2 
86.2 
55.3 
95.8 
42.4 
43.9 12 
Source: UN - Demographic Yearbook 1964 - New York, 1965, pp.l90-99 
1. Lower age limit (in years) of economically active population 
tabulations. 
2. Data are based on a 10 per cent sample of census returns. 
3. Data are esti~ates, based on results of sample survey. 
4. Irregularities in age distribution partly due to over-
compensation by enumerators in correctin0 for tendency of 
persons to round their age to numbers ending 0 or 5. 
5. Data for economically active population and for total popu-
lation 14-15 years, are rounded. 
6. Excluding persons of unknown age. 
7. The economically active population is here confined mainly 
to persons reporting a classifiable gainful occupation. 
8. Data are estimates of de jure population based on results of 
sample survey; data exclude popula ·tion of Niamey city (number-
ing 30,030 at census of April 1959), and also an estimate of 
234,300 persons for the cercle of Agades, the nomad Subdivi3on 
of Tahoua and the northern part of the cercles of ~1aradi, Goure, 
Zinder, and N'Guigmi, not covered by survey. 
9. Because of rounding, totals are not in all cases the sum of the 
parts. 
10. Data are estimates of de jure population based on results of 
sample survey . 
11. Activity rates for females, except for total rate (34.4), are 
for Africans only, and have not been computed by the Statis-
tical Office of the United Nations. 
12. Economically active population excludes 14,130 apprentices 
and 2,630 unemployed persons. If these are included the 
per cent economically active for both sexes becomes 45.0 
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TABLE 3 
West Africa: Population, Area, and Gross Domestic Product 
Area Density Income 
Population (thous. per sq. GDP per capita 
Country (millions) sq · - km) km. ( $m) $ 
Dahomey 2.41 113 20 112.8 80 
Gambia 0.34 10 32 30.6 90 
Ghana 7.96 239 31 1830.8 230 
Guinea 3.61 246 14 288.8 80 
Ivory Coast 3.91 322 11 862.4 220 
Liberia 1.09 111 9 228.9 210 
Mali 4.65 1202 4 279.0 60 
Mauritania 1.07 1086 1 137.1 130 
Niger 3.43 1267 2 274.4 80 
Nigeria 56.70 924 61 4532.0 80 
Senegal 3.58 196 17 751.8 210 
Sierra Leone 2.40 72 31 310.0 150 
Togo 1.68 57 28 168.0 100 
Upper Volta 4.96 274 17 248.0 50 
Total 97.70 6119 10056.6 
Average 6.98 437 15 718.3 103 
Sources: U.N. , Year Book of National Accounts Statistics, 1967 
(New York, 1968), p. 824. 
The Journal of Modern Africa Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 
July 1970, p. 215. 
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TABLE 3a 
Africa: Percentage Distribution of GDP at 1960 factor cost 
by Industrial Origin for 1966. 
Other 
Africa 
excl 
North Central Eastern West South South All 
Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa 
Agriculture 23.7 38.5 41.2 53.9 23.9 9.9 30.1 
Mining 11.2 5.8 6.7 4.1 1.3 12.0 8.6 
Manufactur-
ing 15.6 14.1 10.6 6.7 7.6 24.1 14.8 
Construction 5.2 3.4 3.5 4.4 0.8 3.6 4.0 
Commerce 11.1 14.8 13.0 12.7 15.1 17.8 13.7 
Transport 7.2 4.0 6.8 5.3 2.4 9.2 6.9 
Public Admin-
istration 11.1 12.3 7.4 7.3 9.0 9.3 9.3 
Other Ser-
vices 14.9 7.1 10.8 5.6 39.9a 14.1 12.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Research and 
Statistics Division. cf. Journal of Development 
Planning, Vol. l, 1969. p. 111. 
(a) In view of the Portuguese classification great caution 
should be taken in interpreting the GDP structure. 
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TABLE 4 
West Africa: Estimates of Total and Per Capita National 
Income and Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost 
Country 
Dahomey 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Ivory Coast 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeriac 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
(a) 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
Nl 
GDP 
(US million $) 
Type of 
Estimate 
B 
B 
A 
A 
B 
B 
B 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
A 
A 
B 
1958 
122 
126 
20 
20 
898 
979 
379 
406 
95 
140 
224 
2 35 
46 
sob 
174 
183 
2453 
2589 
475 
517b 
134 
14ob 
87 
96 
138 
146 
1963 
143 
154 
22 
23 
1380 
1521 
596 
654 
150 
245 
280 
295 
93 
102 
234 
247 
3677 
3931 
559 
609 
255 
282 
114 
135 
189 
200 
1965 
26 
27 
1801 
1983 
735 
816 
161 
278 
328 
345 
108 
116 
268 
284 
3945 
4315 
617 
668 
300 
337 
142 
161 
195 
206 
1966 
2104 
2298 
803 
874 
168 
296 
282 
298 
4060 
4496 
648 
700 
314 
347 
179 
199 
206 
216 
1967 
1703 
1870 
851 
928 
630 
682 
317 
354 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook 1969, New York, 1970 
1968 
1661 
1838 
676 
727 
(a) GDP refers to Gross Domestic Product and Nl to National Income 
(b) Data not strictly comparable with those for subsequent years. 
(c) Twelve months beginning 1 April of year stated. 
Country (a) 
Dahomey Nl 
GOP 
Gambia Nl 
GDP 
Ghana Nl 
GDP 
Ivory Coast Nl 
Liberia Nl 
GDP 
Mali Nl 
GDP 
Mauritania Nl 
GDP 
Niger Nl 
GDP 
Nigeriac Nl 
GDP 
Senegal Nl 
GDP 
Sierra Leone N~ 
GDP 
Togo Nl 
GDP 
Upper Volta Nl 
GDP 
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TABLE 4 
(cont.) 
1958 
63 
65 
68 
68 
140 
152 
123 
131 
99 
146 
57 
60 
49b 
53 
65 
69 
49 
52 
160 
174 
6lb 
64b 
64 
70 
34 
36 
Per 
1963 
64 
69 
70 
72 
188 
207 
163 
179 
146 
238 
64 
68 
92 
100 
70 
74 
66 
71 
168 
183 
111 
123 
72 
86 
41 
43 
Capita 
1965 1966 
80 
83 
233 
256 
192 
213 
150 
260 
72 
76 
103 
111 
76 
81 
68 
74 
177 
192 
127 
142 
87 
98 
40 
42 
265 
289 
205 
223 
154 
272 
78 
83 
68 
75 
182 
197 
131 
144 
107 
118 
42 
44 
1967 
209 
230 
212 
231 
174 
188 
130 
145 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook 1969, New York, 1970 
1968 
198 
219 
183 
197 
(a) GDP refers to Gross Domestic Product and Nl to National 
Income 
(b) Data not strictly comparable with those for subsequent 
years. 
(c) Twe~ve months beginning 1 April of year stated. 
TABLE 5 
West Africa: Estimates of Total and per Capita Gross National Product at Market 
Prices - in million U.S. $ 
Type 
of 
esti-
mate GNP at Market Prices 
Country 1963 1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Dahomey B 136 167 
Gambia B 22 26 31 
Ghana · A 1087 1667 2225 2492 2038 1995 
Guinea B 258 333 
Ivory 
Coast A 439 764 924 1005 1079 1248 
Liberia B 120 192 216 229 
Mali B 247 321 376 
Mauritania B 53 108 127 
Niger B 192 260 300 319 
Nigeria B 2770 4120 4467 4559 
Senegal B 600 707 775 808 784 830 
Sierra 
Leone A 148 295 353 373 373 
Togo A 103 135 169 209 
Upper 
Volta B 166 227 236 245 
Total 6341 9 3 2 2 10 19 9 10 23 9 
Per Capita 
National Product at Market Prices 
1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 
70 75 
77 81 94 
169 227 288 314 250 238 
89 99 
142 208 241 256 269 304 
125 186 202 210 
63 74 83 
57 107 121 
72 78 85 88 
55 75 77 76 
202 213 222 227 217 225 
68 128 149 155 153 
76 87 103 124 
41 49 49 49 
Source: U.N. - Statistical Yearbook 1969, New York 1970. Twenty first issue. 
tv 
tv 
0 
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TABLE 6 
West Africa: Estimates of National Income and 
Gross Domestic Product - Selected Years 
A = National Income 
B = Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices 
Country and 
Currency units Code 
Thousand millions of national currency unliB 
1958 1960 1963 1966 1967 1968 
Dahomey (CFA 
franc) 
Gambia (pound)c 
Ghana (new cedi)c 
Ivory Coast 
(cfa franc) 
Liberia (US $) 
Mauritania 
(cfa franc) 
Niger 
(cfa franc) 
Nigeria 
{pound) c 
Senegal 
B 
B 
35.0 
695 
780 
14.5 
46.5 
971 
36.6 
9.29 
856 
956 
114.7 
140.7 
138.6 
221.1 
41.8 
35.2 
9.16 
1076 
1208 
147.1 
195.9 
19.0 27.5 
50.1 66.2 
48.0 
41.2 
1627 
1793 
196.8 
257.7 
168.3 
317.2 
1189 1488 1703 
1591 
1778 
206.0 
276.0 
174.2 
329.8 
1836 
2074 
183.5 
351.8 
(cfa franc) 
Sierra Leone 
(leone)e 
B 142.3 145.8 174.9 200.2 194.2 205.6 
Togo 
(cfa franc) 
Upper Volta 
(cfa franc) 
A 
B 
A 
B 
A 
B 39.7 42.6 
182. 
216 
27.9 
33.1 
223 
271 
44.2 
53.1 
50.8 
58.2 
Source: UN - Statistical Yearbook, 1969 - Twenty-first issue, 
New Yor~, 1970. 
(a) Gross National Product at Market prices. 
(c) Million Currency units. 
(d) Data not strictly comparable with those of previous years 
(e) 1959 
(f) Gross National Product at Factor Cost. 
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TABLE 7 
West Africa: Share of Agricultural Production in Gross 
Domestic Product - (Shares in percentages) 
b Proportion of Share of Agricul- commercialised 
non-
agri-
Countrya Year c tural production cultural production 
in GDP 
Senegal 1964 28.9 44.3 
Ivory Coast 1964 38.4 48.4 
Togo 1963 54.5 51.2 
Mauritania 1961 48.1 60.5 
Dahomey 1959 52.2 64.4 
Mali 1962 51.0 72.5 
Niger 1962 60.7 76.8 
Upper Volta 1964 51.8 84.4 
Source: National Sources 
La Cooperation et l'integration economiques en Afrique. 
Trois etudes regionales - Nations Unies. ST/ECA/109 
N.Y. 1969. p. 62. 
(a) The classification follows an increasing percentage of 
the proportion of non-commercialised agricultural pro-
duction. 
(b) Agriculture includes also breeding, fishing, and sylri-
culture. 
(c) The classification as indicated in (a) is misleading 
since different years are considered. 
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TABLE 7a 
West Africa: Annual Growth Rates of Total Agricultural 
Production - (percentages per year) 
country 1957-65 Country l96l-65 
Ivory Coast 8.l Ivory Coast 9 .. 7 
Ghana 7.0 Liberia 4.8 
Togo 3.4 Ghana 4.8 
Senegal 3.2 Togo 4.3 
Upper Volta 3.l Senegal 3.9 
Mali 
Nigeria 
Sierra 
Niger 
Guinea 
Dahomey 
Liberia 
Source: 
2.9 Upper Volta 2.5 
2.8 Niger 2.3 
Leone 2.8 Nigeria 2.2 
2.5 Sierra Leone l.4 
l.7 Dahomey 0.9 
l.4 Mali 0.3 
0.8 Guinea (-0.2) 
Calculated by Jack Dalton from 'Indices of Agri-
cultural Production in 29 African Countries', 
USDA Economic Research Service, December 1965, 
Washington, D.C. 
cf. A.F. Ewing: Industry in Africa - Oxford 
University Press 1968, p. 6. 
TABLE 8 
West Africa: Percentage Distribution of GDP by Industrial Origin in 1964 fo~ Certain Countries 
Secondar:t Sector Tertiary Sector 
Manu- con- Publ1c Other 
Primary Extractive factur- struc- Trans- ser- ser-
Country Sector Total Industries ing tion Total Commerce port vices vices 
Ivory Coastc 42.3 16.1 0.5 10.9 4.7 42.3 15.7 8.4 5.7 11.8 
Ghana 51.4 14.4 2.5 7.5 4.4 34.2 . . . . .. ... . .. 
Guinead 53.8 24.8 8.9 2.6 13.3 21.4 3.0 3.0 7.8 13.6 
Upper Volta 52.0 13.0 1.0 9.0 3.0 35.0 . . . ... 
Liberia 28.0 36.0 26.0 4.0 6.0 36.0 11.0 6.0 
Malie 54.0 12.0 1.0 6.0 5.0 34.0 17.0 6.0 2. 0 9.0 
Nigerf 61.0 11.1 0.4 4.6 6.1 27.9 ... ••• • • • 
Nigeriae 62.6 11.3 1.9 5.4 4.0 26.1 11.8 4.9 5.7 3.7 
Senegale 29.4 13.0 1.8 7.4 3.8 57.6 30.2 3.8 8.6 15.0 
Sierra Leoneg30.2 26.3 17.7 5.5 3.1 43.5 14.0 7.1 17.5 4.9 
Togo 54.0 15.2 4.9 6.6 3.7 30.8 11.2 6.3 4.9 8.4 
I Source: Nations Unies, Annuaire de statistiques des complabilites nationales, and national 
sources. 
(a) Includes agriculture, breeding, fishing, and sylviculture 
(b) In the French speaking countries, services of non-lucrative private institutions 
are included. 
(c) 1965. 
(d) 1964-65 estimates. 
(e) 1962. 
(f) 1963. 
(g) 1964-65. 
1\.) 
1\.) 
~ 
TABLE 9 
West Africa: Output of · Principal Minerals (Average 1955-57) 
(Thousands of Tons) 
Countries 
French West 
Africa 
Ghana 
Liberia 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
Bauxite 
437.1 
149.0 
Iron 
Ore 
1302 
817 
Gold Manganese 
21.9 292 
Tin 
con-
cen-
trate 
9123 
Diamonds 
Gems Industrial 
129.3 207 
203 2372 
213 397 
Source: U.N., Economic Survey of Africa since 1950. pp. 33-34. 
Phos-
phate 
Rock 
4.9 
Columbium 
N 
N 
U1 
2615.6 
4.1 
f . a West A rJ..ca: 
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TABLE 10 
Imports by Productsb (average 1962-65) 
Composition of Imports 
by Origin 
Product from World from West Africa 
Share of intra-
Regional imports 
in Total Imports 
Total 
Foodstuffs, 
beverages 
and tobacco 
Non-comestible 
raw materials, 
fats 
Fuel (mineral) 
Machines and 
Transport 
materials 
Other Manu-
factured goods 
100 
19.4 
2.1 
6.2 
26.4 
45.8 
100 2.7 
49.1 6.9 
14.2 18.3 
9.3 4.0 
1.9 0.2 
25.5 1.5 
Source: Nations Unies, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series 
2, 1962-1966; Nations Unies, Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics, 1965; Commission Economique pour 
l'Afrique, Statistiques Africaines du Commerce exterieur, 
Serie B 1962 et 1963; Communaute economique europeenne, 
Associes et Outre - Mer, Statistiques du Commerce exterieur 
1967, No. 1; Communaute economique europeenne, Associes 
d'Outre - Mer, Annuaire de Statistiques generales, 1967. 
(a) Data do not include the statistics for Gambia, Guinea, 
and Liberia. 
(b) Following the U.N. classificationfur international trade. 
TABLE lOb 
West Africac: Origin and Destination of Exports, 1962, 1965 Average 
(thousands of us $) 
Ex12orts ~ ..-I ({j ({j Share 
Destination 
Q) I ({j ({j fll ·.-I ({j ·r-l ({j of each country in ~.j..l S · ~ ({j ·r-l ({j ~ tr> Q) ·r-l ({j ~ ~ QJ ~ (') Exports to \'lest 
'7 ~ Ul 0 QJ.j..l ·r-l ~-r-l Q) Q) c 0 .Q c QJ ~ c (i .j..l ·.-1 the Regional ExEorts to 0 ({j ..c:: D.; ..-I ..-I ;:::1 c tJ1 c ·.-I tJl s fll tJ1 QJ 0 .Q Ul 1-1 Africa as % > 0 ({j P..O fll fll ({j ·r-l Q) ;:::1 0 ({j ..c:: ·.-I ·rl Q) ·.-I QJ4-I Origin! HU Cl :::>~ :2:: :S+l ...,. (f) l? 8 l? l? z u: H H ~~ of Total Export~West Africa Rest of the world 
"' 
Ivory Coast 148 1594 1033 35 191 3670 25 94 39 69 89 6987 2.6 15.8 19.0 
Dahomey 120 110 204 420 320 1174 9.2 2.6 0.9 
Upper Voltaa 194 2622 389 160 65 - 3270 6700 71.3 15.1 0.7 
!'lali 4426 950 90 111 1600 118 - 1583 157 9035 60.8 20.4 0.9 
Hauritania 21 51 72 0.4 0.2 1.2 
Niger 365 106 159 211 274 597 4728 6440 32.1 14.5 1.4 N 
Senegal 98 235 41 370 452 59 1255 1.0 2.8 9.1 N 
Togo 420 42 156 618 2.7 1.4 1.6 CXl 
Gambia 7 5 11 94 117 1.4 0.3 0.7 
Ghana 8 1300 15 8 33 13 1694 215 46 3332 1.2 7.5 19.7 
Nigeria 100 870 1 1 30 52 133 10 164 17 5887 836 137 8238 1.4 18.6 39.7 
Sierra Leone 5 24 6 10 281 8 35 ·15 384 0.5 0.9 5.1 
Total 1325 8434 4004 1673 155 673 5989 566 1130 311 118 8 h 6 5 9fi 1145 495 44352b 2.9 100 100 
Sources: Nations Unies· Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; National Sources. 
UN-ST/ECA/109, p. 9 3. Tahleau 12. 
(a) 1962-64. 
(b) Does not include Guinea and Liberia 
(c) The countries are classified by the foMmving groups: UDEAO (The West African Customs 
Union) ; Other French sneaking West African Countries: the British Commonwealth Countries; 
and others. 
TABLE lOc 
West Africa: Origin of Imports and Destination of Exports by Subregional Groups 
1962-65 Average 
(Per Cent) 
Other 
Ex- Other mem-
British bers 
West West of United 
Sub Groups UDEAOa Africab France EEC Kingdom U.S.A. World 
s 
UDAOa 3,8 2,4 0,4 6,6 50,8 14,8 2,1 8,9 100 
Ex-British 
West Africab 0,3 0,9 1,2 4,0 25,4 33,2 14,0 100 
West Africa 1,4 1,3 0,1 2,8 18,9 22,1 23,2 12,3 100 
UDAOa 
Imports 
3,9 1,0 4,9 57,6 8,3 1,9 5,2 100 
Ex-British 
West Africab 1,0 0,7 0,1 1,8 3,4 17,4 31,3 11,0 100 
West Africa 1,9 0,8 0,2 2,9 20,3 14,4 22,2 9,1 100 
Sources: Nations Unies, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D for the Years 1962-1966; 
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 (Publication des Nations 
Unies, No. de vente: 67..xvii.2); Foreign Trade Statistics of Africa: Trade by 
Commodity, Series B, 1962 et 1963; Communa~e ~conomique europ~enne, Overseas 
Associates: Foreign Trade Statistics, 1967, No. 1; Overseas Associates: 
Yearbook of General Statistics, 1967 (Paris). cf. NU: ST/ECA/109. p. 67. 
(a) UDEAO: West African Customs Union; includes Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. 
(b) Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. 
(c) Guinea, Liberia, and Togo (hardly have similar economic systems) 
t\J 
t\J 
1..0 
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TABLE 11 
West Africa: Imports (Average 1965-1966) 
Country 
Dahomey 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Ivory Coast 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
Weighted 
Average 
Percantage of Total Imports Pur-
chased from: 
West Africa Africa 
10.4 12.5 
5.0 5.8 
3.3 4.0 
2.3 8.9 
10.2 18.1 
2.4 2 .. 7 
11.5 14.0 
0.3 1.1 
4.3 10.4 
1.5 2.7 
7.4 8.7 
32.0 33.3 
3.3 5.5 
Source: UN-ECA: Foreign Trade Statistics of Africa 1965 
and 1966 (Addis Ababa, 1966 and 1967). 
TABLE 12 
Intra-West African Trade Matrix, 1g661 ($ooo) 
TO IMPORTING COUNTRIES 
FROM 
EXPORTING Mauri- Ivory Upper Sierra 
COUNTRIES tania2 Senegal2 Mali2 Coast2 Volta2 Dahomey2 Niger2 Leone Ghana Togo Nigeria Total 
Mauritania - 63 823 1 - - - - 8 - - 97 
Senegal 2643 - 11 I IO 5,320 1,336 1,471 r,s6o 470 2I9 535 I 12 12,397 
Mali _3 571 - 4023 2,882 - 2 - 3•177 4 21 7,059 
Ivory Coast 83 6,884 2,870 - 8,463 4183 I ,9413 - 571 249 553 21,957 
Upper Volta - 93 165 412 - s8s 151 3 - 3,921 83 _s 4.799 
Dahomey - 573 190 244 3 - 2983 - 3 825 23 1,6og 
Niger - I 67 353 216 47 - - I,246 II6 753 2,121 
Guinea - 27 191 3 4 - - I - - 3 62 288 
Sierra Leone - 5 82 - - - - - 6r - 137 285 
Liberia 597 2 62 175 - - - - 34 4 r68 1,040 
Ghana - 26 429 9' 4763 63 4013 190 - 1,7353 687 3,961 
Togo - 8 I 103 5 732 19' 375 179 - 26 1,355 
Nigeria - 85 5 9403 28 69ss 66ss 683 3·307 318 - 6,726 
Gambia - I343 - 57 - - - 99 - - 2 292 I 
Total 869 7,815 5,254 7,885 I3,409 3·427 s.o38 I,8I9 12,726 3.872 r,866 6g,480 
1 The table is based on import figures (c.i.f.) from U.N. E.C.A., Foreign Trade Statistics of Africa, Series C, 1966 (Addis Ababa, mimeo.) and 
Commerce exterieur des pays associes d'outre-mer (Paris), 1967. Import figures were not available for Guinea, Liberia, or Gambia. 
t Part of the trade between these countries of the West African Customs Union is not recorded as foreign trade. 
• Significant unrecorded trade flows exist. 
-·~ ,._ ___ . 
'--- ., - ,._.--. 'J 
TABLE 13 
West Africa: Trade Hatrix 1963 
(thousands of US $ and million US $) 
cO 
·r-1 
Importing ~ 
r-i ~ cO cO ~-~ rO Q) rO rO rO ·.-1 ·.-1 tJI ~+l ~ rO E ~ ·r-1 GJ ~ QJ ~ cO ~ ~ QJ ·rl ~ Ul GJ+l 0 QJ ..Q c ~ c QJ c 0 QJ Other 
Ex ~ c r-i 0 cO O..r-i ..c: tJI E ·rl QJ 0 ..Q cO tJI tJI Total African Total QJ cO :> 0 0..0 cO ·rl cO ::l ·rl QJ ·.-1 ..c: 0 ·rl countr1es ::8 U) ::8 HU ::>::> 0 z l? l? U)~ ~ l? 8 z West Africa Countries Africa ~ilorld 
thousands us $ million $ 
Hauritania 31 35 21 87 1121 1208 5.1 
Senegal 147 6320 1707 1770 1313 215 952 29 79 126 731 25 13414 10099 23513 110.5 
Mali 163 16 1658 73 91 3389 2 2 5304 387 5691 10.6 
Ivory Coast 1 3396 6919 472 1028 19 461 220 137 236 12889 16722 29611 280.3 
Upper Volta 113 7 64 l 6664 3 6852 201 7053 9. 3 rv 
Dahomey 55 147 13 546 72 40 607 157 1637 188 1825 12.8w 
Niger 197 4 810 2 1573 111 106 2803 592 3395 19.7 rv 
Gambia 109 36 145 145 8.7 
Guinea 93 177 12 2 l 1 26 151 3 3 469 8511 8980 55 
Sierra Leone l 183 2 192 18 233 5 24 568 29 687 81.0 
Liberia 10 152 10 l 31 l 58 263 86 349 81.1 
Ghana 29 349 25 1426 14 86 5 290 120 1376 711 4431 371 4802 304.8 
Togo 17 2 21 687 3 l 1228 4 1963 473 2436 18.3 
Nigeria 105 l 638 48 1506 1683 33 562 77 6375 161 11189 2093 13282 531.2 
Total West 
Africa 419 4801 7188 12550 4437 4725 526 1189 1016 1122 19642 3131 1362 62104 40873 102977 1478.5 
Other African 
Countries 30 9543 2876 7900 540 867 443 152 3737 929 677 50(.8 532 3417 36712 472432 509144 6071.5 
Total Africaa 30 9962 7677 15088 13090 5306 5168 678 4926 1945 17 99 24710 3663 4779 98816 513305 612121 7550.0 
Horld 
(million $) 30.6 156.1 34.2 169.7 37.1 33.4 22.7 11.8 65.6 8 3 . 6 131. 6 364 . 9 29.0 580.9 1750.8 5952.2 7710.0 
Source: Nations Unies, International Trade Yearbook, 1963; CEA, Bulletin de Statistique 
pour l'Afrique, No. 1 1ere partie, 1965. 
(a) Continental Africa and neighbouring islands. 
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TABLE 14 
West Africa: Share of Imports and Exports in the GDP 
Average 1963-64 - (Percentages) 
Countries Exports Imports 
Liberia a 45 40 
Gambia 34 46 
Ivory Coast 29 22 
Sierra Leone 27 28 
Mauritania 26 20 
Senegal 18 25 
Togo 16 24 
Nigeria 14 15 
Ghana 13 16 
. b Gu1nea 11 22 
Dahomey 8 19 
Niger 8 11 
Mali 4 12 
Upper Volta 4 17 
Source: Fonds Monetaire International, International 
Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.), Janvier 1968; 
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1965 
Publication des Nations Unies, No. de vente 67.XVII.2). 
UN: ST/ECA/109. 
(a) Only 1964. 
(b) 1964-65. 
TABLE 15 
UMOAa: Trade with Major Industrial Countries 
Millions of u.s. $ and % 
October 1st - September 30th 
1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 
% % % % % 
European 
Economic 
Community: 
Imports from 
UMOA 438,2 82.46 447,6 82.86 493,3 82.46 515,8 79.87 550,4 80.17 
Exports to N 
UMOA 365,7 88.38 381,1 89.61 367,9 85.68 399,5 88.96 427,7 88.70 w 
,t:. 
United Kingdom: 
Imports from 
UMOA 30,6 5.76 35,8 6.63 37,0 6.19 33,8 5.23 43,7 6.37 
Exports to 
UMOA 13,9 3.56 13,1 3.08 14,2 ' 3.31 13,0 2.89 15,9 3.30 
United States 
of America: 
Imports from 
UMOA 56,1 10.56 46,8 8.66 52,7 8.81 70,8 10.96 65,4 9.53 
Exports to 
UMOA 27,7 6.69 23,6 5.55 37,6 8.76 25,6 5.70 26,4 5.47 
Japan: 
Imports from 
UMOA 6,5 1.22 10,0 1.85 15,2 2.54 25,4 3.93 27,0 3.93 
Exports to 
UMOA 6,5 1.57 7,5 1.73 9,7 2.26 11,0 2.45 12,2 2.53 
(cont.) 
1963/64 
% 
Total: 
Imports from 
U'MOA 531,4 100 
Exports to 
UMOA 413,8 100 
Balanceb: 
(E-I} -117,6 
TABLE 15 
(cont.} 
October lst - September 30th , 
1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 
% % % 
540,2 100 598,2 100 645,8 100 
425,3 100 429,4 100 449,1 100 
-114,9 -168,8 -196,7 
1967/68 
% 
686,5 100 
482,2 100 
-204,3 
Source: Statistiques des pays industriels selon le Fonds Monetaire International 
("Direction of Trade"} et l'Office de statistiques des Communeute's 
Europeennes. 
cf. BCEAO 1968, p. 34. 
(a} UMOA: Union Monetaire Ouen Africaine, established by the Treaty of 
May 12, 1962 merges Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
Upper Volta, and Togo. 
(b) The apparently positive balance for the UMOA should' be interpreted with 
care for the value of imports, except for the U.S.A., are CAF values. 
cf. BECAO 1968, pp 33 and 34. 
rv 
w 
Ul 
TABLE 16 
West Africa: Destination of Exports, 1965 
(by percentage shares) 
Destination Sino Australia 
~ Soviet and E.E.C. U.K. E.F.T.A. u.s. Bloc Japan South Africa Other (A) Associated Overseas States of the Eur9pean Economic Community 
Dahomey 80.3 1.5 1.5 2.9 1.5 12.4 
Ivory Coast 61.2 3.4 0.9 15.6 2.1 0.9 0.1 15.8 
Mali 5.8 1.3 3.9 89.0 
Mauritania 69.0 25.0 3.4 2.6 
Niger 58.3 1.6 0.8 39.3 
Senegal 85.7 1.4 3.3 2.0 0.4 1.9 1.2 5.8 
Togo 80.3 1.9 0.4 0.7 2.2 4.5 4.1 5.9 
Upper Volta 26.9 7.5 1.5 64.1 
(B) Commonwealth Countries 
Gambia 35.2 42.9 1.1 20.8 
Ghana 27.8 20.8 3.3 15.6 18.2 2.3 1.9 10.1 
Nigeria 36.1 38.0 4.5 9.8 2.9 1.2 0.1 7.3 
Sierra Leone 21.6 66.9 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.7 
(D) Non-Associated Countries 
Guinea 16.7 4.1 29.9 23.3 0.2 25.9 
Liberia 53.7 11.0 0.8 25.4 7.8 0.6 
Source: Direction of Trade Annual, No. 4, IMF/IBRD (Washington, 1967) 
African Affairs Vol. 68, No. 270 January 1966, p. 30: David Wall: "Export 
Prospects for Africa South of the Sahara". 
1\.) 
w 
en 
TABLE 17 
Production of Some Resources 
A - Crude Petroleum Production 
Sp. Thousand metric tons 
Country Gr. 1953 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
World 657700 1053600 1122200 1217200 1305800 1409700 1510700 1641600 1760100 1923800 
Nigeria 0.85 850 2271 3328 3772 5953 13538 21000 15588 7298 
B - Phosphate Rock Production 
World 25700 40690 43600 46030 48870 56820 63190 75110 78390 84550 
Senegal 46 198 546 638 596 798 1038 1135 1276 1270 
Togo 118 197 476 759 974 1152 1139 1375 
1\.) 
C - Diamonds Production w 
.....,] 
Country Code I 1953 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
World A 20730 28400 38250 33100 36670 38000 37120 38630 39590 43490 
Ghana A 2181 3273 3213 3210 2682 2668 2273 2819 2537 2447 
Guinea A 78 1117 2 1220 42 54 72 72 72 70 111 
Ivory 
Coast A 102 119 549 284 180 200 198 183 176 187 
Liberia A2 125 3 976 1096 855 747 571 539 555 569 730 
Sierra 
Leone A 482 1909 2295 1637 1388 1463 1462 1462 1400 560 4 
1 . A: Gem and industrial diamonds. 
2 . Exports (Guinea beginning 1960) 
3. 1954. 
4. Gem diamonds only. 
TABLE 17 (cant.) 
D - Iron Ore (Fe content) Production 
Thousand metric tons 
Country 1953 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
World 158600 256600 246100 252300 266700 301100 326400 339900 337800 368100 
Guinea 199 388 271 350 279 454 378 800 . . . 
Liberia 893 2192 2139 2653 4963 8843 10985 11538 12575 13292 
Mauri ttnia) ... 198 656 841 3239 3875 4638 4846 5006 
' uroofh S1erra 
Leone 848 881 1029 1186 1147 1196 1286 1382 1259 1800 
E - Bauxite Production Thousand metric tons 
World 15280 28950 30280 32280 31690 34600 39250 41310 45390 47700 
Ghana 117 1 194 204 243 314 250 309 352 351 28 5 1\J 
Guinea 327 1378 1767 1468 1664 1678 1870 1609 1639 2118 ~ 
Sierra 
Leone 42 153 207 272 342 470 I. Exports. 
F - Gold Production Kilogrammes 
World .1 751000 1044000 1080000 1152000 1202000 1247000 1278000 1278000 1239000 1250000 
Ghana 22736 27340 25934 27641 28654 26902 23490 21287 23720 22616 
Liberia 27 32 65 68 61 57 53 135 159 100 
Nigeria 21 24 21 12 10 8 2 2 1 7 
Upper 
Volta 320 482 1237 1393 1034 1011 500 
1. Excluding U.S.S.R. and China (Mainland) 
TABLE 17 (cont.) 
G - Forestry - Natural Rubber Production 
Thousand metric tons 
Country 1953 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
World 1755 2015 2125 2155 2100 2270 2380 2435 2490 
Ivory 
Coast a 0.-1 0.2 0.4 1.6 2.8 5.5 5.8 
Liberia a 36.8 48.4 41.2 45.4 41.3 42.6 49.2 52.9 62.3 
Nigeria a 21.6 59.5 55.7 60.1 64.2 72.2 69.0 :tl.O 47.9 
Source of Tables A through G: UN: Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty-First Issue. 
New York, 1970. 
(a) Net exports. 
1968 
2645 
6.7 
59.1 
52.8 
1\.) 
w 
\.0 
Country 
World 
Africa 
Ghana 
Ivory 
Coast 
Mali 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Upper 
Volta 
TABLE 18 
Forestry: Roundwood Production 
Million cubic metres (Solid volume of roundwood without bark) 
1953 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Total Total Total Coniferous 
1668 2031 2054 993 
165.7 222.9 230.2 7 .=8 
7.9 9.7 9.8 
4.6 7.8 8.2 
1.9 2.4 2.4 
26.3 48.0 49.4 
1.8 2.2 2.2 
'2.6 3.4 3.5 
Broad- Broad-
Leaved Coniferous Leaved Coniferous 
1085 1008 1097 1024 
228.0 7.9 233.9 7.9 
7.2 8.6 
8.3 8.8 
2.5 2.5 
50.8 52.2 
2.2 2.2 
3.5 3.6 
Broad-
Leaved 
1099 
237.2 
8.7 
..... 
2.6 
53.8 
2.2 
3.7 
Source: UN: Statistical Yearbook 1969. Twenty First Issue. New York 1970. p. 134. 
1\.) 
.J:>. 
0 
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